When Sir Eric Geddes, First Lord of the British Admiralty, visited Washington in October, 1918, he told me that we might expect a decided increase in submarine activity, a German drive at sea. In the official conferences we held, Sir Eric and his associates predicted that, notwithstanding all the efforts we were making, vastly more tonnage might be sunk in the ensuing months. The British were striving to increase ship production, and put as many war vessels as possible into commission.
The next day I telegraphed the leading shipbuilders of the country, asking them to come to Washington. Over 200 destroyers were under construction or contracted for, and rapid progress was being made on them. But I thought that, by special effort, we might rush a larger number to completion. The critical situation outlined by the British authorities was explained to the builders, and they were directed to make construction continuous—to run three shifts of eight hours each, working day, night and Sundays, and to speed up to the utmost on destroyers and all anti-submarine craft. They pledged their earnest assistance, proposing to increase forces, if labor could be secured, and to push the program already undertaken on the highest gear.
While the visit of the British mission as announced was to "discuss certain matters concerning the naval situation," and its conferences were confidential, its members in public statements made clear their belief that easy or early victory was not to be expected.
"I have made it the keynote of all my policy and all my advice to others not to be deluded with hopes of an early peace, but to prepare for an ever-receding duration of the war," said Sir Eric Geddes. "We must always be prepared for two years more, and then only shall we have the sure means of victory in our hands."
More significant still, more to the point, was the remark made by Sir Eric just before he sailed for Europe:
"A great renewed effort on Germany's part is impending. We know it, and its extent."
Before he reached England, U-boat warfare was practically ended. Within ten days the submarines were recalled to their home bases. As they were returning to Germany they sank a few ships. But these were the last few examples of German frightfulness on the seas.
What had brought about that tremendous change? It was not due to any lack of determination on the part of the German Admiralty, or the Kaiser. But they found that the big stick with which they were to strike was only a broken reed. The morale of their navy was shattered. Officers were willing enough to obey orders, but their men refused to fight.
The U-boat crews, for years the pick and pride of the service, refused to go to sea. Germany was building hundreds of submarines, they were being turned out by the score. She might soon have sent out a dozen for every one she had when ruthless warfare began. But willing crews were lacking to man them.
This was a complete reversal of previous experience. A year before U-boat duty had been the most sought-for branch of the service. Essaying long voyages in the Atlantic or the Mediterranean, cruising for weeks around the waters of England and France, their officers and men had braved many dangers, and returning were hailed by their countrymen as conquering heroes.