[10.] The hill (El Peñón Viejo) was about 1000 yards in length at the base, and the higher of its two summits reached an elevation of about 400–450 feet ([66]reports of Lee, Stevens and Mason, Aug. 12, 26). The work of fortifying it was skilfully as well as thoroughly done. Engineer I. I. Stevens made out nearly forty guns. Topog. Engineer M. L. Smith thought there were about sixty (Sen. 19; 30, 2, p. 4). A large stock of rations was placed here ([76]acuerdo, Aug. 5).
[11.] Santa Anna’s preparations (see [note 1]). [66]Stevens to J. L. Smith, Aug. 12, 26. [66]R. E. Lee, J. L. Mason to J. L. Smith, Aug. 12. S. Anna, Apelación, 44–7. Id.., Detall, 8–11. [60]Patterson to Marcy, Oct. 26. Picayune, June 30; Aug. 8. Donnavan, Adventures, 29. Pacheco, Exposíción. Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 91–4, 123–5. Scott, Mems., ii, 466. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 274. [224]Intercepted Letters (ed. by Hitchcock). (Embezzlement) Consideraciones, 25; Apuntes, 207. Sen. 19; 30, 2 (M. L. Smith, E. L. F. Hardcastle). Apuntes, 205–10, 223–8. Molina, El Asalto. Raleigh Star, Sept. 1. [13]Thornton, June 29. [178]Davis, diary. Portrait of Lombardini: city hall, Mexico. [350]Weber, recolls. N. Orl. Delta, July 18. Verdadero Liberal, May 20. (San Patricio cos.) Dublán, Legislación, v, 290; Diario, July 15. México á través, iv, 668–71. [70]“Guerra,” no. 1120. London Times, May 10; Sept. 6. Semmes, Service, 348–9. Dublán, Legislación, v, 280, 284, 289, 294. [73]Bermúdez de Castro, nos. 517, June 29; 534, res., July 28. [73]Lozano, No. 2, Aug. 24. Gamboa, Impug., 51. Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal, ii, 205–6. [335]Thornton to N. P. Trist, July 29. Encarnacion Prisoners, 69. [60]Wilson to Marcy, Aug. 1. N. Y. Sun, Aug. 23. Diario, May 24; June 5–10, 14–6, 18, 20, etc. Monitor Repub., May 31 (Eleventh Inf.); June 13–5, 18, etc.; Dec. 12 (S. Anna, Nov. 19). Niles, June 19, p. 251. [13]Bankhead, no. 74, 1846. (Honduras) [60]Patterson to Marcy, Oct. 26, 1847. (Powder from N. Orl.) [166]Consul McFaul to ——, Nov. 12, 1846. Ramírez, México, 268. The following from [76] are cited for particular reasons. Valencia, proclam., May 14. Estado of garrison, May 13. Ayunt., Mexico, June 3. Recommended measures, Apr. 6, 14. Circulars, June 12; July 24. S. Anna to Alcorta, June 12; Aug. 3. Valencia, July 19. Statement, lines of defence, June 29. J. Terrés, report on cavalry [Nov.]. J. de D. Peza, report on infantry, Nov. 29. Acuerdos, May 21, 23–4; June 5, 6, 8, 19, 25; July 17, 18, 19, 28, 30; Aug. 2, 3, 5, 6. To Alvarez, June 3, 30, etc. To Mora, June 26; July 2, 20, 23, etc. To Lombardini, June 26; July 2, 5, 7, 11, 22, 31, etc. Alvarez. May 29; June 9, 16; July 5, etc. Mora, July 9, 19, 20, 22, etc. Lombardini, July 6, 7, 10, 12, 14, 15, etc. Olaguíbel, Aug. 20. Decrees, June 5, 8; July 10, 12; Aug. 8, etc.
