The vulnerable point of El Peñón Viejo was that owing to its steepness the cannon could have little action on the slopes ([66]Stevens to Smith, Aug. 26). A particular disadvantage in attacking Mexicaltzingo would have been that (Santa Anna said) such a movement could have been detected in good season, and reinforcements could have been placed there promptly ([76]to Bravo, Aug. 13). As the American generals needed information that could only be obtained from Mexicans, they were peculiarly exposed to the artifices of spies, and some of these gained a confidential footing with Worth and even with Scott.
[18.] To S. Agustín. [218]Henshaw narrative. S. Anna, Apelación, 47, 50; app., 146–51. Id.., Detall, 12. Ballentine, Eng. Soldier, ii, 195. Davis, Autobiog., 192–5. [217]Henshaw to wife, Aug. 21. [221]Hill, diary. [159]Collins papers. Latrobe, Rambler, 121. Lawton, Artill. Officer, 290, 293. Sen. 34; 34, 3, p. 37. Sen. 11; 31, 1 (map). Sen. 19; 30, 2 (M. L. Smith, E. L. F. Hardcastle). G. W. Smith, Co. A. [204]Gouverneur, diary. [178]Davis, diary. Gamboa, Impug., 38–9. México á través, iv, 672. Apuntes, 220, 229. Arróniz, Manual, i, 243. Semmes, Service, 352–5, 370–5. Nebel and Kendall, 28. [12]Caryton to Lambert, Sept. 1. Steele, Campaigns, i, 123. [236]Judah, diary. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 275. Moore, Scott’s Camp., 129. Wash. Union, Nov. 3. Stevens, I. I. Stevens, 168. Niles, Oct. 30, p. 139. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 303 (Scott); app., 28 (Twiggs); 37 (Sumner); 39 (McKinstry). [76]To Alvarez, Aug. 11, 21. [76]To Valencia, Aug. 14, 15. [76]To Lombardini, Aug. 14. [76]Acuerdos, Aug. 15, 16. [76]To Herrera, Aug. 15. [76]Becerril, Aug. 15. [76]Valencia, Aug. 14, 15. [76]Alvarez, Aug. 16, 17, 19, 22, 25. [76]To Alvarez, Aug. 14, 15. Ripley, War with Mexico, ii, 647 (Lee to Mason).
Santa Anna’s policy seems to have been wise. Any detachments that he could have thrown hastily in front of Worth must have consisted of inferior troops, and would no doubt have been routed. The last portion of the Chalco route was over ground which, though in part hilly, was firm (T. F. Davis, diary). The brush with Twiggs was greatly exaggerated by the Americans, some of whom estimated the enemy as 12,000 strong, and felt that a victory was gained, whereas Alvarez had no intention of fighting, and did not come within musket range. It has been said (Ripley, War with Mexico, ii, 289) that Scott should have had the cavalry, Worth and Pillow advance without heavy baggage, and reach S. Agustín in twelve hours. But (1) there was a distinct advantage in keeping Worth’s division intact, (2) Scott’s van was less likely to be attacked than his rear, (3) Scott probably understood that Santa Anna intended to rely on his fortified positions, for he was well posted about affairs at the capital ([13]Thornton to Bankhead, June 14), nothing could be kept secret there, and Santa Anna’s Plan was known to many, (4) Scott’s judgment on the point was likely, especially in view of his fuller knowledge of the facts, to be better than Ripley’s, and (5) it was justified by the event. The Chalco route was the one taken by Cortez (Gamboa, Impug., 38). In leaving Peñón Viejo Santa Anna had money and provisions remain there for a prospective “distant march” ([76]to Herrera, Aug. 15). Whether this referred to a pursuit of the Americans or his own flight can only be guessed, but as the order was addressed to Herrera, one inclines to the former view.
[19.] [52]Trist, no. 11, Aug. 14. México á través, iv, 672–3. Apuntes, 220–2, 230. S. Anna, Detall, 11–2. [95]Notice to first alcalde, Aug. 19. So. Qtrly. Rev., Apr., 1852. Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 446. [73]Bermúdez de Castro, no. 445, Mar. 2. [76]To Valencia, Aug. 14, 15, 16. [76]To Lombardini, Aug. 14. [76]Valencia, Aug. 15, 16. [76]To Alvarez, Aug. 16. [76]Acuerdo, Aug. 16.
