[9.] As Santa Anna’s movement rested essentially upon non-military reasons, Scott’s forecast of his operations naturally proved incorrect. The American attack upon Vera Cruz, though known to be planned, was not yet known certainly to be coming. Santa Anna defended himself later for not going to Vera Cruz by saying that he was merely commander of the northern army, but in fact he did not so regard himself. The truth is that he urged and expected the government to provide for Vera Cruz, that the government assured him it had been provided for, and that, had it been tenaciously defended, it could have held out until he could have arrived in that vicinity ([76]S. Anna, Oct. 14, 20, 1846; Jan. 14, 18, 1847. Id., Apelación, 33. [76]To S. Anna, Jan. 30, 1847). Taylor’s moving away from Scott caused the intercepting of Scott’s letter of January 3, which revealed Taylor’s weakness, and thus may have been the cause of the battle of Buena Vista.
[10.] Why Santa Anna marched north (complaints of his conduct). [52]Black, Aug. 27; Oct. 8; Nov. 17, 1846; Jan. 28, 1847. Sierra, Evolution, 218. Soldado de la Patria, no. 13. London Times, Jan. 28. Memoria de ... Relaciones, Dec., 1846. Courrier des Etats Unis, June 20; July 9, 1846. [335]Mackenzie to Trist, Nov. 25, 1846. Gamboa, Impug., 15–19, 21–2. Kenly, Md. Vol., 390. Ramírez, Mexico, 173, 192. Don Simplicio, Jan. 9, 20, 27; Feb. 3. [82]MS. apparently written in Jan., 1847. [77]Relaciones, circular, Nov. 27, 1846. Republicano, Jan. 21, 31. [13]Pakenham, no. 127, 1846. [83]Gov. Querétaro to S. Anna, Nov. 21, 1846. Biog. del Gen. S. Anna, 1847. [13]Pakenham to Palmerston, Oct. 29, 1846. Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 483 (Otero); iv, app., 177. Balbontín, Invasión, 59. Apuntes, 77. Pacheco, Exposición. [13]Bankhead, nos. 121, 140, 141, 157, 169, 1846; 5, 1847. García, Juárez, 65. Tributo á la Verdad, 27. S. Anna, Manifiesto, Méx., 1847, 6. Id., Apelación, 16, 23. Picayune, Mar. 9, 10. Acta, Mazatlán, Jan. 18. [80]Olaguíbel to S. Anna, Jan. —, 1847. Wash. Union, Oct. 10, 1846 (from La Patria); Mar. 17, 1847. Nat. Intelligencer, Sept. 5, 1846. Richmond Times, Sept. 2, 1846. Diario, Nov. 24; Dec. 6, 8, 1846; Jan. 30, 1847. Monitor Repub., Oct. 22; Nov. 20, 29; Dec. 28, 1846; Jan. 4, 6, 8, 14, 19, 22 (calling attention to the scattered state of Taylor’s forces), 26, 29, 1847. Mora, Papeles, 70. Niles, Mar. 27, p. 57. [73]Bermúdez de Castro, nos. 343, res., 410, 1846. Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal, ii, 90. [76]Relaciones, Jan. 11. [76]S. Anna, Feb. 27. [76]Id., Manifiesto, Jan. 26.
Rives (U. S. and Mexico, ii, 341) doubts whether S. Anna had learned from Richey’s despatches (chap. xviii, [note 27]) that Taylor’s forces had been depleted, and cites in evidence S. Anna’s declaration in defence of himself for going against Taylor when Scott was about to attack Vera Cruz (Apelación, 32). But (1) S. Anna was not a person to admit unnecessarily the strongest point of an accusation against him, and in fact the other point of his defence, cited by Rives, was not honest; (2) S. Anna here representing that he feared Scott was coming from Tampico to S. Luis Potosí shows again the disingenuousness of his defence, for he must have known that such a movement was impracticable; (3) it is hardly conceivable that Scott’s intercepted letter of Jan. 3 did not, like Marcy’s of Sept. 2, find its way to headquarters.
