The Turks occupied two lines of intrenchments, and had about twenty thousand men, the English about twelve thousand. General Townshend’s plan was to divide his army into three columns. The first was to attack the center of the first Turkish position. A second was directed at the left of that position, and a third was to swing widely around and come in on the rear of the Turkish force. This plan was entirely successful, but the Turkish army was not routed, and retreated fighting desperately to its second line. There it was reinforced and counter-attacked with such vigor that it drove the British back to its old first trenches. The next day the Turks were further reinforced and attacked again. The British drove them back over and over, but found themselves unable to advance. The Turks had lost enormously but the English had lost about one-third of their strength, and were compelled to fall back. They therefore returned on the 26th to Lajj, and ultimately, after continual rear guard actions, to Kut. There they found themselves surrounded, and there was nothing to do but to wait for help.
By this time the eyes of the world were upon the beleaguered British army. Help was being hurried to them from India, but Germany also was awake and Marshal von Der Goltz, who had been military instructor in the Turkish army, was sent down to take command of the Turkish forces. The town of Kut lies in the loop of the Tigris, making it almost an island. There was an intrenched line across the neck of land on the north, and the place could resist any ordinary assault. The great difficulty was one of supplies. However, as the relieving force was on the way, no great anxiety was felt. For some days there was constant bombardment, which did no great damage. On the 23d an attempt was made to carry the place by assault, but this too failed. The relieving force, however, was having its troubles. These were the days of floods, and progress was slow and at times almost impossible. Moreover, the Turks were constantly resisting.
The relief expedition was composed of thirty thousand Indian troops, two Anglo-Indian divisions, and the remnants of Townshend’s expedition, a total of about ninety thousand men. General Sir Percy Lake was in command of the entire force. The march began on January 6th. By January 8th the British had reached Sheikh Saad, where the Turks were defeated in two pitched battles. On January 22d he had arrived at Umm-el-Hanna, where the Turks had intrenched themselves.
After artillery bombardment the Turkish positions were attacked, but heavy rains had converted the ground into a sea of mud, rendering rapid movement impossible. The enemy’s fire was heavy and effective, inflicting severe losses, and though every effort was made, the assault failed.
For days the British troops bivouacked in driving rain on soaked and sodden ground. Three times they were called upon to advance over a perfectly flat country, deep in mud, and absolutely devoid of cover against well-constructed and well-planned trenches, manned by a brave and stubborn enemy, approximately their equal in numbers. They showed a spirit of endurance and self-sacrifice of which their country may well be proud.
But the repulse at Hanna did not discourage the British army. It was decided to move up the left bank of the Tigris and attack the Turkish position at the Dujailah redoubt. This meant a night march across the desert with great danger that there would be no water supply and that, unless the enemy was routed, the army would be in great danger.
General Lake says: “On the afternoon of March 7th, General Aylmer assembled his subordinate commanders and gave his final instructions, laying particular stress on the fact that the operation was designed to effect a surprise, and that to prevent the enemy forestalling us, it was essential that the first phase of the operation should be pushed through with the utmost vigor. His dispositions were, briefly, as follows: The greater part of a division under General Younghusband, assisted by naval gunboats, controlled the enemy on the left bank. The remaining troops were formed into two columns, under General Kemball and General Keary respectively, a reserve of infantry, and the cavalry brigade, being held at the Corps Commander’s own disposal. Kemball’s column covered on the outer flank by the cavalry brigade was to make a turning movement to attack the Dujailah redoubt from the south, supported by the remainder of the force, operating from a position to the east of the redoubt. The night march by this large force, which led across the enemy’s front to a position on his right flank, was a difficult operation, entailing movement over unknown ground, and requiring most careful arrangement to attain success.”
Thanks to excellent staff work and good march discipline the troops reached their allotted position apparently undiscovered by the enemy, but while Keary’s column was in position at daybreak, ready to support Kemball’s attack, the latter’s command did not reach the point selected for its deployment in the Dujailah depression until more than an hour later. This delay was highly prejudicial to the success of the operation.
When, nearly three hours later, Kemball’s troops advanced to the attack, they were strongly opposed by the enemy from trenches cleverly concealed in the brushwood, and were unable to make further ground for some time, though assisted by Keary’s attack upon the redoubt from the east. The southern attack was now reinforced, and by 1 P. M. had pushed forward to within five hundred yards of the redoubt, but concealed trenches again stopped further progress and the Turks made several counter-attacks with reinforcements which had by now arrived from the direction of Magasis.
It was about this time that the Corps Commander received from his engineer officers the unwelcome news that the water supply contained in rain-water pools and in Dujailah depression, upon which he had reckoned, was insufficient and could not be increased by digging. It was clear, therefore, that unless the Dujailah redoubt could be carried that day the scarcity of water would, of itself, compel the troops to fall back. Preparations were accordingly made for a further assault on the redoubt, and attacks were launched from the south and east under cover of a heavy bombardment.