The attacking forces succeeded in gaining a foothold in the redoubt. But here they were heavily counter-attacked by large enemy reinforcements, and being subjected to an extremely rapid and accurate shrapnel fire from concealed guns in the vicinity of Sinn After, they were forced to fall back to the position from which they started. The troops who had been under arms for some thirty hours, including a long night march, were now much exhausted, and General Aylmer considered that a renewal of the assault during the night could not be made with any prospect of success. Next morning the enemy’s position was found to be unchanged and General Aylmer, finding himself faced with the deficiency of order already referred to, decided upon the immediate withdrawal of his troops to Wadi, which was reached the same night.
For the next month the English were held in their positions by the Tigris floods. On April 4th the floods had sufficiently receded to permit of another attack upon Umm-el-Hanna, which this time was successful. On April 8th the Turkish position at Sanna-i-yat was attacked, but the English were repulsed. They then determined to make another attempt to capture the Sinn After redoubt. On April 17th the fort of Beit-Aiessa, four miles from Es Sinn, on the left bank, was captured after heavy bombardment, and held against serious counter-attacks. On the 20th and 21st the Sanna-i-yat position was bombarded and a vigorous assault was made, which met with some success. The Turks, however, delivered a strong counter-attack, and succeeded in forcing the British troops back.
General Lake says: “Persistent and repeated attempts on both banks have thus failed, and it was known that at the outside not more than six days’ supplies remained to the Kut garrison. The British troops were nearly worn out. The same troops had advanced time and again to assault positions strong by art and held by a determined enemy. For eighteen consecutive days they had done all that men could do to overcome, not only the enemy, but also exceptional climatic and physical obstacles, and this on a scale of rations which was far from being sufficient in view of the exertions they had undergone, but which the shortage of river transports, had made it impossible to augment. The need for rest was imperative.”
On April 28th the British garrison at Kut-el-Amara surrendered unconditionally, after a heroic resistance of a hundred and forty-three days. According to British figures the surrendered army was composed of 2,970 English and 6,000 Indian troops. The Turkish figures are 13,300. The Turks also captured a large amount of booty, although General Townshend destroyed most of his guns and munitions.
During the period in which Kut-el-Amara was besieged by the Turks, the British troops had suffered much. The enemy bombarded the town almost every day, but did little damage. The real foe was starvation. At first the British were confident that a relief expedition would soon reach them, and they amused themselves by cricket and hockey and fishing in the river. By early February, however, it was found necessary to reduce the rations, and a month later they were suffering from hunger. Some little help was given them by airplanes, which brought tobacco and some small quantities of supplies. Soon the horses and the mules were slaughtered and eaten. As time went on the situation grew desperate; till almost the end, however, they did not lose hope. Through the wireless they were informed about the progress of the relief expeditions and had even heard their guns in the distance. They gradually grew, however, weaker and weaker, so that on the surrender the troops in the first lines were too weak to march back with their kits.
The Turks treated the prisoners in a chivalric manner; food and tobacco was at once distributed, and all were interned in Anatolia, except General Townshend and his staff, who were taken to Constantinople. Later on it was General Townshend who was to have the honor of carrying the Turkish plea for an armistice in the closing days of the war.
The surrender of Kut created a world-wide sensation. The loss of eight thousand troops was, of course, not a serious matter, and the road to India was still barred, but the moral effect was most unfortunate. That the great British nation, whose power had been so respected in the Orient, should now be forced to yield, was a great blow to its prestige. In England, of course, there was a flood of criticism. It was very plain that a mistake had been made. A commission was appointed to inquire into the whole business. This committee reported to Parliament on June 26, 1917, and the report created a great sensation. The substance of the report was, that while the expedition was justifiable from a political point of view, it was undertaken with insufficient forces and inadequate preparation, and it sharply criticized those that were responsible.
It seems plain that the military authorities in India under-estimated their opponent. The report especially criticized General Sir John Eccles Nixon, the former commander of the British forces in Mesopotamia, who had urged the expedition, in spite of the objection of General Townshend. Others sharing the blame were the Viceroy of India, Baron Hardinge, General Sir Beauchamp Duff, Commander-in-Chief of the British forces in India, and, in England, Major-General Sir Edmund Barrow, Military Secretary of the India office, J. Austin Chamberlain, Secretary for India, and the War Committee of the Cabinet. According to the report, beside the losses incurred by the surrender more than twenty-three thousand men were lost in the relieving expedition. The general armament and equipment were declared to be not only insufficient, but not up to the standard.
In consequence of this report Mr. Chamberlain resigned as secretary for India. In the House of Commons, Mr. Balfour, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, supported Lord Hardinge, who, at the time of the report, was Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs. He declared the criticism of Baron Hardinge to be grossly unjust. After some discussion the House of Commons supported Mr. Balfour’s refusal to accept Baron Hardinge’s resignation, by a vote of 176 to 81. It seems to be agreed that the civil administration of India were not responsible for the blunders of the expedition. Ten years before, Lord Kitchener, after a bitter controversy with Lord Curzon, had made the military side of the Indian Government free of all civilian criticism and control. The blunders here were military blunders.
The English, of course, were not satisfied to leave the situation in such a condition, and at once began their plans for a new attempt to capture Bagdad. The summer campaign, however, was uneventful, though on May 18th a band of Cossacks from the Russian armies in Persia joined the British camp. A few days afterwards the British army went up the Tigris and captured the Dujailah redoubt, where they had been so badly defeated on the 8th of March. They then approached close to Kut, but the weather was unsuitable, and there was now no object in capturing the city.