“About a quarter of an hour after the first torpedo had hit, a third torpedo fired from the submarine just before the starboard beam, hit us under the No. 5 boiler room. The time was 7.30 A. M. The ship then began to heel rapidly, and finally turned keel up remaining so for about twenty minutes before she finally sank. It is possible that the same submarine fired all three torpedoes at the Cressy.”
Of the total crews of 1,459 officers and men only 779 were saved. The survivors believed that they had seen at least three submarines, but the German official account mentions only one, the U-9, under Captain-Lieutenant Otto Weddigen whose account of this battle confirms the report of Commander Nicholson. Referring to the reports that a flotilla of German submarines had attacked the cruisers, he says:
“These reports were absolutely untrue. U-9 was the only submarine on deck.” He adds: “I reached the home port on the afternoon of the 23d and on the 24th went to Wilhelmshaven to find that news of my effort had become public. My wife, dry-eyed when I went away, met me with tears. Then I learned that my little vessel and her brave crew had won the plaudit of the Kaiser, who conferred upon each of my co-workers the Iron Cross of the second class and upon me the Iron Crosses of the first and second classes.”
Weddigen was the hero of the hour in Germany. He had with him twenty-five men. He seems to have acted with courage and skill, but it is also evident that the English staff work was to blame. Three such vessels should never have been sent out without a screen of destroyers, nor should the Hogue and the Cressy have gone to the rescue of the Aboukir. A few days after the disaster the English admiralty issued the following statement:
The sinking of the Aboukir was of course an ordinary hazard of patrolling duty. The Hogue and Cressy, however, were sunk because they proceeded to the assistance of their consort, and remained with engines stopped, endeavoring to save life, thus presenting an easy target to further submarine attacks. The natural promptings of humanity have in this case led to heavy losses, which would have been avoided by a strict adhesion to military consideration. Modern naval war is presenting us with so many new and strange situations that an error of judgment of this character is pardonable. But it has become necessary to point out for the future guidance of His Majesty’s ships that the conditions which prevail when one vessel of a squadron is injured in the mine field, or is exposed to submarine attack, are analogous to those which occur in action, and that the rule of leaving ships to their own resources is applicable, so far, at any rate, as large vessels are concerned.
On the 28th of August occurred the first important naval action of the war, the battle of Helgoland. From the 9th of August German cruisers had shown activity in the seas around Helgoland and had sunk a number of British trawlers. The English submarines, E-6 and E-8, and the light cruiser Fearless, had patrolled the seas, and on the 21st of August the Fearless had come under the enemy’s shell fire. On August 26th the submarine flotilla, under Commodore Keyes, sailed from Harwich for the Bight of Helgoland, and all the next day the Lurcher and the Firedrake, destroyers, scouted for submarines. On that same day sailed the first and third destroyer flotillas, the battle cruiser squadron, first light cruiser squadron, and the seventh cruiser squadron, having a rendezvous at this point on the morning of the 28th.
The morning was beautiful and clear, so that the submarines could be easily seen. Close to Helgoland were Commodore Keyes’ eight submarines, and his two small destroyers. Approaching rapidly from the northwest were Commodore Tyrwhitt’s two destroyer flotillas, a little to the east was Commodore Goodenough’s first light cruiser squadron. Behind this squadron were Sir David Beatty’s battle cruisers with four destroyers. To the south and west of Helgoland lay Admiral Christian’s seventh cruiser squadron.
Presently from behind Helgoland came a number of German destroyers, followed by two cruisers; and the English submarines, with the two small destroyers, fled westwards, acting as a decoy. As the Germans followed, the British destroyer flotillas on the northwest came rapidly down. At the sight of these destroyers the German destroyers fled, and the British attempted to head them off.
According to the official report the principle of the movement was to cut the German light craft from home, and engage it at leisure on the open sea.
But between the two German cruisers and English cruisers a fierce battle took place. The Arethusa was engaged with the German Ariadne, and the Fearless with the Strasburg. A shot from the Arethusa shattered the fore bridge of the Ariadne and killed the captain, and both German cruisers drew off to Helgoland.