The number of troops left with Taylor for defence against an enemy who was not expected to advance was about 800 regulars and 6–7000 well seasoned and respectably trained volunteers ([169]Taylor to Crittenden, March 25, 1847) besides several regiments of new volunteers—say 2400–2800 men—who were expected to arrive soon; while Scott had less than 13,000 to face (with all the disadvantages of debarking) the garrisons of Vera Cruz and Ulúa, the army that Santa Anna was believed to be leading against him, and all such reinforcements as the Mexican government could raise when threatened at the vital point. Moreover Scott’s new volunteers were to land with practically no training whatever, and could hardly be counted on for the initial fighting. Taylor said that for a blow at the capital 25,000 men (10,000 of them regulars) would be required (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 353). As Scott pointed out, Taylor now had really nothing to do except defend Texas (Memoirs, ii, 409) and, should it be practicable, aid Scott’s offensive by threatening to advance. Scott took Robert E. Lee from Taylor’s army.
On receiving Scott’s orders of Jan. 3 Taylor replied in a style corresponding to his state of mind (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 863). Scott answered: “There are some expressions in those letters [of Jan. 15] which, as I shall wish to forget them, I shall not specify or recall” (ibid., 864); and to Marcy Scott wrote privately: “However, he [Taylor] is still the same excellent man” ([256]Jan. 23). In his correspondence on this subject Taylor appeared to regard the troops placed under his command as his personal property. The battle of Buena Vista has commonly been cited as the cause of Taylor’s election, but it was the idea that he had been deliberately exposed to the Mexicans which gave that victory its remarkable political effect ([210]Simms to Hammond, Jan. 15, 1847; So. Qtrly. Review, Jan., 1851, p. 37). It may be observed further that for the government to sacrifice him, his army and all the public property in northern Mexico, and give Santa Anna an opportunity to ravage Texas would have been to commit suicide. The idea was unreasonable.
[28.] Scott, who was a great soldier but not a great lawyer, had the imprudence to attack Marcy, a master of fence, in regard to the supply of vessels, and he fared rather badly. Marcy’s defence was, however, by no means wholly sound. He himself called it privately a “special plea” ([256]to Wetmore, Apr. 11, 1848). For example, Dec. 15, 1846, he notified Scott (and also Jesup, who had gone to the front) that he was ordering ten transports in ballast to the Brazos, but later, on receiving a letter dated Jan. 27 from Jesup (then at the Brazos) which over-confidently stated that all needed vessels could be chartered there, he countermanded the order; and this looks like a satisfactory defence against Scott’s complaint that none of the ten transports specified by him in his requisition appeared. But Marcy neglected to inform Jesup or Scott that the order had been countermanded, and, as Jesup’s letter could not have reached Washington before about Jan. 7, Jesup naturally assumed that the ten transports had got under way. Indeed, Jan. 23 the adjutant general wrote what Scott understood to mean that the latter might soon expect ten ships in ballast (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 897). Therefore Jesup and Scott counted upon them (ibid., 896), and naturally did not exert themselves to obtain shipping (when disappointed about vessels already engaged) as otherwise they doubtless would have done. (See Scott, Marcy, Jesup, Hetzel in Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 894, 1218, 1227, 1253.) Besides, it was found necessary to send a number of the Brazos vessels to Tampico for the troops of Patterson, Twiggs and Quitman. Jesup (supra) charged Scott with causing delay by changing the assignation of certain regiments; but Scott certainly did not desire to waste time, and it is only fair to suppose that he made the changes for adequate reasons. Jesup complained that many of his officers were inefficient, and Marcy with well feigned naïveté replied that their names had been presented to Polk [by politicians] with “the highest testimonials.”
[29.] Harney soon disobeyed Scott’s positive orders at Medellín bridge (chap. xxii, [note 25]), and his biographer admits that he might justly have been shot (Reavis, Harney, 186). Scott, however, merely refrained from reporting the affair, whereupon Harney complained that he had been unjustly ignored. One of the best reasons for studying the Mexican war is to observe how political considerations interfered with military affairs. The Harney episode was enough to justify Scott’s apprehensions of a fire from the rear, but it was not the only instance of executive meddling ([213]Hatch to sister, Feb. 11, 1847). Another incident also, which occurred at this time, illustrates his magnanimity and good sense. Lieut. Col. Ethan Allen Hitchcock, a man of notable talents and attainments and formerly instructor in tactics at West Point, was admirably qualified to act as inspector general, and Scott gave him the post although Hitchcock had repeatedly opposed him, and was personally unfriendly to him. Experience soon made Hitchcock one of Scott’s firmest admirers and partisans (Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 234–6).
