Our Navy at war

by Josephus Daniels

Sinkings had been made more difficult by the convoy system. Listening devices had made it more dangerous for submarines to remain in the vicinity of naval vessels. Patrol, by surface ships and aircraft, had become more efficient. Shipping was more difficult to get at and destroy. More submarines were being sunk than in the early days. But, with all these operating against them, the U-boats, even if they could not make such high scores in tonnage, had more than an even chance to reach their home bases unscathed.

Now was another danger to face, however; one that was hidden and deadly, and it had to be faced by every boat departing or returning. Some U-boats, putting out to sea from their nesting places on the German coasts, vanished utterly. No trace was left, no record of what fate befell them.

Others, badly damaged, limped back to port. Survivors told of colliding with mines hidden far below the surface, whose presence could not be guessed. No vigilance could locate or action avoid them. They might run into them anywhere within hundreds of miles. This was a terror the undersea boatmen were unwilling to face. The revolt of the U-boat crews spread to other branches of the naval service, and the entire German navy began to disintegrate.

The mutiny in the German sea forces, the demoralization of its personnel, has no parallel in naval history. This was undoubtedly due to various causes, but, in my belief, there was no one thing that had more influence in breaking the German morale, particularly in the U-boat service, than did the Northern Mine Barrage.

Stretching across the North Sea, from Norway almost to the Orkneys, this heavy barrier of powerful mines opposed any enemy vessels which attempted to make their way around the north of Scotland into the Atlantic. The Germans had only two exits from the North Sea, the one covered by this mine barrier, and, to the south, the narrow Straits of Dover, also partially mined and guarded by the famous Dover Patrol.

It was a new factor in war, this vast barrage, the most successful innovation, the biggest new naval offensive put forth after our entrance into the war. American in conception, it was also mainly American in construction. A joint British and American undertaking, as it was, four-fifths of the mines laid were of American design and manufacture, made in this country, taken across the Atlantic in American ships, and laid by American naval vessels.

Though not actually laid until the summer of 1918, this was the first big project proposed by the United States Navy after our entrance into the war. In fact, it was only nine days after war was declared that the Bureau of Ordnance presented an elaborate memorandum, outlining the proposition. But the British Admiralty, without whose consent and coöperation it could not be constructed, and Admiral Sims pronounced it "impractical" and "unfeasible." It was not until six months later that we secured the Admiralty's approval, and the great project got under way.

The first mine was laid on June 8, 1918. "The barrier began to take toll of the enemy's submarines as early as July 9, when one was disabled on the barrier and compelled to return to Germany," reported Admiral Joseph Strauss, commander of American mining operations in the North Sea. "It is not known how many submarines were sunk or disabled in the mine field. It has been placed as high as twenty-three. My own estimate, based on known sinkings, is ten, although I am inclined to think that is a modest one."

Captain Reginald R. Belknap, commander of Mine Squadron 1, says the barrage began to yield results before it was half way across. "From the nature of the case it may never be known definitely how many actually did come to grief there," he said; "but the best information gives a probable ten before the middle of October, with a final total of seventeen or more. In addition to this toll, the squadron should be given credit for two submarines lost in the field of British mines laid by the Baltimore off the Irish coast."

Eight and one-half per cent of the total number of submarines lost during the war were brought into the list of missing by the barrage, was the estimate of Admiral Ralph Earle, Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, under whose administration and leadership the mine barrage was conceived, projected and constructed. Admiral Earle reported to me: