The intermediate battery (at what was called the Bridge of the Insurgents) seems to have been built for four guns but to have had only one, two, three guns in place, or perhaps none. The accounts disagree. Quitman and Smith, both of them volunteer officers, appear distinctly to have colored their reports in favor of the Palmetto regiment, which was second to none in gallantry, but was not enabled by circumstances to do all it would gladly have done here. The First Artillery, on the other hand, did not receive the credit it deserved. It was merely a question of precedence, not of courage, but vigorous protests against their reports were the consequence. Perhaps, however, the real explanation of their inaccuracies is that the reports represent orders of which circumstances (unknown or forgotten by them) prevented the execution.
Sept. 9, believing Scott would attack the southern side, Santa Anna had two guns removed from the Belén garita. The “citadel” had originally been a tobacco factory. Terrés was treated by Santa Anna with the utmost contempt and even subjected to personal violence, but a court martial exonerated him, and he was regarded by Scott with marked respect (Delta, Jan. 11, 1848).
[20.] The S. Cosme operations. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 381–2 (Scott), 391–3 (Worth), 421 (Sumner), 424 (Huger), 428–9 (J. L. Smith); app., 166 (Huger), etc. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1072–3, 1077, 1079. Journ. Milit. Serv. Instit., v, 46; xxxiii, 444. Wilson, Grant, 63–7. Stevens, Stevens, i, 211–2, 215. So. Qtrly. Rev., Jan., 1853, p. 44. Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 430–41, 450; iv, app., 305–8. Grant, Mems., i, 150, 155–9. Ballentine, Eng. Sold., ii, 249. [66]Lee to J. L. Smith, Sept. 15. [66]McClellan to G. W. Smith, Sept. 14. [66]Stevens to J. L. Smith, Sept. 25. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 379. [113]Beauregard, remins. [60]Paul to Lovell, Sept. 20. Semmes, Service, 457–61. Apuntes, 316–22. Rangel, Parte (with notes). [70]“Guerra,” no. 273 (trial of Bravo). Delta, Oct. 14. S. Anna, Detall, 30–2. México á través, iv, 695. Monitor Repub., Dec. 16 (S. Anna). [76]Mora to Lombardini, Aug. 9; to Guerra, July 22. [76]Lombardini, Aug. 22. Jackson, Mems., 43. [80]Relac. to Olaguíbel, Sept. 14. G. W. Smith, Co. A, Corps of Engins. [51]Letter from Marine officer, Oct. 20. [51]Terrett, undated. [51]Henderson to sec. navy, May 12, 1848. Stevens, Vindication. Raleigh Star, Oct. 27. Arnold, Jackson, 130, 177. Dabney, Jackson, 47–9. Murphy, Remins., 69. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 496–502.
Remarks on the San Cosme operations. The Mexicans retreating by this route were commanded by Gen. Rangel, assisted by Gen. Peña y Barragán and Lt. Col. Echeagaray. It is impossible to be as precise as would be desirable in describing the first part of Worth’s advance, for the reports are both vague and inconsistent. This is mainly, no doubt, because the officers wrote from memory and without the aid of a map. Ripley observes (op. cit., ii, 484) that Worth’s movement “had the great element of success, celerity.” In reality, it was very slow, but unofficial accounts and the Mexican reports contain evidence that the resistance was not only vigorous but more than once temporarily triumphant. The one-gun redoubt seems to have been abandoned when the hill yielded. Ripley observes also (op. cit., ii, 485) that Worth did not need to advance rapidly: “Time was not immediately pressing.” But this is a mistake, for substantially all the Mexican preparations at the S. Cosme garita were made after Worth’s advance began. The fortification (unarmed) near the English cemetery was at the bridge of Santo Tomás. The Mexican infantry was withdrawn from this position because the Americans could have struck the S. Cosme highway (by a cross-road) between it and the city; but a large body of cavalry under Torrejón remained and charged in order to gain time for Rangel to make preparations at the garita.
While Quitman was struggling with the intermediate battery, Duncan of Worth’s command sent a gun from La Verónica causeway into a road that extended some distance toward the right, and fired at the Mexicans. He and Worth believed they gave Quitman material assistance, but this does not appear to have been the fact, for the distance was found to be much greater than they supposed ([113]Beauregard). The better way to aid Quitman would have been to press forward without loss of time, and threaten the rear of the Mexicans opposing Quitman. Later some of Worth’s guns did aid Quitman by firing at the garita.
