| 1 | Troop of Horse, | numbering | 100 | officers | and | men. | |||||
| 1 | Company of Artillery, | ” | 100 | ” | ” | ” | |||||
| 3 | Independent Companies of old Troops, | each | ” | 100 | ” | ” | ” | ||||
| 2 | Companies | of the | Regiment | of | Austurias, | ” | ” | 53 | ” | ” | ” |
| 1 | Company | ” | ” | ” | Valencia, | ” | 53 | ” | ” | ” | |
| 1 | ” | ” | ” | ” | Catalonia, | ” | 53 | ” | ” | ” | |
| 2 | Companies | ” | ” | ” | Cantabria, | ” | ” | 53 | ” | ” | ” |
| 2 | ” | ” | ” | ” | Mercia, | ” | ” | 53 | ” | ” | ” |
| Armed Negroes, | 200 | ” | ” | ” | |||||||
| White Transports for labor, | 200 | ||||||||||
| 1 | Company of Militia, (strength unknown.) | ||||||||||
| Indians, (number not ascertained.) | |||||||||||
It was General Oglethorpe’s original purpose, as foreshadowed in his dispatch of the 27th of March, 1740,[86] with four hundred regular troops of his regiment, one hundred Georgians, and such additional forces as South Carolina could contribute, to advance directly upon St. Augustine, and attack, by sea and land, the town and the island in its front. Both of these, he believed, could be taken “sword in hand.” He would then summon the castle to surrender, or surprise it. Conceiving that the castle would be too small to afford convenient shelter for the two thousand one hundred men, women, and children of the town, he regarded the capitulation of the fortress as not improbable. Should it refuse to surrender, however, he proposed to shower upon it “Granado-shells from the Cohorns and Mortars, and send for the Artillery and Pioneers and the rest of the Aid promised by the Assembly;[87] also for Mortars and Bombs from Providence;” and, if the castle should not have yielded prior to the arrival of “these Aids,” he was resolved to open trenches and conduct a siege which he reckoned would be all the easier, the garrison having been weakened by the summer’s blockade.
About the time of the concentration of the Georgia and Carolina forces for combined operations against St. Augustine, that town was materially reinforced by the arrival of six Spanish half-galleys,—manned by two hundred regular troops and armed with long brass nine-pounder guns,—and two sloops loaded with provisions.
Warned by the preliminary demonstration which eventuated, as we have seen, in the capture of forts Francis de Papa and Diego, the enemy massed all detachments within the lines of St. Augustine, collected cattle from the adjacent region, and prepared for a vigorous defense.
Apprehending that he might not be able to carry the town by assault from the land side,—where its entrenchments were strong and well armed,—unless supported by a demonstration in force from the men of war approaching the town where it looks toward the sea and where it was not covered by earth-works, and being without the requisite pioneer corps and artillery train for the conduct of a regular siege, before putting his army in motion General Oglethorpe instructed the naval commanders to rendezvous off the bar of the north channel, and blockade that and the Matanzas pass to St. Augustine. Captain Warren, with two hundred sailors, was to land on Anastasia island and erect batteries for bombarding the town in front. When his land forces should come into position and be prepared for the assault, he was to notify Sir Yelverton Peyton, commanding the naval forces, and St. Augustine would thus be attacked on all sides. Shortly after the middle of May, 1740, General Oglethorpe, with a land army numbering over two thousand regulars, militia, and Indians, moved upon St. Augustine. Fort Moosa,[88] situated within two miles of that place, lay in his route. Upon his approach the garrison evacuated it and retired within the lines of the town. Having burnt the gates of this fort and caused three breaches in its walls, General Oglethorpe, on the 5th of June, made his reconnoissances of the land defenses of St. Augustine and prepared for the contemplated assault. Everything being in readiness, the signal previously agreed upon to insure the coöperation of the naval forces was given; but, to the General’s surprise and mortification, no response was returned. His forces being disposed and eager for the attack, the signal was repeated, but failed to evoke the anticipated answer. Satisfied that the town could not be carried without the assistance of the naval forces, and being ignorant of the cause of their non-action, the General reluctantly withdrew his army and placed it in camp at a convenient distance, there to remain until he could ascertain the reason of the failure on the part of the navy to coöperate in the plan which had been preconcerted. This failure was explained in this wise. Inside the bar, and at such a remove that they could not be affected by the fire of the British vessels of war,—the Flamborough, the Phœnix, the Squirrel, the Tartar, the Spence, and the Wolf,—Spanish gallies and half gallies were moored so as to effectually prevent the ascent of the barges intended for the attack, and preclude a landing of troops upon Anastasia island. The shallowness of the water was such that the men of war could not advance near enough to dislodge them. Under the circumstances therefore, Sir Yelverton Peyton found himself unable to respond to the important part assigned him in the attack.
