[17.] From La Encarnación to Carnero Pass. Carleton, Buena Vista, 232. Semmes, Service, 121. Gamboa, Impug., 23. Epoca, Feb. 25. Balbontín, Invasión, 69, 70, 79. Apuntes, 97. S. Anna, Apelación, 25. Ordóñez, Refutación. Republicano, Mar. 24. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 156–8. Diario, June 13 (Ordóñez). Diccionario Universal (Itinerarios). [76]Mora, Feb. 25. [76]S. Anna, Feb. 27.

[18.] McCulloch had made a previous expedition to La Encarnación and found cavalry there.

[19.] Santa Anna attributed to a deserter named Váldez the failure of his plan to surprise Taylor (Apelación, 26), but the story of Váldez in itself probably would not have had much effect on Taylor. At La Hedionda May sent Lieut. Sturgis on a scouting expedition. Firing was heard later, and Sturgis, being captured, did not return. This La Hedionda was often called La Hedionda Grande.

[20.] Chamberlain’s [147]diary states in detail, quoting the remarks made, how Wool, supported by the officers, forced the withdrawal from Agua Nueva by threatening to lead the troops back himself rather than see them sacrificed. This is startling, but cannot easily be rejected. Of all the military men known to the author Chamberlain was the most sternly soldierlike. He rose from the ranks to a brevet brigadier-generalship, and he vouched for the correctness of his diary, which had been kept strictly for himself. When not acting as Wool’s orderly he served as one of May’s dragoons, who were commonly used by Taylor as a sort of bodyguard. The reason given by Taylor for retreating (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 132) was that his position could be turned on either side; but he knew that long before, or should have known it.

As the route via La Hedionda debouched in the rear of Buena Vista, one asks why the reason which seems mainly to have caused the retreat did not veto the stand actually taken. Wool must have seen this point; and one suspects that he used the alarm produced by the reports of the scouts to bring about a withdrawal to the position he had long preferred, reckoning also that, should it prove necessary to retire farther, this could much more easily be done from Buena Vista than from Agua Nueva. Evidently the sudden retreat fatigued the troops as well as discouraged them; and not having become acquainted with the peculiar ground on which they were to fight, they were repeatedly taken by surprise during the battle that followed. By retreating Taylor gave up the advantage, on which he had insisted, of forcing S. Anna to fight at the very edge of a desert (chap. xviii, [note 39]).

[21.] At night wagons were sent to Agua Nueva for the stores, but the Gentlemen-Volunteers under Yell refused to load them. Hence the First Dragoons (regulars), who had slept only some three hours in as many days, were sent up to do the work (Chamberlain, diary). Marshall’s Kentucky horse reinforced Yell. The haste of the Americans was such that corn and beans, instead of being loaded into waiting wagons or destroyed, were thrown into a spring, where the Mexicans found them (officer’s diary in Republicano, May 3, 1847). Yell’s instructions were to retire before midnight, taking the Second Kentucky with him from La Encantada.

[22.] Taylor’s operations Feb. 20–21 (including night of Feb. 21). [299]Posey to friend, Feb. 19. [69]Wool to Bliss, Feb. 7. [147]Chamberlain, diary. [148]Id., recollections. Madison Record, 1850 (Prickett). [300]Prickett, letters. Semmes, Service, 121–2. Tampico Sentinel, Mar. 27. Scribner, Camp., 59. Smith, Remins., 37, 42. Picayune, Apr. 14 (Taylor). Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 97, 99, 132 (Taylor); 144 (Wool). J. Davis in Cong. Globe, 31, 1, app., 1034–41. [173]Id., Address. Benham, Recolls. Journ. U. S. Artillery, July, 1892, p. 294. Davis, J. Davis, i, 336. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1168, 1176 (Taylor). Carleton, Buena Vista, 4, 12–21, 24–6, 45. Journ. Milit. Serv. Instit., xiv, 199 (No one can tell why Taylor did not fortify Saltillo before the battle), 443. N. Y. Eve. Post, Jan. 4, 1849. [76]Mora, Feb. 25.

The reason that led Taylor to neglect preparing Saltillo was no doubt the same that had led him previously to neglect preparations when the circumstances called for them.

XX. BUENA VISTA

[1.] Many of the Mexicans marched nearly forty-five miles in less than twenty-four hours. See Stevens, Camps., 18.