Among other preparations were the following: information about the defence not to be published, and no communication to be had with points occupied by the Americans; the troops to be trained in firing (June 6); the state of siege to be rigorous (June 28); as much wheat as possible to be ground and stored in the city, and the rest to be removed from the Valley; all Americans, even if naturalized, to leave the city (July 12); the American prisoners (e.g., from La Encarnación) to go to Toluca; prices of provisions fixed; no persons to be tried for acts not injurious to a third party. Naturally there was much evasion of these edicts. A Council of Defence composed of the heads of the executive departments most concerned in the work began to meet on July 2 ([76]acuerdo, June 29; Lombardini, July 6). After the near approach of the enemy the shops (excepting those selling provisions and those of the Plaza del Mercado) were to close, civilian horses and carriages to keep off the streets, and no civilian to leave the city [without a pass] except those who had brought in coal and provisions [but on August 13 permission was given old men, women and children to go out]. By August 24 nearly all civilians [of any importance] left the city ([73]Lozano, no. 2). After the Americans came within easy reach the usual efforts to cause desertion among them were made by the Mexican government. The Paixhan guns cast by the Mexicans were believed by them to equal the American ordnance (Apuntes, 207).
[12.] Diario, Aug. 10–13. [77]Relaciones, circular, Aug. 9. [73]Lozano, no. 2, Aug. 24. Apuntes, 206–8, 210–20. México á través, iv, 671–2. Ramírez, México, 296. [76]To Basadre, Aug. 10. [76]To Alvarez, Aug. 12. [76]Relaciones to gov. Zacat., Aug. 11. [76]Olaguíbel, Aug. 11. [76]Decree, Aug. 8.
[13.] April 30 Marcy had promised that by the end of June, Scott should have about 20,000 men (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 922). Scott felt he needed that number in addition to the garrison of Puebla (Sedgwick, Corres., i, 141). He has been criticised for having his small army march in four divisions a day apart. Twiggs and Quitman together had only about 4000 men and it has been represented that, even had they and the cavalry combined, Santa Anna could have crushed them before Worth could have reached the scene (Semmes, Service, 326); but, as a day’s march was only 12–15 miles (Hardcastle in Sen. 19; 30, 2, p. 10), Worth was but five hours (in case of emergency much less) behind Quitman, and an attack strong enough to crush Harney, Twiggs and Quitman, provided as they were with heavy ordnance, could not have taken place in a moment nor without warning. Scott expected to be attacked on the march (Scott, Mems., ii, 466). He might have avoided the high mountains by taking the route via Tlaxcala and Apam; but this route was long and unsuitable for his trains. There were nearly 1000 wagons ([335]Trist to Buchanan, Aug. 22).
[14.] These works were abandoned because not in keeping with Santa Anna’s plan. Very likely the fact that it would not have been easy to subsist a large force here counted also. Many of the Americans believed Santa Anna had built the works in the expectation of using them to cut Scott off after defeating him in the Valley, and set their teeth the harder. All felt that they must conquer or die.
[15.] Scott’s march to Ayotla. Scott, Mems., ii, 465–7. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 266, 271. Grant, Mems., i, 164–5. Ballentine, Eng. Soldier, ii, 190–3. Davis, Autobiog., 192. Missouri Republican, Nov. 3, 1857 (Hitchcock). [217]Henshaw papers. [218]Henshaw narrative. Haynes, Gen. Scott’s Guide. [183]Drum, recolls. [376]Nicholson, recolls. Donnavan, Adventures, 98. [159]Collins papers. (Route) Lyon, Journal, ii, 106; Thompson, Recolls., 33; Velasco, Geografía, i, 25; Cardona, Méx. y sus Capitales, 129; Robertson, Visit, i, 321; Ruxton, Adventures (1847), 33–4; Tudor, Tour, ii, 211; LeClercq, Voyage, 178–9; Mason, Pictures, ii, 6; Bullock, Across Mex., 67–8. Lawton, Artillery Officer, 274, 281–7. [65]Gen. orders 246, Aug. 5. [291]Pierce papers. Sen. 11; 31, 1 (map). Sen. 19; 30, 2 (M. L. Smith, E. L. F. Hardcastle). G. W. Smith, Co. A. Carleton, Address. [178]Davis, diary. Sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 124 (Scott); 186–8. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 303 (Scott). app., 37. Kenly, Md. Vol., 344. Rosa, Impresiones Nebel and Kendall, 27. Brackett, Lane’s Brigade, 280–1. Colección de Itinerarios. Oswandel, Notes, 242, 245. Semmes, Service, 235, 286–9, 325–8, 452–3. [73]Bermúdez de Castro, nos. 534, res., July 28; 550, Aug. 21. [73]Lozano, no. 2, Aug. 24. [335]Trist, statement, July 25, 1849. [236]Judah, diary. Diario, July 2. Sedgwick, Corres., i, 108, 141. Smith, To Mexico, 188–93. Wilson, Mexico, 168. Niles, Oct. 30, p. 138. Sen. 1; 30, 1, app., 37. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1032 (Scott). [132]Atocha to Buchanan, Aug. 1. Ripley, War with Mexico, ii, 187. Michigan Pioneer Soc. Colls., vii (Toll). So. Qtrly. Rev., Apr., 1852, pp. 406–7. [316]Judd to Sherman, Feb. 26, 1848. Ramírez, México, 239. Monitor Repub., Oct. 1 (Gamboa). Manifiesto que dirige ... Alvarez.
