[31.] Pursuit, losses, prisoners, spoils. Ho. 60; 30, 1, 948, 1012, 1221 (Scott); 1089 (Hitchcock); 1233 (Marcy). Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 258 (gen. orders 111); 262 (Scott); 276, 278, 283, etc. Scott, Mems., ii, 443. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 253. Ballentine, Eng. Soldier, 86–7, 106–7. Tributo á la Verdad, 62. Bustamante, N. Bernal, ii, 189. S. Anna, Apelación, 40. Lawton, Artill. Officer, 140, 179. Ho. 24; 31, 1. Sen. 34; 34, 3, p. 37. Republicano, Apr. 27.; June 9. Sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 122, 136. Courrier Français, May 5. México á través, iv, 655. Monitor Repub., Apr. 24; May 6. [322]Smith, diary. Williams to father, Apr. 21. [152]Claiborne, mems. [332]Tennery, diary. [82]Pavón to Puebla sec. state, Apr. 29. N. Y. Sun, Aug. 16. Niles, May 15, p. 164; May 29, p. 201. McClellan, diary. Nebel and Kendall, 25. Robertson, Remins., 249, 253. [76]Carrera, Apr. 27; May 1. [76]Ampudia, Apr. 25. [76]Canalizo, Apr. 18. [76]Id.., undated. [76]S. Anna, May 7. [76]Junta directiva, May 3. [76]G. Gómez to Gaona, Apr. 18. The cavalry appear to have been late in beginning the pursuit. Ripley (War, etc., ii, 75) says Scott was so busy that he forgot to send for the cavalry, but Scott’s orders for the battle put the responsibility on the commander of that corps, which was placed in reserve on the highway with a field battery (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 259). In places, too, they found the highway cut or blocked.
[32.] A deputation of the ayuntamiento met Patterson (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 296), and were promised protection on condition that no liquor should be sold to the troops. The term “nondescript costumes” applies primarily to the volunteers, but probably some of the regulars had lost parts of their outfits.
[33.] Scott’s report was a model in concealing facts; and Worth, writing to a member of his family, called it “a lie from beginning to end.” Gen. U. S. Grant, doubtless recording without investigation his early impressions, wrote in his Personal Memoirs (i, 132): “Perhaps there was not a battle of the Mexican war, or of any other, where orders issued before an engagement were nearer being a correct report of what afterwards took place,” and such has been the accepted opinion, though a thoughtful comparison of the orders with Scott’s own report (Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 258, 261) is enough to disprove this view. For example, Scott in his orders, intending to attack from the enemy’s rear, assigned no troops to the frontal attack on El Telégrafo, which was the main feature of the actual battle. Unpublished documents of a wholly unbiassed character disprove it still further. As two more illustrations, the artillery, for which infinite trouble was taken to make a passable road, did not figure at all in the battle (though a section of Taylor’s battery went that way in season to join in the pursuit), and a court of inquiry declared that Riley’s brigade, which played a most important rôle, was diverted from its original destination—a finding approved by Scott ([65]gen. orders 249). Robert Anderson said that if Scott’s orders had been carried out, not a Mexican would have escaped (Lawton, Artillery Officer, 137); and Davis, Shields’s aide, stated that Twiggs failed to execute Scott’s orders and disappointed Scott’s expectations (Autobiography, 148). See also notes 22 and 25. It is possible that one reason why Scott in his report commended Twiggs’s course was that, even if satisfied as to the practicability of his own plan, he did not care to raise an issue on that question. Obviously it would have been impossible to prove now that the plan was practicable, and a bitter, harmful controversy would have resulted. That on general principles such an exposure of the American flank was very hazardous could not be denied.
[34.] Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 296 (Patterson). [217]Henshaw papers. [159]Narrative based on F. Collins papers. Robertson, Remins., 253–7. Ruxton, Adventures (1847), 16. (King Death) Griffis, Perry, 217. [298]Porter, diary. Monitor Repub., Apr. 24, 27. [322]Smith, diary. [66]G. W. Smith to Stevens, May 1. Oswandel, Notes, 140. [256]J. Parrott to Marcy, Apr. 19. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 948 (Scott). [254]McClellan, diary. Ramírez, México, 260.