With remarkable daring Capt. Terrett of the Marines, Lieuts. Gore and U. S. Grant of the Fourth Infantry, a few other officers and a small party of men captured the unarmed work near the junction of La Verónica and San Cosme roads by moving to the left round the English cemetery, and took the parapet on the San Cosme highway. From the latter Worth recalled them because the American guns behind them were about to open. Cadwalader, sent to Worth by Scott, was placed by the former at the English cemetery to guard Worth’s left and rear. Sumner, after pursuing the Mexicans for some time, was detached to protect Tacubaya. Scott joined Worth near the English cemetery and directed him to carry the garita (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 392), but he soon returned to the base of Chapultepec so as to be within easy reach of all his scattered forces (ibid., 382). By Scott’s order Huger sent to Worth four siege guns and a mortar, but on account of the nature of the ground none of these pieces was used against the garita (ibid., 424). Santa Anna brought four guns to the garita, but only three of them were available. The stampede from the garita seems to have been due in part to a cornet signal for retreat, meant for a single corps. The cavalry under Alvarez entered the city during the afternoon of Sept. 12. Grant was assisted by Lieut. Lendrum of the Third Artillery in handling the mountain howitzer.
[21.] The night of Sept. 13–14. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 383 (Scott), 393 (Worth), 416 (Quitman), 424 (Huger), 429 (J. L. Smith); app., 168, etc. (officers). Ho. 60: 30, 1, pp. 1077–9 (Worth), 1079 (Scott). [179]Diario Esactísimo. Stevens, Stevens, i, 213, 215. Sen. Rep. 32; 34, 1. Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 129, 450; iv, 108, 116–22; app., 309–10. So. Qtrly. Rev., Jan., 1853, p. 49. Davis, Autobiog., 235–7, 287–90. [217]Henshaw to wife, Sept. 13 [partly later]. [218]Henshaw narrative. [61]Gates, Oct. 6. [376]Nicholson, recolls. [151]Steptoe to Lovell, Sept. 16. London Times, Nov. 13. [92]S. Anna to Mex. ayunt., Sept. 15. [80]Fernández to gov. Michoacán, Sept. 13. [80]Relac. to Olaguíbel, Sept. 14. S. Anna, Mi Historia, 83. Gamboa, Impug., 57–8. [70]“Guerra,” no. 954 (trial of Bonilla). [366]Ayunt. poster, Sept. 25. Monitor Repub., Sept. 27 (Pacheco); Oct. 2 (S. Anna). S. Anna, Contestación. Lawton, Artill. Off., 315. [73]Lozano, nos. 4 and 8, res., 1847. Ramírez, México, 318. [92]Mex. ayunt. to Scott, Sept. 13, 11 P.M. S. Anna, Apelación, 58–9. Calderón, Rectificaciones, 48. Giménez, Memorias, 114. Stevens, Vindication. Raleigh Star, Oct. 27. [112]Beauregard to Quitman, Sept. 17. [113]Id.., remins. Rangel, Parte (with notes). Claiborne, Quitman, i, 370. [221]Hill, diary. Semmes, Service, 463. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 304. S. Anna, Detall, 32–3. Apuntes, 334–5. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 503–4.
Quitman sent to Scott for heavy cannon and ammunition, and the latter, though offended by Quitman’s course, had them supplied. During the night, under Beauregard’s direction, two batteries inside the Belén garita (for a 24-pounder, an 18-pounder and a 24-pound howitzer) and a breastwork on the right for infantry were made ready. Steptoe, sent here by Scott, was on hand to superintend the firing. To assault the citadel across about 300 yards of open ground, even with the aid of these pieces, would have been a very serious affair, and it was most fortunate for Quitman that Worth’s entering the town where no citadel existed made it unnecessary.
It has been supposed that Huger’s brief bombardment caused Santa Anna to evacuate the city (Semmes, Service, 463); but Santa Anna knew, without being shown again, what the American artillery could do, and he seems to have decided upon his policy before this firing occurred. Santa Anna’s chief published reasons for the evacuation were that he wished to save the city from bombardment, assault and sack, and save the army, arms and cannon for future operations. Gamboa complained that no provision was made before the evacuation for the security of the people, the archives, etc. But Scott’s previous conduct was an adequate pledge, and the council relied upon his regard for international law. Considering Santa Anna’s known love of money, the vast Mexican interests now imperilled, and his summary manner of deciding the question of evacuation, one cannot help suspecting that inducements were offered him. The council was probably held merely to divide the responsibility for what he had resolved to do.
It was charged that Santa Anna let the criminals out of jail expressly to attack the Americans, and to bring odium upon us by committing outrages that could be attributed to our troops. One cannot be sure about this matter; but it is noticeable that Gamboa, in piling up all possible charges against the President, only accused him of failing to prevent the criminals from getting free. Santa Anna must have been completely exhausted, but it seems to be true, as was stated by the British minister (Bankhead, no. 86, 1847), that some one in authority let about 2000 men out of confinement. Very likely it was hoped that the Americans would be guilty of disorder; but the palace at least was sacked before they entered it. Some of the Mexican soldiers acted like brigands, it was reported—even robbing the British consul. No preparations to evacuate the town had been made. Some one might and should have had sentinels posted at the public buildings and offices ready to surrender them in a proper manner. See chap. xxix, [note 2].