[16.] S. Anna, Apelación, 44; app., 146–50, 157–61. Sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 186–7. [73]Bermúdez de Castro, no. 534, res., July 28. Monitor Repub., Dec. 12 (S. Anna, Nov. 19). And from [76] the following. To Canalizo, June 30. To Alvarez, June 29, 30; July 13, 28; Aug. 6, 9, 12, 14, 21. To Valencia, Aug. 9, 11, 13, 14, 15. Canalizo, June 23; July 19; Aug. 9, 10, 11. Alvarez, July 5, 8; Aug. 6, 8, 8, 9, 9, 10, 10, 11, 12, 12, 25. Valencia, Aug. 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14. Expediente against Valencia. Acuerdo, Aug. 13.
[17.] The choice of approaches. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 272–4. Grant, Mems., 164–5. Mo. Republican, Nov. 3, 1857 (Hitchcock). Weekly Courier and N. Y. Enquirer, Mar. 2, 1848 (letter from Hitchcock). [217]Henshaw to wife, Aug. 21. Haynes, Gen. Scott’s Guide. [61]Hamilton to Scott, Oct. 17, 1850. [66]R. E. Lee, I. I. Stevens, J. L. Mason to J. L. Smith, Aug. 12, 26. Chase, Polk Admin., 225. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 333–7. [221]Hill, diary. [159]Collins papers. Lawton, Artill. Officer, 289. Sen. 11; 31, 1 (M. L. Smith). Sen. 19; 30, 2 (M. L. Smith, E. L. F. Hardcastle). [178]Davis, diary. [136]Butterfield, recolls. S. Anna, Detall, 11. [52]Trist nos. 11, 12, Aug. 14, 22. [185]Letters from Worth, Duncan and others. [335]H. L. Scott to Worth, Aug. 13. Picayune, Oct. 8. Nebel and Kendall, 27. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 303, app., 27. Apuntes, 208, 225. Semmes, Service, 348–52, 355–8. Ramírez, México, 293. Sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 461–2 (Lee); 522–7 (Hitchcock). [68]Charges against Duncan (Scott). [236]Judah, diary. Wash. Union, Nov. 3. Nat. Intelligencer, Nov. 12. Diario, Aug. 18. [377]Capt. Willing (paper published by Engineer School, Washington). Stevens, I. I. Stevens, i, 148–9, 190. So. Qtrly. Rev., Apr., 1852, p. 412. [76]Order to Lombardini, June 19. [76]To Mora, July 2. [76]Acuerdos, Aug. 5, 8. [76]Mora, Aug. 2. [76]Gugerson to Alvarez, Aug. 10. [76](Spies) Alvarez, Aug. 12; Valencia, Aug. 13, 14; Becerril, Aug. 13; spy, Aug. 12; etc. [76]Bravo, Aug. 13. [76]To Bravo, Aug. 13.
