[36.] The Louisiana men went from Lobos Islands to Tampico. Col. De Russey and the other part of the regiment were wrecked about Feb. 6 on the coast nearly opposite those islands, but after some hardships and considerable danger of being captured by Gen. Cos, commanding at Tuxpán about forty miles distant, they made their way to Tampico, meeting en route an expedition sent to rescue them (Meade, Letters, i, 179; Lawton, Artillery Officer, 32–5; [270]Moore, diary; [76]F. de Garay, Mar. 5).
[37.] To Lobos Islands. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1256 (Hetzel); 1259 (Babbitt); 878 (Conner); 568 (Jesup); 840, 841, 846, 880, 891, 896 (Scott). [65]Scott, gen. orders 1, 6, 8, Jan. 15, 30, 30. Lawton, Artillery Officer, 23, 65. [61]Brooke to Munroe, Jan. 11; to Scott, Jan. 9, 21. [62]Stanton to Jesup, Feb. 16. Scott, Mems., ii, 413. [298]Porter, diary. [254]McClellan, Feb. 23. [193]Foster to mother, Feb. 26. Ho. 59; 30, 1, p. 41. Smith, To Mexico, 105, 108. [164]Scott to Conner, Dec. 26, 1846. Niles, Mar. 13, p. 21; 20, p. 48. Hartman, Journal, 6. Oswandel, Notes, 54–6. Picayune, Feb. 18. [159]Collins, diary. [146]Caswell, diary. Ballentine, English Soldier, i, 266. Bishop, Journal.
[38.] Polk and Marcy felt that he was looking for an issue ([256]Marcy to Wetmore, April 25, 1847), and his course warrants that supposition.
[39.] Taylor’s movements. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 861, 890, 1097 (Taylor), 875 (Scott). Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 72, 85, 87, 180–2. [169]Id. to Crittenden, Jan. 26. Polk, Diary, Oct. 20, 1846; Jan. 5; Mar. 21–23; Apr. 1, 1847. [256]Marcy to Wetmore, Mar. 11. Journ. Mil. Serv. Instit. xiv, 443.
Jan. 26 Scott wrote to Taylor: “I must ask you to abandon Saltillo, and to make no detachments, except for reconnaisances and immediate defence, much beyond Monterey. I know this to be the wish of the government, founded on reasons in which I concur” (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 864). In reply Taylor wrote on Feb. 7 that he was going to remain at his advanced position unless “positively ordered to fall back by the government at Washington” (ibid., 1162). In addressing the government on the same day (ibid., 1110) he referred to Scott’s instructions as advice. But such language from a superior officer was clearly an order courteously phrased, and this interpretation is confirmed by the fact that Scott deemed it necessary to give Taylor express authority later to make a diversion toward San Luis Potosí (ibid., p. 876). Polk (Diary, April 7, 1847, and elsewhere) remarked that Taylor had violated his orders by taking his advanced position.
Taylor’s ostensible reasons for so doing as given by himself (Bixby coll., 182) were these: 1. It would be safest to fight, should the Mexicans advance, immediately on their getting across the desert region that lay between San Luis Potosí and the advanced American position, rather than let them recuperate and use Saltillo as a base. 2. Had the Americans fallen back to Monterey, Santa Anna would have invested it, the Mexicans of that section would have risen, every animal at Monterey would have starved or been destroyed, the troops—disheartened by retreating, and beyond succor—would have surrendered or been cut to pieces, and every American dépôt in the rear would have been abandoned or captured. 3. Doniphan would have been ruined. But (1), as we have seen (note 27), Taylor believed on Jan. 26, Feb. 4, 7, and 14 (i.e. both before and after taking the advanced position) that he was in no real danger of being attacked by Santa Anna, and hence had not the warrant of a supposed emergency for disregarding his instructions. (2) This advanced position was not, as his explanation assumes, a good place at which to meet the Mexicans, and he retired from it before the battle of Buena Vista. (3) Rinconada Pass, on the other hand, could probably have been made virtually impregnable toward the south, and, if properly defended, could at least have held out for a considerable time. (4) It was not reasonable to suppose that Santa Anna, learning that Scott was about to strike at the vitals of Mexico, would undertake to carry the Pass and besiege a city like Monterey, prepared in all ways—as Marcy had instructed Taylor on Oct. 13, 22 (Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 356, 364) to prepare it—for a stubborn resistance (Howard, Taylor, 238). (5) If, however, Santa Anna were going to do so, as Taylor’s explanation assumes, the policy of Scott and the administration was certainly the true one, since it would have contributed to a triumph on the line from Vera Cruz to the capital. (6) Taylor’s retirement to Monterey and vicinity would have entailed no loss of prestige or confidence on the part of the Americans, since it would have formed one part of a bold offensive plan; but would only have diminished somewhat Taylor’s personal effulgence. (7) It was not reasonable to believe that the men with whom Taylor (Bixby coll., 86) was ready to meet Santa Anna in the field could not hold their own against him in strong works (Meade, Letters, i, 179), and a success at Monterey would have been not only more certain but more decisive and less costly than at Buena Vista (Scott, Mems., ii, 412). Moreover Taylor would have had the Monterey garrison as well as the troops who actually fought at Buena Vista. (8) Taylor represented that he could not transport siege guns from Camargo to Monterey, and how could he have expected Santa Anna to bring them to Monterey from San Luis Potosí? (9) If Monterey did not contain ample forage for the animals, the fault was Taylor’s; and, if he was to stand a siege, most of the animals could have been sent to the Rio Grande (Ripley, War with Mex., i, 435). (10) Reinforcements from the north were en route, and succor from Scott could have reached Monterey more easily than a position far in advance. (11) Doniphan could have retired from Chihuahua by the way he had gone there or (like a party of only forty men: Hughes, Doniphan’s Exped., 335) via Presidio del Rio Grande; and before moving toward Saltillo it was his duty to ascertain, as he actually did, whether he could safely go there.
Another point brought forward by Taylor was that had he remained at Monterey, the Mexicans could more effectually have annoyed his flanks and lines of communication (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1110); but (1) evidently, had he remained at Monterey, his flanks and lines of communication would have been less extended and more easily protected than when he was about eighty-five miles farther on (Polk, Diary, Mar. 23, 1847), and (2) as a matter of fact his flanks were effectually annoyed and his communications entirely cut off. (For certain points in this discussion the author is indebted to Ripley’s “War with Mexico.”) In short, the only rational explanation of Taylor’s course appears to be that suggested in the text. Oct. 15 Taylor wrote: Every day’s march beyond Saltillo will weaken our position and strengthen the enemy’s (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 352). Nov. 26 he wrote: “We have advanced as far from our base in this quarter as we ought to venture” (Bixby coll., 72).
The troops that Taylor now had were: regulars—two squadrons of cavalry, four batteries (16 guns), and at Monterey one company of artillery; volunteers—two regiments of horse, eight regiments of foot, and two guns at Monterey, Saltillo and beyond Saltillo; and three regts. of volunteer foot holding the line to Camargo and down the river (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1098).