Thanks to excellent staff work and good march discipline the troops reached their allotted position apparently undiscovered by the enemy, but while Keary's column was in position at daybreak, ready to support Kemball's attack, the latter's command did not reach the point selected for its deployment in the Dujailah depression until more than an hour later. This delay was highly prejudicial to the success of the operation.
When, nearly three hours later, Kemball's troops advanced to the attack, they were strongly opposed by the enemy from trenches cleverly concealed in the brushwood, and were unable to make further ground for some time, though assisted by Keary's attack upon the redoubt from the east. The southern attack was now reinforced, and by 1 P.M. had pushed forward to within five hundred yards of the redoubt, but concealed trenches again stopped further progress and the Turks made several counter-attacks with reinforcements which had by now arrived from the direction of Magasis.
It was about this time that the Corps Commander received from his engineer officers the unwelcome news that the water supply contained in rain-water pools and in Dujailah depression, upon which he had reckoned, was insufficient and could not be increased by digging. It was clear, therefore, that unless the Dujailah redoubt could be carried that day the scarcity of water would, of itself, compel the troops to fall back. Preparations were accordingly made for a further assault on the redoubt, and attacks were launched from the south and east under cover of a heavy bombardment.
The attacking forces succeeded in gaining a foothold in the redoubt. But here they were heavily counter-attacked by large enemy reinforcements, and being subjected to an extremely rapid and accurate shrapnel fire from concealed guns in the vicinity of Sinn After, they were forced to fall back to the position from which they started. The troops who had been under arms for some thirty hours, including a long night march, were now much exhausted, and General Aylmer considered that a renewal of the assault during the night could not be made with any prospect of success. Next morning the enemy's position was found to be unchanged and General Aylmer, finding himself faced with the deficiency of order already referred to, decided upon the immediate withdrawal of his troops to Wadi, which was reached the same night.
For the next month the English were held in their positions by the Tigris floods. On April 4th the floods had sufficiently receded to permit of another attack upon Umm-el-Hanna, which this time was successful. On April 8th the Turkish position at Sanna-i-yat was attacked, but the English were repulsed. They then determined to make another attempt to capture the Sinn After redoubt. On April 17th the fort of Beit-Aiessa, four miles from Es Sinn, on the left bank, was captured after heavy bombardment, and held against serious counter-attacks. On the 20th and 21st the Sanna-i-yat position was bombarded and a vigorous assault was made, which met with some success. The Turks, however, delivered a strong counter-attack, and succeeded in forcing the British troops back.
General Lake says: "Persistent and repeated attempts on both banks have thus failed, and it was known that at the outside not more than six days' supplies remained to the Kut garrison. The British troops were nearly worn out. The same troops had advanced time and again to assault positions strong by art and held by a determined enemy. For eighteen consecutive days they had done all that men could do to overcome, not only the enemy, but also exceptional climatic and physical obstacles, and this on a scale of rations which was far from being sufficient in view of the exertions they had undergone but which the shortage of river transports, had made it impossible to augment. The need for rest was imperative."
On April 28th the British garrison at Kut-el-Amara surrendered unconditionally, after a heroic resistance of a hundred and forty-three days. According to British figures the surrendered army was composed of 2,970 English and 6,000 Indian troops. The Turkish figures are 13,300. The Turks also captured a large amount of booty, although General Townshend destroyed most of his guns and munitions.
During the period in which Kut-el-Amara was besieged by the Turks, the British troops had suffered much. The enemy bombarded the town almost every day, but did little damage. The real foe was starvation. At first the British were confident that a relief expedition would soon reach them, and they amused themselves by cricket and hockey and fishing in the river. By early February, however, it was found necessary to reduce the rations, and a month later they were suffering from hunger. Some little help was given them by airplanes, which brought tobacco and some small quantities of supplies. Soon the horses and the mules were slaughtered and eaten. As time went on the situation grew desperate; till almost the end, however, they did not lose hope. Through the wireless they were informed about the progress of the relief expeditions and had even heard their guns in the distance. They gradually grew, however, weaker and weaker, so that on the surrender the troops in the first lines were too weak to march back with their kits.
The Turks treated the prisoners in a chivalric manner; food and tobacco was at once distributed, and all were interned in Anatolia, except General Townshend and his staff, who were taken to Constantinople. Later on it was General Townshend who was to have the honor of carrying the Turkish plea for an armistice in the closing days of the war.
The surrender of Kut created a world-wide sensation. The loss of eight thousand troops was, of course, not a serious matter, and the road to India was still barred, but the moral effect was most unfortunate. That the great British nation, whose power had been so respected in the Orient, should now be forced to yield, was a great blow to its prestige. In England, of course, there was a flood of criticism. It was very plain that a mistake had been made. A commission was appointed to inquire into the whole business. This committee reported to Parliament on June 26, 1917, and the report created a great sensation. The substance of the report was, that while the expedition was justifiable from a political point of view, it was undertaken with insufficient forces and inadequate preparation, and it sharply criticized those that were responsible.