[6.] Scott at Jalapa (except his proclamation, etc.: [Note 8]. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 910, 944–8, 954–8, 1221 (Scott); 983–92; 950 (H. L. Scott); 904, 953, 1241 (Marcy); 967 (Worth). [61]Scott to Wilson, Apr. 26. [68]Worth court of inquiry, proceedings. Ballentine, Eng. Soldier, i, 278; ii, 118–23, 126–7, 129–30, 143–4. [66]Beauregard to Smith, May 10. [52]Trist to Buchanan, May 7. Davis, Autobiog., 164–6. Hartman, Journal, 13. [330]Scott to Cadwalader, Apr. 25. [304]Patterson, orders 10, May 1. (The district) Robertson, Visit, i, 278; Ruxton, Adventures (1915), 56; Kendall, Narrative (N. Y., 1844), ii, 398; Orbigny, Voyage, 410; Lyon, Journal, ii, 186; Velasco, Geografía, iii, 99. [362]G. A. Worth to Van Buren, May 20. Robertson, Remins, 261, 275. Revue de Paris, Dec., 1844. [218]Henshaw narrative. Löwenstern, Le Mexique, 26. [68]Scott to Worth, May 6. [65]Scott, gen. orders 128, 129, 135–6, Apr. 30, 30; May 4, 5. [332]Tennery, diary. Thompson, Recolls., 13. Oswandel, Notes, 142, 149, 152. Sen. 14; 30, 1, p. 6 (Scott). Semmes Service, 189–90, 207–10. Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 528 (Hitchcock). [139]W. B. to D. Campbell, Nov. 2, 1846. Sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 124, 129 (Scott). Picayune, May 4, 7, 11; Nov. 14. Steele, Amer. Campaigns, i, 110. [335]Scott to Trist, July 21, 1848. [61]Field report, May 7, 1847. [61]Scott to Wilson, May 2. Moore, Scott’s Camp., 68. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 236. [322]Smith, diary. [270]Moore, diary. [73]Bermúdez de Castro, no. 517, June 29. Polk, Message, Feb. 13 (Richardson, iv, 515). Scott, Mems., ii, 452, 466, 553. London Times, Aug. 6. Diario, Aug. 5. N. Y. Sun, Aug. 16. Stevens, I. I. Stevens, i, 133, 135. (Bounty) U. S. Statutes at Large, ix, 184. Upton, Mil. Policy, 215. So. Qtrly. Review, Apr., 1852, 376–85. 6lScott, memo., Nov. 29, 1846 (12 new regts.). Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 45–6. [364]Worth to daughter, Apr. 30. Bishop, Journal. [112]Beauregard to Smith, May 2. Negrete, Invasion, iii, app., 60. [60]Scott to Marcy, Apr. 5. Stevens, Campaigns, 16. [139]Five colonels to Scott, May 1. [62]Adj. gen. to Brooke, May 29. (Govt. will move) [76]To S. Anna, Apr. 21.
The Spanish minister reported that if Scott had been prepared to attack the capital immediately after April 18, he could have taken it without a shot (no. 517, June 29). Patterson left the army at this time because the return of so many volunteers destroyed his command, and Pillow left because he had been appointed a major general and wished to bring on his division. Ripley (War with Mexico, ii, 514) says Scott could have established a garrison of 4000 at Mexico and held the city. But assassinations and sickness would soon have reduced his numbers. Parties sent out for provisions and forage would have been cut off. The Mexicans, not yet thoroughly beaten, would have been encouraged by the isolation of so weak a force, as they had been by the size of Taylor’s army. They might have been able to starve out the garrison. The result would probably have been at best that a rescue-army would have had to fight its way to the capital without the assistance of Scott, his regular officers and his veteran troops. He had no right to take such a risk, especially when it seemed very doubtful whether success in holding the capital would signify much.
[7.] This agent, whose name has been given as Campos and (probably correctly) as Campomanes, appears to have been the parish priest of Jalapa (Baz, Juárez, 47, note). The paper, which was printed first in Spanish and then in English ([76]Hitchcock to Worth, May 12), may be summarized as follows: It is my duty, Mexicans, to make known certain facts that are purposely concealed from you. For the sake not only of ourselves but of the whole American continent and of republican institutions, we of the United States made every effort consistent with honor to adjust our difficulties with Mexico, but the patriotic Herrera was thrown from power, and the new government, ignoring your interests in order to further its monarchical designs, compelled my nation to take up arms. Like you, we hoped that good would result from the overthrow of Paredes, and therefore we permitted Santa Anna to return; but, again like you perhaps, we were mistaken as to his intentions. What has followed, you know. Your troops, whose devotion and valor we admire, have been badly led, and even betrayed or deceived; and he has not only rewarded those who waged civil war at Mexico, but insulted the brave defenders of Vera Cruz. Recently the battle at Cerro Gordo showed what you may expect from him. Everywhere generals long supported in idleness by the nation have exhibited a lack of honor or skill, while the dead or wounded soldiers, abandoned on the field, have not been given by their leaders even the poor recompense of a grave. The clergy and all other peaceable and useful citizens have been, and still are, taxed, menaced and sacrificed, whereas criminals go unpunished. Can this be called liberty? The Mexicans, I am sure, have the courage to admit mistakes that involve no dishonor, and to adopt for the future a policy of peace, of liberty and of harmony with their brethren of the United States. My troops, as your bishops and priests will testify, have not committed the outrages alleged against us for the purpose of exciting your anger. We adore the same God as you, and many of our people and of our army are Roman Catholics. We punish crime and reward merit; we respect property—especially that of the Church—and we seek your friendship. Abandon prejudice, then; cease to be victims of the ambitious; act as a great American nation. If, however, the war must go on, my country will send—should they be needed—100,000 men, and settle the pending difficulties in a decisive manner. Guerilla warfare, should it be persisted in, would lead to reprisals, and you could not blame us for your sufferings. I have set out for Puebla and Mexico, and shall certainly reach those places; but my desire is peace, friendship, union. It is for you to choose between these and war (Tributo á la Verdad, doc. 18).