The Mexicaltzingo plan was said to be, that while the rest of the troops should force their way between Lakes Chalco and Xochimilco by a broken causeway commanded by five batteries on a hill, Worth should pass round or across the latter lake and coöperate with them wherever he could do so to the best advantage (Davis, Autobiog., 193; etc.). Under orders from Scott (Hitchcock in Mo. Republican, Nov. 3, 1857; [377]paper; [335]H. L. Scott to Worth, Aug. 13; [68]charges against Duncan) to examine the Chalco route, Worth (at Duncan’s suggestion) had Duncan, supported by strong detachments, reconnoitre that route on August 14 under the pretence of obtaining provisions. Duncan, who reported ([305]Aug. 14) favorably, was sent to Scott late that day to give an account of the reconnaissance and deliver a [305]letter from Worth, which argued against dividing the army. Not receiving credit in Scott’s report Duncan published (Picayune, Oct. 8; Dec. 18) a letter claiming in effect to have caused the change of plan (chap. xxix, [p. 187]). But the letter proved that he knew less about the matter than he supposed ([68]charges); it did not prove that the change of orders resulted from his report; and there is no proof that Scott intended to divide the army—though he collected boats enough for about 2000 men with a view to crossing or to making the Mexicans believe (Claiborne, Quitman, i, 335) he intended to cross the lake and it was thought that as many more could be obtained—or definitely decided to attack Mexicaltzingo. On the other hand Scott stated ([68]charges) that he was himself investigating ([305]Mackall to ——, May 10, 1848) the Chalco route while Duncan was doing so, and that a spy sent from headquarters reported favorably upon it ([68]charges); and he denied squarely that he gave up the Mexicaltzingo for the Chalco route in consequence of Duncan’s report ([68]charges). Extreme secrecy and all possible mystification of the enemy were necessary, and on account of Worth’s unfriendliness Scott had special reasons for not opening his mind fully to him. Other generals have purposely kept their subordinates in the dark (see Henderson, Jackson, i, 421, 441; Id.., Science of War, 42). Instead of proving that Worth was the better general, Worth and Duncan proved the opposite, for they showed that Worth committed himself to the Chalco route on very incomplete data, whereas Scott studied three routes and reserved his decision until, as far as was possible, he had full information before him. As usual, when Worth’s relations with Scott were concerned, we find Semmes inaccurate and biassed here. Ripley uses the incident against Scott at great length and very unfairly. Facts regarding the Mexicaltzingo route are brought forward, though not known to the Americans at the time (Ripley, War with Mexico, 194). We are told (p. 191) that Scott ordered Duncan to study the Chalco route after Duncan had proposed to do so, as if Scott had not previously ordered Worth, Duncan’s commander, to investigate the route. It is alleged that the case did not warrant “a departure from the rules of the [military] art to so great a degree” [as was proposed by the Mexicaltzingo plan]; yet Ripley shows that the Texcoco route was impracticable (pp. 179, 186), that El Peñón was virtually “impregnable” (p. 188), and that the Chalco route was considered out of the question (p. 190). This was a situation clearly warranting extraordinary measures. On p. 202 Ripley seems to argue that the orders to attack Mexicaltzingo cannot have been given to conceal the movement that Scott actually made, since any movement against that point would have caused Santa Anna to place troops in that vicinity, detect promptly Scott’s real intention, and defend the southern line, and so the ruse would have defeated itself. But (1) the question concerns orders, not—as Ripley assumes—an actual movement toward Mexicaltzingo; (2) Santa Anna had troops in the vicinity of Mexicaltzingo, but the results anticipated by Ripley did not follow; (3) indeed, though Ripley was not aware of the fact, Santa Anna concluded Aug. 14 ([76]to Valencia) that Scott was going to S. Agustín, and merely had the reserves at S. Antonio garita go with five 4-pounders to S. Antonio hacienda ([76]to Valencia, Aug. 14), for he was relying on his fortified points; and (4) since the same troops could not defend at the same time the works near Mexicaltzingo and also the road to S. Agustín, orders involving a threat against the former would have tended, without costing Scott anything, to keep the latter clear.