In calculating the chances in this war, it has always been considered that the Boers have their greatest advantage in being independent of commissariat transport, and although provision must be made to be in touch with certain points with the necessary provision for the commissariat, these, notwithstanding, must be viewed as items wherewith, considering the great interests at stake, too much care is not needed to be taken.
On this ground the British troops are far ahead of the Boers, on account of their proper organisation, and it is indeed to be regretted that a like department has not been established, especially as the Boers would be specially fitted for it, and have up to this time made so little use of their talent in this direction. Herein a serious instance is brought as an example, namely, the fact that the English troops could retreat in order from Dundee, without its being directly known. Also the disaster at Elandslaagte must be ascribed thereto, where small isolated troops, consisting of a mixed commando, were surrounded in positions not advantageous to their mode of warfare, and, even had our troops at that place been in a defensible position, they were "not in touch" with other troops, who could hasten to their assistance.
As to plans which are reckoned to be the best to obtain the victory for the Republican arms, it is an axiom that the deeper one penetrates into an enemy's country, the more one's power is weakened by the necessity for keeping up communication, but there is an exception to every rule, and this war at the present time makes the exception. The Boer forces strengthened their resources, instead of weakening them, by their invasion of Natal and of the Cape Colony. A great proportion of the inhabitants of these Colonies are friendly, and they will thus always keep communication open, even when they take no active part in warlike operations. Taking this as granted, the conclusion is arrived at that the whole design of the Republican commanders should be to push their troops as far as possible, until they reach a war basis or boundary line.
Our Governments employ too many troops for Bechuanaland and Rhodesia without obtaining benefit therefrom. A picked commando of 1,000 men would possibly be sufficient to keep control over Mashonaland, while 1,500 at Mafeking would suffice to cut off the Bulawayo division, and in that case the troops which are now occupied about Mafeking and Kimberley could be better employed and with likelihood of good results, by being pushed South. If a sufficient number of men are left behind to dispute an eventual sortie from Kimberley and Mafeking, there is little benefit obtainable in the investment of towns which probably can hold out six or eight months. As long as they are well watched they cannot do much harm.
Much more could have been gained in Natal immediately after the Imperial troops were surrounded at Ladysmith, by sending a strong commando at once to the "Town Hill" at Pietermaritzburg, and if that commando was not strong enough to offer resistance, on retirement it could have broken up the railway, and thereby the siege of Ladysmith, which is now being prosecuted, would have been a shorter and less troublesome task.
It appears that the Boer forces have not directed their attention to making a series of attacks in the night. For such a purpose their troops are specially adapted, and the result on the enemy would certainly be terrible, as the loss of sleep would weary them bodily as well as mentally. A certain number of men could be picked to trouble the enemy every night; for instance, 500 men at Ladysmith, 100 at Mafeking, and 250 at Kimberley, without doing that injury to the Republican troops which would tend to weaken the command of British officers, and make the men grumble and dissatisfied, even if the number in killed and wounded was not especially great. There should also be, when British troops are marching, a division of picked sharpshooters to be used in attacking them on the flanks, without much damage to the Republican troops, while doing much damage to the enemy. The killing of a mule or ox belonging to a waggon or gun necessitates delay and inconvenience.
Under ordinary circumstances, this war will necessarily continue some time, possibly even over a year, and seeing that there is such a number of burghers commandeered, it would be well if the authorities could arrange a plan to relieve them, say, for instance, ten in each month per hundred. Some men of every commando will be desirous to visit their relations in case of sickness, or to rest, or to attend to private matters. When not relieved it may be that the men may become listless and dissatisfied; while the force will not be appreciably weakened by the absence of 10 per cent., such a rule would be pleasing to the burghers, and in every sense satisfying to their officers.