The Russian front now followed the west bank of the Bzura for a few miles, changed to the eastern bank following the river until it met with the Rawka, from there a line of trenches passed south and east of Balinov and from there to Skiernievice. Von Mackensen concentrated a considerable army at Balinov and had on the 1st of February about a hundred and forty thousand men there. That night, with the usual artillery preparation, he moved from Balinov against the Russian position at the Borzymov Crest. The Germans lost heavily but drove forward into the enemy's line, and by the 3d of February had almost made a breach in it. This point, however, could be readily reinforced and troops were hurried there from Warsaw in such force that on February 4th the German advance was checked. Von Mackensen had lost heavily, and by the time it was checked he had become so weak that his forces yielded quickly to the counter-attack and were flung back.
This was the last frontal attack upon Warsaw. Von Hindenburg then determined to attack Warsaw by indirection. Austria was instructed to move forward along the whole Carpathian front, while he himself, with strong forces, undertook to move from East Prussia behind the Polish capital, and cut the communications between Warsaw and Petrograd. If Austria could succeed, Przemysl might be relieved, Lemberg recaptured, and Russia forced back so far on the south that Warsaw would have to be abandoned. On the other hand if the East Prussia effort were successful, the Polish capital would certainly fall. These plans, if they had developed successfully, would have crippled the power of Russia for at least six months. Meantime, troops could be sent to the west front, and perhaps enable Germany to overwhelm France. By this time almost all of Poland west of the Vistula was in the power of the Germans, while three-fourths of Galicia was controlled by Russia.
Von Hindenburg now returned to his old battle-ground near the Masurian Lakes. The Russian forces, which, at the end of January, had made a forward movement in East Prussia, had been quite successful. Their right was close upon Tilsit, and their left rested upon the town of Johannisburg. Further south was the Russian army of the Narev. Von Hindenburg determined to surprise the invaders, and he gathered an army of about three hundred thousand men to face the Russian forces which did not number more than a hundred and twenty thousand, and which were under the command of General Baron Sievers. The Russian army soon found itself in a desperate position. A series of bitter fights ensued, at some of which the Kaiser himself was present. The Russians were driven steadily back for a week, but the German stories of their tremendous losses are obviously unfounded. They retreated steadily until February 20th, fighting courageously, and by that date the Germans began to find themselves exhausted.
Russian reinforcements came up, and a counter-attack was begun. The German aim had evidently been to reach Grodno and cut the main line from Warsaw to Petrograd, which passes through that city. They had now reached Suwalki, a little north of Grodno, but were unable to advance further, though the Warsaw-Petrograd railway was barely ten miles away. The southern portion of von Hindenburg's army was moving against the railway further west, in the direction of Ossowietz. But Ossowietz put up a determined resistance, and the attack was unsuccessful. By the beginning of March, von Hindenburg ordered a gradual retreat to the East Prussian frontier.
While this movement to drive the Russians from East Prussia was under way, von Hindenburg had also launched an attack against the Russian army on the Narev. If he could force the lower Narev from that point, too, he could cut the railroad running east from the Polish capital. He had hoped that the attacks just described further east would distract the Russian attention so that he would find the Narev ill guarded. The advance began on February 22d, and after numerous battles captured Przasnysz, and found itself with only one division to oppose its progress to the railroad. On the 23d this force was attacked by the German right, but resisted with the utmost courage. It held out for more than thirty-six hours, until, on the evening of the 24th, Russian reinforcements began to come up, and drove the invaders north through Przasnysz in retreat.
It was an extraordinary fight. The Russians were unable to supply all their troops with munitions and arms. At Przasnysz men fought without rifles, armed only with a bayonet. All they could do was to charge with cold steel, and they did it so desperately that, though they were outnumbered, they drove the Germans before them. By all the laws of war the Russians should have been defeated with ease. As it was, the German attempt to capture Warsaw by a flank movement was defeated. While the struggle was going on in the north, the Austrian armies in Galicia were also moving, Russia was still holding the three great passes in the Carpathian Mountains, but had not been able to begin an offensive in Hungary.
The Austrians had been largely reinforced by German troops, and were moving forward to the relief of Przemysl, and also to drive Brussilov from the Galician mountains. Brussilov's movements had been partly military and partly political. From the passes in those mountains Hungary could be attacked, and unless he could be driven away there was no security for the Hungarian cornfields, to which Germany was looking for food supplies. Moreover, from the beginning of the Russian movement in Galicia, northern Bukovina had been in Russian hands. Bukovina was not only a great supply ground for petrol and grain, but she adjoined Roumania which, while still neutral, had a strong sympathy with the Allies, especially Italy. The presence of a Russian army on her border might encourage her to join the Allies. Austria naturally desired to free Roumania from this pressure. The leading Austrian statesmen, at this time, were especially interested in Hungary. The Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs was Baron Stephen Burian, the Hungarian diplomatist, belonging to the party of the Hungarian Premier, Count Tisza. It was his own country that was threatened. The prizes of a victorious campaign were therefore great.
The campaign began in January amid the deepest snow, and continued during February in the midst of blizzards. The Austrians were divided into three separate armies. The first was charged with the relief of Przemysl. The second advanced in the direction of Lemberg, and the third moved upon Bukovina. The first made very little progress, after a number of lively battles. It was held pretty safely by Brussilov. The second army was checked by Dmitrieff. Further east, however, the army of the Bukovina crossed the Carpathian range, and made considerable advances. This campaign was fought out in a great number of battles, the most serious of which, perhaps, was the battle of Koziowa. At that point Brussilov's center withstood for several days the Austrian second army which was commanded by the German General von Linsengen. The Russian success here saved Lemberg, prevented the relief of Przemysl and gave time to send reinforcements into Bukovina.
The Austrian third army, moving on Bukovina, had the greatest Austrian success. They captured in succession Czernowitz, Kolomea, and Stanislau. They did not succeed, however, in driving the Russians from the province. The Russians retired slowly, waiting for reinforcements. These reinforcements came, whereupon the Austrians were pushed steadily back. The passes in the Carpathians still remained in Austrian hands, but Przemysl was not relieved or Lemberg recaptured. On March 22d Przemysl fell.
The capture of Przemysl was the greatest success that Russia had so far attained. It had been besieged for about four months, and the taking of the fortress was hailed as the first spectacular success of the war. Its capture altered the whole situation. It released a large Russian army, which was sent to reinforce the armies of Ivanov, where the Austrians were vigorously attacked.