Meanwhile the renewed siege of Przemysl was going on with great vigor, and attracting the general attention of the Allied world. The Austrians attempted to follow up their successes at the Dukla Pass by attempting to seize the Lupkow Pass, and the Uzzok Pass, still further to the east, but the Russians were tired of retreating. New troops had arrived, and about the 20th of December a new advance was begun.

With the right of the army swinging up along the river Nida, northeast of Cracow, the Russian left attacked the Dukla Pass in great force, driving Austrians back and capturing over ten thousand men. On Christmas Day all three great western passes were in Russian hands. The Austrian fighting, during this period, was the best they had so far shown, the brunt of it being upon the Hungarian troops, who, at this time, were saving Germany.

Meantime von Hindenburg was pursuing his movement in the direction of Warsaw. The Russian generals found it difficult to obtain information. Each day came the chronicle of contests, some victories, some defeats, and it soon appeared that a strong force was crushing in the Russian outposts from the direction of Thorn and moving toward Warsaw. Ruzsky found himself faced by a superior German force, and was compelled to retreat. The Russian aim was to fall back behind the river Bzura, which lies between the Thorn and Warsaw. Bzura is a strong line of defense, with many fords but no bridges. The Russian right wing passed by the city of Lowicz, moved southwest to Strykov and then on past Lodz. West of Lowicz is a great belt of marshes impossible for the movement of armies.

The first German objective was the city of Lodz. Von Hindenburg knew that he must move quickly before the Russians should get up reserves. His campaign of destruction had made it impossible for aid to be sent to the Russian armies from Ivanov, far in the south, but every moment counted. His right pushed forward and won the western crossings of the marshes. His extreme left moved towards Plock, but the main effort was against Piontek, where there is a famous causeway engineered for heavy transport through the marshes.

At first the Russians repelled the attack on the causeway, but on November 19th the Russians broke and were compelled to fall back. Over the causeway, then, the German troops were rushed in great numbers, splitting the Russian army into two parts; one on the south surrounding Lodz, and the other running east of Brezin on to the Vistula. The Russian army around Lodz was assailed on the front flank and rear. It looked like an overwhelming defeat for the Russian army. At the very last moment possible, Russian reinforcements appeared—a body of Siberians from the direction of Warsaw. They were thrown at once into the battle and succeeded in re-establishing the Russian line. This left about ninety thousand Germans almost entirely surrounded, as if they were in a huge sack. Ruzsky tried his best to close the mouth of the sack, but he was unsuccessful. The fighting was terrific, but by the 26th the Germans in the sack had escaped.

The Germans were continually receiving reinforcements and still largely outnumbered the Russians. Von Hindenburg therefore determined on a new assault. The German left wing was now far in front of the Russian city of Lodz, one of the most important of the Polish cities. The population was about half a million. Such a place was a constant danger, for it was the foundation of a Russian salient. When the German movement began the Russian general, perceiving how difficult it would have been to hold the city, deliberately withdrew, and on December 6th the Germans entered Lodz without opposition.

The retreat relieved the Russians of a great embarrassment. Its capture was considered in Germany as a great German victory, and at this time von Hindenburg seems to have felt that he had control of the situation. His movement, to be sure, had not interfered with the Russian advance on Cracow, but Warsaw must have seemed to him almost in his power. He therefore concentrated his forces for a blow at Warsaw. His first new movement was directed at the Russian right wing, which was then north of the Bzura River and east of Lowicz. He also directed the German forces in East Prussia to advance and attempted to cut the main railway line between Warsaw and Petrograd. If this attempt had been successful it would have been a highly serious matter for the Russians. The Russians, however, defeated it, and drove the enemy back to the East Prussian border. The movement against the Russian right wing was more successful, and the Russians fell back slowly. This was not because they were defeated in battle, but because the difficult weather interfered with communications. There had been a thaw, and the whole country was waterlogged. The Grand Duke was willing that the Germans should fight in the mud.

This slow retreat continued from the 7th of December to Christmas Eve, and involved the surrender of a number of Polish towns, but it left the Russians in a strong position. They were able to entrench themselves so that every attack of the enemy was broken. The Germans tried hard. Von Hindenburg would have liked to enter Warsaw on Christmas. The citizens heard day and night the sound of the cannon, but they were entirely safe.

The German attack was a failure. On the whole, the Grand Duke Nicholas had shown better strategy than the best of the German generals. Outnumbered from the very start, his tactics had been admirable. Twice he had saved Warsaw, and he was still threatening Cracow. The Russian armies were fighting with courage and efficiency, and were continually growing in numbers as the days went by.

During the first weeks of 1915 while there were a number of attacks and counter attacks both armies had come to the trench warfare, so familiar in France. The Germans in particular had constructed a most elaborate trench system, with underground rooms containing many of the ordinary comforts of life. Toward the end of the month the Russians began to move in East Prussia in the north and also far south in the Bukovina. The object of these movements was probably to prevent von Hindenburg from releasing forces on the west. Russia was still terribly weak in equipment and was not ready for a serious advance. An attack on sacred East Prussia would stir up the Germans, while Hungary would be likewise disturbed by the advance on Bukovina. Von Hindenburg, however, was still full of the idea of capturing Warsaw. He had failed twice but the old Field Marshal was stubborn and moreover he knew well what the capture of Warsaw would mean to Russia, and so he tried again.