One is the opposition between the dissimilar forms of government in these countries. England is the advocate of liberal social institutions all over the continent, but Russia poses as the mainstay of unlimited sovereign power and of conservative principles. Yet doubtless Russia will sooner or later, with a firmness and consistency hitherto lacking, strike into the path of political reform, and then this contrast will be assimilated.

The other consists in the opposing interests of the two powers upon the Eastern Question. But if this question is solved as the author proposes, by the whole Balkan peninsula being permitted to form itself into independent States under the guarantee of united Europe, this cause of strife would also be removed. Russia need no longer threaten India. Russia's true well-being can never consist in spreading herself over the deserts and wastes of Asia, or in the endless compulsory subjection of hostile races under her. She will doubtless in time perceive this.

Historical facts have already marked out the domain of both realms and the boundaries of their influence. The greater part of Southern Asia is more or less subjected to England. The whole of Northern and Central Asia belongs to Russia. Russia and England have a common mission in Asia—to promote the Christian civilization of the world; and in this direction each has her special call.

Also in the relations between Russia and Germany are found indeed inflammable materials; but with wise action on both sides they may be got rid of.

Russia has, more than any other power, promoted the unity and powerful position of Germany. Except during the strife between the Empress Elizabeth and Frederic II., constant friendly relations have obtained between Russia and Prussia; so, under Frederick II. and Catherine II., and during Prussia's struggle against Napoleon I. while the friendship between Alexander II. and William I. made possible the wars of 1866 and 1870-71. The House of Hohenzollern, which has never been any friend of popular freedom, felt drawn to Russia upon the ground of its devotion to conservative modes of thought and its absolutism.

But since Prussia has realized her goal—that of being the leading power in Germany—the relations with Russia have become more and more strained.

One of the chief causes has been the disputes caused by economic questions, and that of the customs in particular.

In addition to this is the general misunderstanding fomented by the press. The political press, says Kamarowski, ought to serve the cause of peace to-day more than ever. Unhappily it by no means does. With few exceptions it helps to fan and feed national hatred, and to stir up enmity between the European States. Most of the principal organs have a narrower horizon than this. Some of these papers and periodicals are worked only as business undertakings, to make the greatest possible profit to the shareholders; the best of them defend with gross one-sidedness the interests of their own country; seldom do they disclose any insight into great, purely humanitarian interests. The political press is, therefore, for the most part a constant source of reciprocal suspicion and hatred, which hinders the States of Europe from entering into the condition of peace they all inwardly so long for. Dip at random into a heap of most of the great papers, and you will find the strangest ideas respecting international justice; rank self-assertion in judgment, and purely barbarous sentiments respecting subjugating and destroying so-called hereditary enemies.

Lastly, there is a cause of tension between Russia and Germany in their opposing attitude with regard to the Sclav question; and if a satisfactory solution is not found for this question in a peaceable way, a crowd of complications will arise, into which Russia will inevitably be drawn.

We have first the Polish question. In our day Russia is entering, through the power of circumstances, more and more into her historic vocation of giving freedom and unity to the Sclavs. But this undertaking stands in direct opposition to the policy which was expressed in the partition of Poland.