It has been said that this proclamation, by opening old political sores and insulting the Mexicans, did more harm than good (Southern Quarterly Review, April, 1852, p. 394); but (1) even the formal reply made to it admitted its truth, and the facts outlasted any temporary resentment that may have been produced in some minds; (2) it was intended for the common people, with whom plain, solid interests had more influence than high-flown sentiments of pride; (3) the clericals, who suggested the contents of the proclamation, were shrewd men; (4) the fury of Santa Anna against it ([76]May 18) is sufficient evidence that he saw it would injure him; and (5) we have direct proof that it was received eagerly by the Mexicans. See, for example, Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 240–1.
Closely allied with the clerical party were the monarchists, who, though comparatively few, wielded much influence on account of their wealth and social position. They had good reason to fear the United States but they hated Santa Anna; and it was suspected that they wished the people to realize that without European aid they were helpless.
Among minor matters attended to by Scott at Jalapa were the establishment of a battery commanding the city, and the creation of the military department of Jalapa (Plan del Río to La Hoya, inclusive).
[8.] The understanding with the clericals, etc. (Beach) [56]Report, June 4; N. Y. Sun, May 19, 22. (Agent) Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 255–6; [68]Id.to Worth, May 10; Baz, Juárez, 47, note; Apuntes, 192; Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 125 (Scott). Tributo á la Verdad, 49, 54, 56 and doc. no. 18 (proclam. of May 11). S. Anna, Apelación, 41–3. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 311. Consideraciones, 3, 7, 22–3. (Priests tolerant) Kendall, Narrative (N. Y., 1844), ii, 341–3; Consideraciones, 32, 37; Lawton, Artill. Officer, 160–1, 175. (True) [13]Bankhead, no. 57, May 29; Impug. del Manif. London Times, July 15. Apuntes, 193. Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 127 (Marcy). Ramírez, México, 239, 256–7, 263, 272. México á través, iv, 661. [236]Judah, diary, May 2, 6, 17, 26. [95]Protest, Apr. 12. Monitor del Pueblo, Apr. 29. [95]Sánchez, proclam., Apr. 29. [95]Orders, May 8. [95]Ayunt., proceedings. Picayune, June 30. [82]Otero, proclam., Apr. 26. [82]Baranda to gov., Apr. 24 and reply (draft). [82]Isunza, proclam., May 13. (Crowning) Scott, Mems., ii, 549. (Proclam. of May 11) Wash. Union, June 12. Courrier des Etats Unis, May 22. Mata, Reflecciones. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 967, 995 (Worth); 968 (proclam.) Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal, ii, 190. [76]Winette, statement, May 2. [76]To S. Anna, May 14. [76]S. Anna, May 18. [76]Hitchcock to Worth, May 12 (intercepted). [76]Fúrlong, May 17.
[9.] His intellectual plane is suggested by the fact that after the battle he promptly sent instructions to his mistress but not to his second in command ([76]Canalizo, Apr. 24).
[10.] At this juncture appeals were again made to the Roman Catholics, particularly the Irish, of the American army, and apparently 2–300 deserted while at Jalapa (Ballentine, English Soldier, ii, 144). One appeal said, “Are Catholic Irishmen to be the destroyers of Catholic temples, the murderers of Catholic priests, and the founders of heretical rites i this pious country?” A large amount of money seems to have been collected by Santa Anna at this time. The Manifiesto of Vera Cruz State (Monitor Republicano, Dec. 19, 1847) asserted that in fifteen days he obtained 120,000 pesos, though he said (May 9) he had received less than 25,000 (Gamboa, Impug., 35).
[11.] Santa Anna’s flank position was even more favorable than Washington’s at Morristown. While he lingered near Vera Cruz, Scott could not feel safe, and his trains were in imminent danger. Had he remained there, Scott, whose small numbers would not have permitted him to send an adequate detachment to Orizaba, might have felt compelled to go there with his whole army, and much embarrassment might have resulted (Steele, American Campaigns, i, 125–6. W. B. Lane, The United Service, June, 1896, p. 485. Stevens, I. I. Stevens, 146).