Meanwhile the destroyers were engaged in a hot fight. They sunk the leading boat of the German flotilla and damaged a dozen more. Between nine and ten o’clock there was a lull in the fight; the submarines, with some of the destroyers, remained in the neighborhood of Helgoland, and the Germans, believing that these boats were the only hostile vessels in the neighborhood, determined to attack them.
The Mainz, the Koln, and the Strasburg came again on the scene, and opened a heavy fire on some of the boats of the first flotilla which were busy saving life. The small destroyers were driven away, but the seamen in the boats were rescued by an English submarine. The Arethusa and the Fearless, with the destroyers in their company, engaged with three enemy cruisers. The Strasburg, seriously injured, was compelled to flee. The boilers of the Mainz blew up, and she became a wreck. The Koln only remaining and carrying on the fight.
The English destroyers were much crippled, and as the battle had now lasted for five hours any moment the German great battleships might come on the scene. A wireless signal had been sent to Sir David Beatty, asking for help, and about twelve o’clock the Falmouth and the Nottingham arrived on the scene of action. By this time the first destroyer flotilla was out of action and the third flotilla and the Arethusa had their hands full with the Koln. The light cruisers were followed at 12.15 by the English battle cruisers, the Lion came first, and she alone among the battle cruisers seems to have used her guns. Her gun power beat down all opposition. The Koln made for home, but the Lion’s guns set her on fire. The luckless Ariadne hove in sight, but the terrible 13.5-inch guns sufficed for her. The battle Cruisers circled around, and in ten minutes the Koln went to the bottom.
At twenty minutes to two, Admiral Beatty turned homeward. The German cruisers Mainz, Koln, and the Ariadne had been sunk; the Strasburg was seriously damaged. One destroyer was sunk, and at least seven seriously injured. About seven hundred of the German crew perished and there were three hundred prisoners. The British force returned without the loss of a single ship. The Arethusa had been badly damaged, but was easily repaired. The casualty list was thirty-two killed and fifty-two wounded. The battle was fought on both sides with great gallantry, the chief glory belonging to the Arethusa and the Fearless who bore the brunt of the battle. The strategy and tactical skill employed were admirable, and the German admiral, Von Ingenohl, from that time on, with one exception, kept his battleships in harbor, and confined his activities to mine laying and the use of submarines.
In the first days of the war the German mine layers had been busy. By means of trawlers disguised as neutrals, mines were dropped off the north coast of Ireland, and a large mine field was laid off the eastern coast of England. One of the most important duties of the Royal Naval Reserve was the task of mine sweeping. Over seven hundred mine-sweeping vessels were constantly employed in keeping an area of 7,200 square miles clear for shipping. These ships swept 15,000 square miles monthly, and steamed over 1,100,000 miles in carrying out their duties. In spite of all these precautions many English ships were destroyed by the mines.
It would be hard to overestimate the effect of the British blockade of the German ports upon the fortunes of the war. The Germans for a long time attempted, by the use of neutral ships, to obtain the necessary supplies through Holland, Sweden, Norway and Switzerland. Millions of dollars’ worth of food and munitions ultimately reached German hands. The imports of all these nations were multiplied many times, but as the time went on the blockade grew stricter and stricter until the Germans felt the pinch. To conduct efficiently this blockade meant the use of over 3,600 vessels which were added to the auxiliary patrol service. Over 13,000 vessels were intercepted and examined by units of the British navy employed on blockade channels.
The Germans protested with great vigor against this blockade, and ultimately endeavored to counteract it by declaring unrestricted submarine warfare. In fact, Great Britain had gone too far, and vigorous protests from America followed her attempt to seize contraband goods in American vessels.
The code of maritime law, adopted in the Declaration at Paris of 1856, as well as the Declaration in London of 1909, had been framed in the interests of unmaritime nations. The British plenipotentiaries had agreed to these laws on the theory that in any war of the future Britain would be neutral. The rights of neutrals had been greatly increased. A blockade was difficult to enforce, for the right of a blockading power to capture a blockade runner did not cover the whole period of her voyage, and was confined to ships of the blockading force. A ship carrying contraband could only be condemned if the contraband formed more than half its cargo. A belligerent warship could destroy a neutral vessel without taking it into a port for a judgment. The transfer of an enemy vessel to a neutral flag was presumed to be valid, if effected more than thirty days before the outbreak of war. Belligerents in neutral vessels on the high seas were exempt from capture. The Emden could justify its sinking of British ships, but the English were handicapped in their endeavor to prevent neutral ships from carrying supplies to Germany.
But Germany had become a law unto itself. And England found it necessary in retaliation to issue orders in council which made nugatory many of the provisions of the maritime code. The protests of the American Government and those of other neutrals were treated with the greatest consideration, and every endeavor was made that no real injustice should be done. When America itself later entered the war these differences of opinion disappeared from public view.