"On this morning, I had preceded the head of the infantry column and arrived at a point some five miles from camp, when I found an unusually bad place in the road and one that would require considerable time and labor to render practicable. While halted here to await the head of the column, I received a message from General Grierson that he had encountered a portion of the enemy's cavalry. In a few minutes more I received another message from him, saying the enemy numbered some 600 and were on the Baldwyn road. That he was himself at Brice's Cross-Roads and that his position was a good one and he would hold it. He was then directed to leave 600 or 700 men at the cross-roads, to precede the infantry on its arrival, on its march towards Guntown, and with the remainder of his forces to drive the enemy toward Baldwyn and there rejoin the main body by way of the line of the railroad, as I did not intend being drawn from my main purpose. Colonel McMillen arrived at this time and I rode forward toward the cross-roads. Before proceeding far, however, I sent a staff officer back directing Colonel McMillen to move up his advance brigade as rapidly as possible without distressing his troops. When I reached the cross-roads, found nearly all the cavalry engaged and the battle growing warm, but no artillery had yet opened on either side. We had four pieces of artillery at the cross-roads, but they had not been placed in position, owing to the dense woods on all sides and the apparent impossibility of using them to advantage. Finding, however, that our troops were being hotly pressed, I ordered one section to open on the enemy's reserves. The enemy's artillery soon replied, and with great accuracy, every shell bursting over and in the immediate vicinity of our guns.
"Frequent calls were now made for re-enforcements, but until the infantry should arrive, I had none to give. Colonel Winslow, 4th Iowa Cavalry, commanding a brigade and occupying a position on the Guntown road a little in advance of the cross-roads, was especially clamorous to be relieved and permitted to carry his brigade to the rear. Fearing that Colonel Winslow might abandon his position without authority, and knowing the importance of the cross-roads to us, I directed him in case he should be overpowered, to fall back slowly toward the cross-roads, thus contracting his line and strengthening his position. I was especially anxious on this point because through some misunderstanding, that I am yet unable to explain, the cavalry had been withdrawn without my knowledge from the left, and I was compelled to occupy the line, temporarily, with my escort, consisting of about 100 of the 19th Penn. Cavalry. This handful of troops under the gallant Lieut.-Colonel Hess, behaved very handsomely and held the line until the arrival of the infantry. About half-past 1 p. m. the infantry began to arrive. Col. Hodge's brigade was the first to reach the field and was placed in position by Colonel McMillen, when the enemy was driven a little. General Grierson now requested authority to withdraw the entire cavalry as it was exhausted and well nigh out of ammunition. This I authorized as soon as sufficient infantry was in position to permit it and he was directed to reorganize his command in the rear and hold it ready to operate on the flanks. In the mean time I had ordered a section of artillery to be placed in position on a knoll near the little bridge, some three or four hundred yards in the rear, for the purpose of opposing any attempt of the enemy to turn our left. I now went to this point to see that my orders had been executed and also to give directions for the management and protection of the wagon-train. I found the section properly posted and supported by the 72nd Ohio Infantry, with two companies thrown forward as skirmishers, and the whole under the superintendence of that excellent officer, Colonel Wilkins, of the 9th Minn. While here, the head of the wagon train, which had been reported still a mile and a half in rear, arrived. It was immediately ordered into an open field near where the cavalry were reorganizing, there to be turned round and carried farther toward the rear. The pressure on the right of the line was now becoming very great and General Grierson was directed to send a portion of his cavalry to that point. At this time I received a message from Colonel Hodge that he was satisfied that the movement on the right was a feint and that the real attack was being made on the left. Another section of artillery was now placed in position a little to the rear of Colonel Wilkins, but bearing on the left of our main line, and a portion of the cavalry was thrown out as skirmishers. The cavalry which had been sent to the extreme right began now to give way, and at the same time the enemy began to appear in force in rear of the extreme left, while Colonel McMillen required re-enforcements in the centre. I now endeavored to get hold of the colored brigade which formed the guard to the train. While traversing the short distance to where the head of that brigade should be found, the main line began to give way at various points; order soon gave way to confusion and confusion to panic. I sent an aid to Col. McMillen informing him that I was unable to render him any additional assistance, and that he must do all in his power with what he had to hold his position until I could form a line to protect his retreat. On reaching the head of the supply train, Lieut.