Advised of this fact, and chagrined at the non-realization of his original plan of operations, Oglethorpe determined at once to convert his purposed assault into a siege. The ships of war lying off the bar of St. Augustine were directed to narrowly observe every avenue of approach by water, and maintain a most rigid blockade. Colonel Palmer, with ninety-five Highlanders and forty-two Indians, was left at Fort Moosa with instructions to scout the woods incessantly on the land side and intercept any cattle or supplies coming from the interior. To prevent surprise and capture, he was cautioned to change his camp each night, and keep always on the alert. He was to avoid anything like a general engagement with the enemy. Colonel Vanderdussen, with his South Carolina regiment, was ordered to take possession of a neck of land known as Point Quartel, about a mile distant from the castle, and there erect a battery. General Oglethorpe, with the men of his regiment and most of the Indians, embarked in boats and effected a landing on Anastasia island, where, having driven off a party of Spaniards there stationed as an advanced guard, he, with the assistance of the sailors from the fleet, began mounting cannon with which to bombard the town and castle.[89] Having by these dispositions completed his investment, Oglethorpe summoned the Spanish Governor to a surrender. Secure in his strong-hold, the haughty Don “sent him for answer that he would be glad to shake hands with him in his castle.” Indignant at such a response, the General opened his batteries upon the castle and also shelled the town. The fire was returned both by the fort and the half gallies in the harbor. So great was the distance, however, that although the cannonade was maintained with spirit on both sides for nearly three weeks, little damage was caused or impression produced.[90] It being evident that the reduction of the castle could not be expected from the Anastasia island batteries, Captain Warren offered to lead a night attack upon the half gallies in the harbor which were effectually preventing all ingress by boats. A council of war decided that in as much as those galleys were covered by the guns of the castle, and could not be approached by the larger vessels of the fleet, any attempt to capture them in open boats would be accompanied by too much risk. The suggestion was therefore abandoned.
Observing the besiegers uncertain in their movements, and their operations growing lax, and being sore pressed for provisions, the Spanish Governor sent out a detachment of three hundred men against Colonel Palmer. Unfortunately that officer, negligent of his instructions and apprehending no danger from the enemy, remained two or three consecutive nights at Fort Moosa. This detachment, under the command of Don Antonio Salgrado, passed quietly out of the gates of St. Augustine during the night of June 14th, and after encountering a most desperate resistance, succeeded in capturing Fort Moosa at day light, the next morning. Colonel Palmer fell early in the action. The Highlanders “fought like lions,” and “made such havoc with their broadswords as the Spaniards cannot easily forget.” This hand-to-hand conflict was won at the cost to the enemy of more than one hundred lives. Colonel Palmer, a Captain, and twenty Highlanders were killed. Twenty-seven were captured. Those who escaped made their way to Colonel Vanderdussen at Point Quartel. Thus was St. Augustine relieved from the prohibition which had hitherto estopped all intercourse with the surrounding country.
Shortly after the occurrence of this unfortunate event, the vessel which had been blockading the Matanzas river was withdrawn. Taking advantage of the opportunity thus afforded, some small vessels from Havana, with provisions and reinforcements, reached St. Augustine by that narrow channel, bringing great encouragement and relief to the garrison. This reinforcement was estimated at seven hundred men, and the supply of provisions is said to have been large. “Then,” writes Hewitt,[91] whose narrative we have followed in the main, “all prospects of starving the enemy being lost, the army began to despair of forcing the place to surrender. The Carolinean troops, enfeebled by the heat, dispirited by sickness, and fatigued by fruitless efforts, marched away in large bodies. The navy being short of provisions, and the usual season of hurricanes approaching, the commander judged it imprudent to hazard his Majesty’s ships by remaining longer on that coast. Last of all, the General himself, sick of a fever, and his regiment worn out with fatigue and rendered unfit for action by a flux, with sorrow and regret followed, and reached Frederica about the 10th of July, 1740.”
The Carolineans, under Colonel Vanderdussen, proved themselves inefficient, “turbulent, and disobedient.” They lost not a single man in action, and only fourteen deaths occurred from sickness and accident. Desertions were frequent.[92]
Upon Oglethorpe’s regiment, and the Georgia companies, devolved the brunt of the siege. On the 5th of July the artillery and stores on Anastasia island were brought off, and the men crossed over to the mainland.[93] Vanderdussen and his regiment at once commenced a disorderly retreat in the direction of the St. Johns, leaving Oglethorpe and his men within half-cannon shot of the castle. In his dispatch to the Secretary of State, dated Camp on St. Johns in Florida, July 19th, 1740, the General thus describes his last movements: “The Spaniards made a sally, with about 500 men, on me who lay on the land side. I ordered Ensign Cathcart with twenty men, supported by Major Heron and Captain Desbrisay with upwards of 100 men, to attack them; I followed with the body. We drove them into the works and pursued them to the very barriers of the covered way. After the train and provisions were embarked and safe out of the harbour, I marched with drums beating and colours flying, in the day, from my camp near the town to a camp three miles distant, where I lay that night. The next day I marched nine miles, where I encamped that night. We discovered a party of Spanish horse and Indians whom we charged, took one horseman and killed two Indians; the rest ran to the garrison. I am now encamped on St. Johns river, waiting to know what the people of Carolina would desire me farther to do for the safety of these provinces, which I think are very much exposed to the half-galleys, with a wide extended frontier hardly to be defended by a few men.”