[11.] The forces taking part in the campaign seem to have been 9500 infantry from San Luis, 4000 (under Mejía) stationed at Matehuala, and 1000 (under Parrodi) from Tula, 6000 cavalry in four brigades (Torrejón at Las Bocas near S. L. P., Juvera at Venado, Andrade at Cedral, and Miñón at La Encarnación), and 900 engineers, artillery and sappers—a total of 21,400 including officers. These numbers are taken from Rápida Ojeada and from a San Luis letter (the figures of which were stated positively to have come from a member of Santa Anna’s staff) printed in El Republicano of February 12, which substantially agree. Santa Anna’s figures were smaller but perhaps did not include Miñón’s and Parrodi’s troops. Those of the Spanish minister were somewhat larger. There seem to have been seventeen guns (three 24-pounders and three 16’s, all of which were siege or fortress guns, and for field pieces five 12’s, five 8’s and a 7-inch howitzer) which, as well as most of the ammunition, appear to have gone forward January 27. Urrea was at the same time to pass from Tula into Tamaulipas, strike at Taylor’s communications and threaten Monterey. Probably there were bodies of irregulars at points not named above.
It occurs to the author at this point to remark that consistency in the use of the article in geographical names is hardly practicable. Even Mexican maps have not been consistent; and for us it would (e.g.) be an affectation to use the article with such well-known names as Puebla and Saltillo.
[12.] At certain points in the desert there were large wells; and in each of these a wide wheel, carrying buckets, was turned by mule power.
[13.] The main part of the army arrived Feb. 17–19 (Apuntes, 96). Taylor thought he could not move more than about 6000 men some 125 miles (supposed to be about 140) from a well-stocked base, Camargo, through a region supplied with water, subsistence and forage, and could not transport 18-pounders (chap. xi, [note 5]). After Miñón advanced to Potosí, Andrade occupied La Encarnación (night of Feb. 11). The wheel pumps were then set in operation, but by Feb. 19 they were worn out. The only ample supply of water was then seven or eight miles away, but it had to be used for the animals. The distance from S. L. Potosí to Agua Nueva by rail is about 223 miles.
[14.] Feb. 19 two brigades of cavalry had not arrived. The figures may or may not have included these and Miñón’s force. Probably they did include many whose duties kept them from the firing line (Republicano, May 3, 1847). The original reports of the officers regarding numbers and operations have disappeared from [76].
[15.] To and at La Encarnación. Carleton, Buena Vista, 23, 229. León, Méx., 474. García, Juárez, 67. London Times, May 10. Journal Milit. Serv. Instit., xiv, 443. Giménez, Mems., 98. Sierra, Evolution, 219. Le Clercq, Voyage, 31–49. Calendario de Ontiveros, 1847. Sen. 32; 31, 1, p. 8, note. Rápida Ojeada, 4, 7–9, etc. Ordóñez, Refutación, 5, 8, etc. [61]Lamar to Bliss, Apr. 21. Rodríguez, Breve Reseña, 1848, 57. Republicano, Feb. 12; Mar. 24; May 3. [80]S. Anna to gov. México state, Jan. 27. Epoca, Jan. 19, 26; Feb. 25. Negrete, Invasión, ii, 389. Balbontín, Invasión, 60–9, 78. Apuntes, 88, 91–7. S. Anna, Manifiesto, Mar., 1848. Id., Apelación, 24–7, 32; app., 67. Muro, Miscelánea, 73–5. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 153–8. De Peyster, Kearny, 127. Diario, June 13. Monitor Repub., Nov. 30. Journal of U. S. Artillery, July, 1892, p. 294. Rápida Ojeada, ii, 4, 6, 7. Niles, Mar. 27, p. 62. [73]Bermúdez de Castro, no. 445, 1846. Encarnacion Prisoners, 43. Steele, Amer. Campaigns, i, 125. [76]S. Anna, Jan. 19, 26; Feb. 2, 11, 17, 27. The author has been over the greater part of the route.
[16.] One cannot be sure enough now regarding the truth of the various allegations regarding the lateral routes to say what Santa Anna might have done. If he had reason (as he seems to have had) to believe that he could surprise Agua Nueva, it would have been unwise to choose a circuitous route of doubtful practicability. No Mexican came to give him information about the ground ([76]Mora, April 23, 1847).