-Colonel Hess was directed to place in position in a wood the first regiment of colored troops I could find. This was done, and it is due to those troops to say here that they stood their ground well and rendered valuable aid to Colonel McMillen, who was soon after compelled to withdraw from his original line and take up new positions in rear. It was now 5 o'clock p. m. For seven hours, these gallant officers and men had held their ground against overwhelming numbers, but at last overpowered and exhausted they were compelled to abandon not only the field, but many of their gallant comrades who had fallen to the mercy of the enemy. Everywhere the army now drifted toward the rear and was soon altogether beyond control. I requested General Grierson to accompany me and to aid in checking the fleeing column and establishing a new line. By dint of entreaty and force and the aid of several officers, whom I called to my assistance, with pistols in their hands we at length succeeded in checking some 1200 or 1500 and establishing them in a line of which Colonel Wilkins, 9th Minnesota, was placed in command. About this time it was reported to me that Col. McMillen was driving the enemy. I placed but little faith in this report, yet disseminated it freely for the good effect it might produce upon the troops. In a few minutes, however, the gallant Colonel McMillen, sad and disheartened, arrived himself, and reported his lines broken and in confusion. The new line under Colonel Wilkins also gave way soon after and it was now impossible to exercise any further control. The road became crowded and jammed with troops; the wagons and artillery sinking into the deep mud became inextricable and added to the general confusion which now prevailed. No power could now check or control the panic-stricken mass as it swept toward the rear, led off by Colonel Winslow at the head of his brigade of cavalry, and who never halted until he had reached Stubbs', ten miles in rear. This was the greater pity as his brigade was nearly, if not entirely, intact, and might have offered considerable resistance to the advancing foe. About 10 o'clock p. m., I reached Stubbs' in person, where I found Colonel Winslow and his brigade. I then informed him that his was the only organized body of men I had been able to find, and directed him to add to his own every possible force he could rally, as they passed, and take charge of the rear, remaining in position until all should have passed. I also informed him that on account of the extreme darkness of the night and the wretched condition of the road, I had little hope of saving anything more than the troops, and directed him therefore to destroy all wagons and artillery which he might find blocking up the road and preventing the passage of the men. In this way about 200 wagons and 14 pieces of artillery were lost, many of the wagons being burned and the artillery spiked and otherwise mutilated; the mules and horses were brought away. By 7 o'clock a. m., of the 11th, we had reorganized at Ripley, and the army presented quite a respectable appearance, and would have been able to accomplish an orderly retreat from that point but for the unfortunate circumstances that the cartridge boxes were well nigh exhausted. At 7 o'clock the column was again put in motion on the Salem road, the cavalry in advance, followed by the infantry. The enemy pressed heavily on the rear, and there was now nothing left but to keep in motion so as to prevent the banking up of the rear, and to pass all cross-roads before the enemy could reach them, as the command was in no condition to offer determined resistance, whether attacked in the front or the rear. At 8 o'clock a. m. on the 12th, the column reached Colliersville, worn out and exhausted by the fatigues of fighting and marching for two days and two nights without rest and without eating. About noon of the same day a train arrived from Memphis, bringing some 2,000 infantry, commanded by Colonel Wolf, and supplies for my suffering men, and I determined to remain here until next day for the purpose of resting and affording protection to many who had dropped by the wayside, through fatigue and other causes. Learning, however, toward evening, that the commander at White's Station had information of a large force of the enemy approaching that place from the southeast, and knowing that my men were in no condition to offer serious resistance to an enemy presenting himself across my line of march, I informed the general commanding the district, by telegraph, that I deemed it prudent to continue my march to White's Station. Accordingly, at 9 p. m., the column marched again, and arrived at White's Station at daylight next morning. This report having already become more circumstantial than was anticipated, I have purposely omitted the details of our march from Ripley to White's Station, as they would extend it to a tiresome length, but would respectfully refer you for these to the sub-reports herewith enclosed. Casualties are as follows:
"Killed, 223, wounded, 394; missing, 1623; total, 2240. That our loss was great, is true; yet that it was not much greater is due in an eminent degree to the personal exertions of that model soldier, Col. W. L. McMillen, of the 95th Ohio Infantry, who commanded the infantry, and to the able commanders under him.
