Kiao-chau, in the Province of Shan-tung, was, as will be remembered, a port marked in the so-called Cassini Convention for the use of the Russian squadron. Its value as a commercial and strategical point d’appui, as well as the greatness of the mineral wealth of Shan-tung, must have been as well known to the Germans as to the Russians.[[180]] How it happened that Russia forsook this important position, or, more accurately, how Germany succeeded in securing its lease without a protest from Russia, still remains to be explained. It is known, however, that the offers which had been made by China, perhaps in recognition of Germany’s service in the Liao-tung affair,[[181]] of a docking and coaling station on the southern coast, had been declined by Germany;[[182]] and also that Germany’s own attempts to secure a point on the Lappa Island near Amoy, and later in Amoy itself, had never materialized. As to Kiao-chau; the desire of Germany for its possession had henceforth been often observed by the Chinese Minister at Berlin,[[183]] but, for the realization of the desire, either the time was not ripe, or the susceptibilities of Russia had to be considered. Toward the latter half of 1897, however, the German Government seemed to have concluded that a general partition of China was now a likelihood, for which emergency Germany should prepare herself by obtaining a powerful foothold on the littoral. Observe the following statement made, in a retroactive manner, after the lease of Kiao-chau had been acquired, by Herr von Bülow in the Reichstag, on April 27, 1898: “Mention has been made of the partition of China. Such a partition will not be brought about by us, at any rate. All we have done is to provide that, come what may, we ourselves shall not go empty-handed. The traveller cannot decide when the train is to start, but he can make sure not to miss it when it does start. The devil takes the hindmost.... In any case, we have secured in Kiao-chau a strategical and political position which assures us a decisive influence in the future of the Far East. From this strong position we can look on with complacency on the development of affairs. We have such a large sphere of action and such important tasks before us that we have no occasion to grudge other nations the concessions made them. German diplomacy will pursue its path in the East as everywhere else—calmly, firmly, and peacefully. We will never play the part of mischief-maker; nor will we play that of Cinderella.”[[184]] Before this glorious consummation was reached, Germany must have, it is presumed, made diplomatic efforts to conciliate Russia, and it is in this connection that it is alleged by some that the two Powers then matured between themselves a compromise whereby Germany should not be molested in her possible attempt to seize Kiao-chau at the first opportunity, and Russia, in her turn, should be free to follow the precedent and demand of China a lease of Port Arthur.[[185]]
However that may be, an opportunity for Germany’s action came when, as is well known, two German Catholic priests were murdered by a mob in the Kü-ye District, in Shan-tung, on November 1, 1897. The late Provincial Governor, Li Ping-hing, who had recently been transferred to Sz-chwan, was suspected of having instigated the crime. The Peking Government at once ordered a strict search for the culprits, and in three weeks the local authorities succeeded in arresting four of the guilty persons.[[186]] It was too late. Three German men-of-war had arrived at Kiao-chau, about November 17, to be joined later by several others, and landed 600 marines, who seized the Chinese barracks of the port.[[187]] As the Tsung-li Yamên had received no previous communication from the German authorities regarding the demonstration, it “could only surmise that Kiao-chau had been seized on account of the murder of the German missionaries.”[[188]] The German Minister at Peking, Baron von Heyking, then presented six demands, including the punishment of the late Governor Li, an indemnity for the murdered, and the preference for German capital and engineers in the future railway and mining enterprises in the Province of Shan-tung—the desire for the lease of Kiao-chau being still veiled,—and these demands were, with some modifications, accepted by China. At this time, however, Prince Henry of Germany, whom the Kaiser had bade farewell at Kiel in his celebrated “mailed fist” speech, was on his way to China with his squadron. As soon as he arrived, Baron von Heyking presented the long concealed demand for a lease of the bay and the surrounding promontories of Kiao-chau. In the face of the strong position and forces commanded by Germany, China had no choice but to yield.[[189]] When she was finally, on March 6, 1898, prevailed upon to sign the Agreement with Germany, the Government of the latter declined to publish anything but its first section containing the use and lease of Kiao-chau,[[190]] and the contents of its other two sections concerning the railway and mining privileges granted to Germany[[191]] in the Shan-tung Province, as well as a separate agreement concerning the direct reparation for the crime of Kü-ye, have not, so far as is known, been officially given to the world from Berlin.[[192]]
