It seems plain that the military authorities in India under-estimated their opponent. The report especially criticized General Sir John Eccles Nixon, the former commander of the British forces in Mesopotamia, who had urged the expedition, in spite of the objection of General Townshend. Others sharing the blame were the Viceroy of India, Baron Hardinge, General Sir Beauchamp Duff, Commander-in-Chief of the British forces in India, and, in England, Major-General Sir Edmund Barrow, Military Secretary of the India office, J. Austen Chamberlain, Secretary for India, and the War Committee of the Cabinet. According to the report, beside the losses incurred by the surrender more than twenty-three thousand men were lost in the relieving expedition. The general armament and equipment were declared to be not only insufficient, but not up to the standard.
In consequence of this report Mr. Chamberlain resigned as secretary for India. In the House of Commons, Mr. Balfour, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, supported Lord Hardinge, who, at the time of the report, was Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs. He declared the criticism of Baron Hardinge to be grossly unjust. After some discussion the House of Commons supported Mr. Balfour's refusal to accept Baron Hardinge's resignation, by a vote of 176 to 81. It seems to be agreed that the civil administration of India were not responsible for the blunders of the expedition. Ten years before, Lord Kitchener, after a bitter controversy with Lord Curzon, had made the military side of the Indian Government free of all civilian criticism and control. The blunders here were military blunders.
The English, of course, were not satisfied to leave the situation in such a condition, and at once began their plans for a new attempt to capture Bagdad. The summer campaign, however, was uneventful, though on May 18th a band of Cossacks from the Russian armies in Persia joined the British camp. A few days afterwards the British army went up the Tigris and captured the Dujailah redoubt, where they had been so badly defeated on the 8th of March. They then approached close to Kut, but the weather was unsuitable, and there was now no object in capturing the city.
In August Sir Percy Lake was succeeded by Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick Stanley Maude, who carefully and thoroughly proceeded to prepare for an expedition which should capture Bagdad. A dispatch from General Maude dated July 10, 1917, gives a full account of this expedition. It was thoroughly successful. This time with a sufficient army and a thorough equipment the British found no difficulties, and on February 26th they captured Kut-el-Amara, not after a hard-fought battle, but as the result of a successful series of small engagements. The Turks kept up a steady resistance, but the British blood was up. They were remembering General Townshend's surrender, and the Turks were driven before them in great confusion.
The capture of Kut, however, was not an object in itself, and the British pushed steadily on up the Tigris. The Turks occasionally made a stand, but without effect. On the 28th of February the English had arrived at Azizie, half way to Bagdad, where a halt was made. On the 5th of March the advance was renewed. The Ctesiphon position, which had defied General Townshend, was found to be strongly intrenched, but empty. On March 7th the enemy made a stand on the River Diala, which enters the Tigris eight miles below Bagdad. Some lively fighting followed, the enemy resisting four attempts to cross the Diala. However, on March 10th the British forces crossed, and were now close to Bagdad. The enemy suddenly retired and the British troops found that their main opponent was a dust storm. The enemy retired beyond Bagdad, and on March 11th the city was occupied by the English.
The fall of Bagdad was an important event. It cheered the Allies, and proved, especially to the Oriental world, the power of the British army. Those who originally planned its capture had been right, but those who were to carry out the plan had not done their duty. Under General Maude it was a comparatively simple operation, though full of admirable details, and it produced all the good effects expected. The British, of course, did not stop at Bagdad. The city itself is not of strategic importance. The surrounding towns were occupied and an endeavor was made to conciliate the inhabitants. The real object of the expedition was attained.
CHAPTER XXV
CANADA'S PART IN THE GREAT WAR
By COL. GEO. G. NASMITH, C. M. G., TORONTO
When, in August,1914, war burst suddenly upon a peaceful world like distant thunder in a cloudless summer sky, Canada, like the rest of the British Empire, was profoundly startled. She had been a peace-loving, non-military nation, satisfied to develop her great natural resources, and live in harmony with her neighbors; taking little interest in European affairs, Canadians, in fact, were a typical colonial people, with little knowledge even of the strength of the ties that linked them to the British Empire.