[30.] Scott’s operations, Jan. 8-Feb. 15. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 844, 855–6, 866, 875, 880, 882, 890–1, 893, 896, 1218, 1273 (Scott); 874, 1227 (Marcy); 568, 571, 1253 (Jesup); 884, 894 (Hetzel); 868, 870, 887–9, 893, 1164–6 (H. L. Scott); 867, 869, 888 (Harney); 860–1, 870 (Worth); 858–9 (Butler). Niles, Feb. 13, p. 369; Feb. 27, p. 401. [63]Marcy to qtrmr. officer, Dec. 11, 15, 1846. Lawton, Artillery Officer, 42–3. [358]Williams to father, Jan. 17. Ballentine, English Soldier, i, 257. Picayune, Feb. 3; Mar. 12. [180]Pillow to wife, Feb. 14. [65]Scott, gen. orders. 8, 11. Polk, Diary, Dec. 14, 1846; Feb. 20, 1847. Reavis, Harney, 186. Grant, Mems., i, 123–4. [61]Worth to adj. gen., Feb. 17. Meade, Letters, i, 176. [60]Scott to Marcy, April 5, 1847. [256]Id. to Id., Jan. 23, 1847, private. Amer. Flag, Matamoros, Feb. 17. Oswandel, Notes, 48. [62]Stanton, Nov. 29; Dec. 7, 13, 20, 1846; Jan. 5; Feb. 16, 1847; Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 91 (Hitchcock). [322]Smith, diary. [364]Worth to S., Feb. 17; to wife, Feb. 18. Smith, To Mexico, 84–103 (Worth’s march from Saltillo).
[31.] An American estimate was 130 miles. This is partially explained perhaps by the fact that the pioneers made some “short cuts” (mule paths) available. Meade (Letters, i, 159) even cut the distance to about 100 miles, but this appears to have been little more than a guess. By the railroad the distance is about 141 miles.
[32.] From Victoria to Tampico. [146]Caswell, diary. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1097 (Taylor); 879 (Patterson). Diccionario Universal (Itinerario). [303]Orders 3, Jan. 12. Robertson, Remins., 199–207. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 181. U. S. Engineer School, Occasional Papers, no. 16 (G. W. Smith). Ho. 13; 31, 2 (Id.). Prieto, Tamaulipas, 229. [332]Tennery, diary. [273]Mullan, diary. Lawton, Artillery Officer, 27. [322]Smith, diary. [169]Taylor to Crittenden, Jan. 26. [69]Colección de Itinerarios. [307]Roberts, diary. Meade, Letters, i, 174–5. Defensor de Tamaul., Jan. 18. [76]Cos, Feb. 1. [218]Henshaw narrative. [139]W. B. Campbell to wife, Jan. 25. Furber, Twelve Months Vol., 342–93.
[33.] The author’s opinion of Pillow is based upon his letters to his wife, Polk, Scott, Duncan and others, the Trist papers, the Campbell papers, the records of two courts of inquiry regarding his conduct, and a large number of additional documents, most of which will be cited later, particularly in chaps. xxvi and xxix. An army correspondent of W. T. (later Gen.) Sherman described Pillow, Feb. 26, 1848, as “a mass of vanity, conceit, ignorance, ambition and want of truth.” There was good warrant for this characterization, but one should add plausibility, cunning, energy and a genial disposition. For his personal appearance: Semmes, Service, 165.
[34.] Scott had not yet heard from Washington regarding Harney.
[35.] At Tampico. [332]Tennery, diary. [273]Mullan, diary. Lawton, Artillery Officer, 10–64. [146]Caswell, diary. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 896, 899, 900, 1169 (Scott); 901 (Totten); 850 (Clarke); 896 (Hetzel). Robertson, Remins., 207–13. Bishop, Journal. [180]Pillow to wife, Dec. 8, 1846; Feb. 23, 1847. [111]Beauregard to Totten, Jan. 9, 14; to Gates, Feb. 24. Kenly, Md. Vol., 241–5. [330]J. T. Taylor to Scott, Feb. 12. [280]Nunelee, diary. Apuntes, 88. Meade, Letters, i, 177, 184–5. [218]Henshaw narrative, Feb. 20. [254]McClellan, diary. [303]Shields to Quitman, Mar. 4. [159]Collins, diary, Feb. 19, 25. Davis, Autobiog., 121–3. [65]Scott, gen. orders 21, Feb. 19. [76]Cos, Feb. 19. [76]Anon. letters to Garay, Jan. 25, 28, etc. [139]Campbell to wife, Feb. 3, 7, 16. Mason, Lee, 37. Furber, Twelve Months Vol., 394–415. Works defending the two land approaches to Tampico were now ready, and Col. Gates of the Third Artillery with a company of artillery, the Md. and D. C. battalion and the new Louisiana regiment—about 1200 men in all—were detached as a garrison. Rumors came that Taylor was in danger, but the air was full of rumors about the enemy, and Scott had ample ground for disregarding these, though criticised for doing so. Von Moltke said (Franco-German War, 71): “It would have been unjustifiable to entirely change the line of march on the ground of rumors that might, after all, prove unfounded.” Feb. 19 Scott announced his staff appointments. The possession of Tampico was extremely useful to him. Fresh provisions abounded there, and the embarking of about 5000 men on the dangerous coast at the Brazos was avoided.