He inherits from his Teuton ancestor a quiet and patient nature, coupled with a strong frame, which makes him less liable to be affected by troubles and loss of spirit under the continued strains which are inseparable from the campaign, while the Huguenot blood which flows through his veins continually gives him fresh power and energy, which is much in his favour in a final attack; further he is filled with an unlimited faith in his God and the assurance of the righteousness of his cause, which fills him with superhuman strength and lion-like courage.
Open-air life has given him a clearness of sight, and perseverance which is probably without equal in the world's history, while his monotonous life is the cause that he, though a lower member of the force, can act independently. By lack of discipline and organisation, his movements are sometimes clumsy, which, however, tends to his benefit in an uneven field, and taken altogether are little to his detriment, as he is not bound by special rules respecting formation or otherwise. In contrast, the British troops are (notwithstanding there may be many brave soldiers found among them) on account of their organisation and equipment, &c., little adapted to keep up their heads against the mental and bodily strain of a continued and wearisome war.
They are mostly obtained out of cities and towns, which leaves much to be wished for in their clearness of sight, steadiness of arm, and power of self-reliance, while the discipline, organisation, rules and directions to which they must hold weaken them more, so that they are merely tools, standing under their officers' commands, of a fighting machine. The officers in many instances are young and without experience, and mentally and bodily unfit to fulfil their serious and responsible duties, chosen to be officers not for their ability, or natural talent, but because they are sons of the noble, or of the respected of the land.
It is, however, not intended here, by any means, to throw the blame on the valour of the officers or men.
When the nature of both armies is considered, one comes to the conclusion that the British troops all gain an advantage in an attack on equal ground, if a strong force is used in it, while the Boers will obtain one in case there are fewer attackers brought into the field. The English will benefit by defending, especially if time be given them to build defences, and also where towns and camps must be held.
Over hilly and uneven ground the Boer has by far the best chance to attack, while in an eventual defence he has everything in his favour, and is practically not to be got at.
The British authorities have apparently too much trust in the result of their Artillery. It is plain that they cherish the idea that it will have a demoralising effect on the Boers, and therein they have fortunately been mistaken. They did not calculate that the effect could not be so great on scattered troops, and that the result cannot be equal to the expenditure and difficulties of transport. On the other hand, the Artillery of the Boers necessarily has a powerful result on troops which, like the British, are formed in close order, notwithstanding, according to the ideas of the writer of this, enough use is not made of "black gunpowder" with a view to find the distances by trial shots with that powder, to be afterwards followed by burstable shells with "time fuse" to produce great destruction.
As the ground is mostly soft, shells which burst on impact, so-called percussion shells, cannot mostly be used with favourable results, except under special circumstances. To bombard camps or towns "cordite" or "melanite" should not be used, as both explosives contain no inflammable properties, which are so necessary to set houses, waggons, forage, &c., on fire.
The greatest care should be taken that the mounted Boers should not be exposed in the open plain to the attacks of the enemy's cavalry, unless they are protected by quick-firing Maxim-Vickers guns and shells, seeing that the British Cavalry have a great advantage at short distances in the use of lances, swords and pistols.
It is highly desirable that the Boer commandos should not be accompanied by many commissariat waggons laden with provision, tents and other things, as they tend to hinder them, and prevent their executing quick movements.