XXIV. PUEBLA
[1.] Worth’s advance. Henshaw narrative. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 255. Ballentine, Eng. Soldier, ii, 154. Davis, Autobiog., 173. Delta, July 8. Picayune, May 19. [159]Collins papers, Apr. 21; June 19. México á través, iv, 655. Tornel, Breve Reseña, 345. Robertson, Visit, i, 303. Orbigny, Voyage, 411. Lyon, Journal, ii, 181. Balbontín, Estado, 22. Velasco, Geografía, iii, 97, 99. Lawton, Artill. Officer, 141–4. Robertson, Remins., 276. [68]Scott to Worth, May 6. Colección de Itinerarios. Revue de Paris, Dec., 1844. Oswandel, Notes, 162. Semmes, Service, 217–22. [139]W. B. to D. Campbell, Apr. 25. [185]Memo. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 261 (Scott); 300 (Worth). Ramírez, México, 228–9. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 236–9. [254]McClellan to sister, Apr. 22. [236]Judah, diary. Moore, Scott’s Campaign, 10–2. Norton, Life. Diccionario Universal (Las Vigas and Perote). [327]Sutherland to father, undated. Ward, Mexico, ii, 193–5. Green, Journal, 238. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 944–6, 948 (Scott). [364]Worth to daughter, Apr. 30. Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 58, 60, 110. Tributo á la Verdad, 43–6. [76]Gaona, Mar. 4, 8, 15; Apr. 8, 19. [76]To Id.., Apr. 17. [76]Canalizo, Apr. 21, 24, etc. [76]Baneneli, Apr. 24. [76]Bravo, Apr. 23. [76]S. Anna, Apr. 27. The distance from Jalapa to Perote was called about thirty miles.
[2.] “Convoy” will be used to signify a line of wagons or pack-mules or both transporting merchandise or supplies under escort. Among the difficulties in getting articles from the coast were the sandy road, the heat, the weakness and insufficient number of animals, the shortage of wagons, and above all the want of good drivers and conductors (Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 127). Scott had supposed that successive bodies of new troops would escort the convoys up, but the diversion of these to the Rio Grande for some time (in consequence of S. Anna’s advance against Taylor) made it necessary to weaken his forces by sending escorts from Jalapa ([61]Scott to Wilson, Apr. 26). The policy of treating the Mexicans kindly required more self-support and therefore larger trains than would otherwise have been necessary. Moreover, in order to avoid a reverse, which would have had consequences of peculiar gravity in Mexico, Scott had to avoid risks.
[3.] It has been argued (e.g. by Semmes) that Scott was in fact able to obtain subsistence from the country all the spring and summer, and therefore the matter involved no difficulties (Service, 208); but Scott had to ascertain beforehand through agents (Delta, May 18) both that subsistence existed and that it could be obtained; and to make the success of his precautions a basis for asserting that he should not have waited to take them, is unreasonable. Scott said later that he might have rushed ahead by depending upon the provisions near at hand, but that within a week the army would have had to scatter and fight for supplies (Mems., ii, 553). The resources of the country were found to be mostly at a distance from the line of march (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 949). Time was required to select intelligent, reliable agents, and they needed time to go and come. A particular reason for deliberation lay in the fact that the new crops would not be ready before about the middle of June. It should be added that some statements of Semmes and others regarding material elements of the situation are contradicted by Scott’s reports written at the time. Semmes was probably influenced by Worth, whose aide he was.
[4.] Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 904. Marcy forgot this when he severely censured Scott for dismissing the men before their time was out (ibid., 1245).
[5.] By the [61]field return of May 7 Scott had: Engineer Co. (Smith), 43; Ordnance Co. (Huger), 60; First Div. (Worth), 2331; Second Div. (Twiggs), 2216; Dragoons (Harney), 433; volunteers (Quitman), 2030. The disparity between Scott’s numbers as figured at Washington and his numbers as counted at the front is suggested by the fact that on April 26 his volunteers (aside from those now discharged) were estimated by the adjutant general as 4994 (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 928). The regiments that went home were the Georgia, the Alabama, the Third and Fourth Illinois, and the First, Second and Third Tennessee.