XXVI. CONTRERAS, CHURUBUSCO
[1.] The basis for distances is Smith and Hardcastle’s map of the Valley (Sen. 11; 31, 1). A garita had to be a somewhat formal place, for municipal duties were levied and collected there, and some accommodations for the officials and the guards were necessary. The last word of “S. Antonio Abad” was commonly omitted. For the sake of distinction the Acapulco road will be called the “highway” and the road via Tacubaya, San Angel and Ansaldo the “turnpike” (Trist’s word for it). The name Contreras was applied by Americans to three places, to none of which it belonged. Contreras was a village on the turnpike some distance south of Padierna. San Agustín was also known as Tlálpam.
[2.] August 14 Valencia’s [76]return (estado) included 486 officers, 5078 rank and file, 1447 horses, one siege 16-pounder, three siege 12-pounders, five 8-inch (68-pound) howitzers and fifteen smaller guns. One of the guns was assigned to Torrejón and he saved it. Another small one disappeared. The name of the rounded hill where Valencia took post was Peloncoahutitlán.
[3.] Valencia had one excuse, for very possibly he believed (in view of Santa Anna’s delay at San Luis Potosí, abandonment of Tampico, apparent neglect of Vera Cruz, etc.) that the President traitorously intended to leave open a door by which Scott could reach the capital; but none the less he was a conscienceless conspirator and the mortal foe of Santa Anna, disgusted with subordination, and eager to overthrow his chief. His past conduct had been thoroughly suspicious, and his manifiesto of August 22 does not bear analysis well. To remove him would have seemed an act of jealousy, if not treason, and very likely have caused a mutiny. Santa Anna hoped that the national crisis would hold him in line for the time being. Besides, Santa Anna did not know precisely where Valencia proposed to make a stand (Diario, Sept. 1). When he learned, he sent General Mora to reconnoitre the position ([76]to Valencia, August 19). Again, he could not afford to raise an issue with Valencia now, for the latter (doubtless with the help of his engineers) had divined Scott’s plans better than the former, and undertaken to guard a quarter left open by the President. Finally it was quite possible that Santa Anna thought Valencia would be taught a lesson by the Americans. It is unnecessary to discuss the merits and disadvantages of Valencia’s position, for they will appear plainly in the narrative (see Balbontín, Invasión, 110–11). Had the Americans been willing to do as he wished, the hill would have been entirely satisfactory. Of Valencia’s intellectual quality the following specimen is suggestive: “Soldiers of Liberty, anarchy put out its head, but your arms drowned it in a moment.”
[4.] Mexican preliminaries. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 304, 306 (Scott); 348–9 (Smith); app., 80 (Alexander). Collins papers. [66]Lee to Smith, Aug. 21. Semmes, Service, 393. Sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 276 (Longstreet); 570. [224]Intercepted Letters (14, L. V. to M. O.; 26, to Old Gentleman). Apuntes, 221, 230–6. Balbontín, Invasión, 111. Gamboa, Impug., 41. [70]“Guerra,” no. 30 (F. Pérez). México á través, iv, 672–3, 677. Long, Memoirs, 54. So. Qtrly. Rev., Apr., 1852, pp. 408–9. Latrobe, Rambler, 90. Sen. 19; 30, 2 (Hardcastle to Smith; Smith to Abert). Valencia, Manifiesto. Calderón, Life, i, 314. [178]Davis, diary. Prieto, Mems., ii, 213. [73]Bermúdez de Castro, no. 534, res., July 28. S. Anna, Apelación, 51–2; app., 140–54, 157–60. Id.., Detall, 12. Monitor Repub., Dec. 17, 1847. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 276. Negrete, Invasión, iv, app., 279–83. [76]Acuerdo, Aug. 16. [76]To Lombardini, July 22. [76]To Alvarez, Aug. 21. [76]Zerecero, Aug. 25. [76]To Valencia, Aug. 16. [76]Expediente contra Valencia.
The defences of Valencia’s camp were somewhat extended later, but not enough to render them formidable.