"The strength of the enemy is variously estimated by my most intelligent officers at from 15,000 to 20,000 men. A very intelligent sergeant who was captured and remained five days in the hands of the enemy, reports the number of the enemy actually engaged, to have been 12,000, and that two divisions of infantry were held in reserve. It may appear strange that so large a force of the enemy could be in our vicinity and we be ignorant of the fact, but the surprise will exist only in the minds of those who are not familiar with the difficulty, (I may even say impossibility) of acquiring reliable information in the heart of the enemy's country. Our movements and numbers are always known to the enemy, because every woman and child is one of them, but we, as everybody knows who has had any experience in this war, can only learn the movements of the enemy and his numbers by actually fighting for the information; and in that case the knowledge often comes too late.
"While I will not prolong this already extended report by recording individual acts of good conduct, and the names of many brave officers and men who deserve mention, but will respectfully refer you for these to the reports of division and brigade commanders, yet I cannot refrain from expressing my high appreciation of the valuable services rendered by that excellent and dashing officer, Col. Joseph Karge, of the 2nd New Jersey Vols., in his reconnoissance to Corinth and his subsequent management of the rear-guard, during a part of the retreat, fighting and defending the rear during one whole afternoon and throughout the entire night following.
"To the officers of my staff,—Lieut.-Col. J. C. Hess, 19th Pa. Cavalry, commanding escort, Capt. W. C. Rawolle, A. D. C. and A. A. A. G.; Capt. W. C. Belden, 2nd Iowa Cavalry, A. D. C.; Lieut. E. Caulkins 7th Indiana Cavalry, A. D. C.; Lieut. Samuel (name illegible) 19th Penn. Cavalry, A. D. C.; Lieut. Dement, A. A. Q. M.; Lieut. W. H. Stratton, 7th Ills. Cavalry, A. A. C. S.,—whose names appear in no other report, I am especially grateful, for the promptness and zeal with which my orders were executed at all times and often under trying and hazardous circumstances.
"I am, major, very respectfully your obedient servant,
S. D. STURGIS,
Maj. W. H. Morgan, A. A. G., Brig.-Gen. Commanding.
Hdqrs. Dist. West Tenn., Memphis, Tenn.
"Amid these scenes we noted the arrival of 95 more men; those who had belonged to a raid sent from Memphis, Tenn., under command of General Sturgis, and were attacked and badly defeated by the rebel General Forrest, at a place in Mississippi. General Sturgis is said to have been intoxicated during the engagement, and that just as soon as he saw things were likely to go against him, he turned away with a portion of his cavalry, and sought to save himself from capture.—'Life and Death in Rebel Prisons.'"
Notwithstanding the arrangements usually and speedily entered into by two belligerent powers for the exchange of prisoners of war, it proved a most difficult task for the Federal Government to consummate an arrangement with the confederates, and much suffering was caused among the prisoners in the hands of the latter while negotiations were in progress. The agreement entered into by the commissioners, after a long delay, did not anticipate there being any black soldiers to exchange; nor would the confederate authorities thereafter allow the terms of the cartel to apply to the blacks, because Jefferson Davis and the confederate Congress regarded it as an outrage against humanity, and the rules of civilized warfare to arm the negroes against their masters.