In one of the Indian chiefs Oglethorpe found a man after his own heart. When asked by some of the retreating troops to march with them, his reply was, “No! I will not stir a foot till I see every man belonging to me marched off before me; for I have always been the first in advancing towards an enemy, and the last in retreating.”[94]

This failure to reduce St. Augustine may be fairly attributed

I; to the delay in inaugurating the movement, caused mainly, if not entirely, by the tardiness on the part of the South Carolina authorities in contributing the troops and provisions for which requisition had been made;

II; to the reinforcement of men and supplies from Havanna introduced into St. Augustine just before the English expedition set out; thereby materially repairing the inequality previously existing between the opposing forces;

III; to the injudicious movement against forts Francis de Papa and Diego, which put the Spaniards on the alert, encouraged concentration on their part, and foreshadowed an immediate demonstration in force against their stronghold; and

IV; to the inability on the part of the fleet to participate in the assault previously planned, and which was to have been vigorously undertaken so soon as General Oglethorpe with his land forces came into position before the walls of St. Augustine.

V. The subsequent destruction of Colonel Palmer’s command,—thereby enabling the enemy to communicate with and draw supplies from the interior,—the lack of heavy ordnance with which to reduce the castle from the batteries on Anastasia island,—the impossibility of bringing up the larger war vessels that they might participate in the bombardment,—the inefficiency of Colonel Vanderdussen’s command,—the impatience and disappointment of the Indian allies who anticipated early capture and liberal spoils,—hot suns, heavy dews, a debilitating climate, sickness among the troops, and the arrival of men, munitions of war, and provisions through the Matanzas river, in the end rendered quite futile every hope which at the outset had been entertained for a successful prosecution of the siege.

Great was the disappointment upon the failure of the expedition, and unjust and harsh the criticisms levelled by not a few against its brave and distinguished leader.[95] We agree with the Duke of Argyle who, in the British House of Peers, declared “One man there is, my Lords, whose natural generosity, contempt of danger, and regard for the public prompted him to obviate the designs of the Spaniards, and to attack them in their own territories; a man whom by long acquaintance I can confidently affirm to have been equal to his undertaking, and to have learned the art of war by a regular education, who yet miscarried in the design only for want of supplies necessary to a possibility of success.”

Although this attempt,—so formidable in its character when we consider the limited resources at command, and so full of daring when we contemplate the circumstances under which it was undertaken,—eventuated in disappointment, its effects were not without decided advantages to the Colonies. For two years the Spaniards remained on the defensive, and General Oglethorpe enjoyed an opportunity for strengthening his fortifications on St. Simons island, so that when the counter blow was delivered by his adversary he was in condition not only to parry it, but also to severely punish the uplifted arm.[96]