The act of Germany was a débâcle, and in the concessions she wrested from China were involved questions of grave importance and far-reaching consequences. In the first place, was not the lease of a commanding port in reality an infringement of the territorial sovereignty of the Chinese Empire? In the second place, how could the preference given to Germany in the future railway and mining operations in one of the richest of the eighteen Provinces be reconciled with the principle of the equal opportunity for the economic enterprise of all nations in China? If the action of Germany could be, as it soon seemed to be, used by other Powers as a precedent, would not the consequences for the cause, to say the least, of the fair treatment and mutual harmony in China of the nations among themselves be disastrous? It is interesting to observe the attitude taken toward this incident by Great Britain, the Power which possessed the greatest interest in insisting upon, as well as strongest power to enforce, the two cardinal principles of the world’s diplomacy in China, namely, the territorial sovereignty of the Chinese Empire and the equality therein of economic opportunity for all nations. Official dispatches of the day clearly indicate that, on the one hand, Germany made efforts to allay the susceptibilities of Great Britain, and that, on the other, the British remonstrances were not only so mollified as to be ineffective, but were also turned in such a direction as only to add to the dangers of the situation. Let us observe how this was done. It was repeatedly declared, during the negotiations between Germany and China, by the German Representatives at Peking and London and by Herr von Bülow himself, that the northern port of Kiao-chau had been chosen for its remoteness, for one thing, from the regions in which England was directly interested; that nothing was being done during the negotiations with China which would be embarrassing to Great Britain; that Germany was raising no objections to the British terms of the Anglo-German loan to China now under consideration; that the management of the new colony would be found to be liberal, for the German Government was convinced that the British system of colonization was the right one; and that the Kaiser and his Government were strong partisans of a good understanding between Germany and England.[[193]] Beside these assurances from Germany, it is interesting to note that, on December 1, 1897, Sir Claude MacDonald wrote from Peking to the Marquess of Salisbury: “If the German occupation of Kiao-chau is only used as a leverage for obtaining satisfactory reparation ... for the murder of the German missionaries, the effect on the security of our own people will be of the best. If, on the other hand, the German object is to secure Kiao-chau as a naval station, under cover of their demands for reparation, it is by no means clear that their acquisition of it will prejudice our interests.”[[194]] Whether or not this idea was indorsed by the British Government, Sir Frank C. Lascelles, the Representative at Berlin, said to Herr von Bülow, on December 30, “That, so far as he knew, Her Majesty’s Government had raised no objection to the German ships going to Kaio-chau. Should, however, a demand be put forward for exclusive privileges, or should other countries seek to take possession of Chinese ports, it would probably become necessary for Her Majesty’s Government to take steps for the protection of her vast interests in China.”[[195]] In this last sentence is seen a curse of China’s foreign relations, that is, the idea of the balance of power—a balance between foreign nations on her ground and at her expense. An offending Power would not retrace its steps, and another Power would virtually recognize them by itself demanding counterbalancing rights from China, which might expect other Powers also to follow suit with little regard to her primary rights of sovereignty. Germany could scarcely have felt the force of the British protest which was, indeed, rather directed to China than to Germany. The latter secured what she asked, and made Kiao-chau as free a port as her treaty-tariff system would allow;[[196]] but German claims to the sole right of railroad and mining concessions in the province were speedily emphasized by the organization of the Schan-tung Eisenbahngesellschaft, with a capital of fifty-four million marks, and also of the Deutsche Bergbaugesellschaft.[[197]]
CHAPTER IV
PORT ARTHUR AND TALIEN-WAN
As has been said, it appears impossible at the present state of our knowledge to trace the exact connection of Russia with the German occupation of Kiao-chau.[[198]] What is of more direct interest to our study, and is more easily established by evidence, is the fact that, with the plea that she could not be denied what had been granted to Germany,[[199]] Russia closely followed the latter’s example,[[200]] and, under similar terms to hers,[[201]] demanded a lease of Port Arthur and Talien-wan, and also a railway concession between a point in the Manchurian line granted in 1896 and the ports. Recent years have seldom seen a situation so instructive of the character of the Far Eastern diplomacy in general, and of Russia’s method in particular, as the foreign relations in China which culminated in the conclusion of the Russo-Chinese Agreement of March 27, 1898. These relations were also unusually complex, owing to the position which England held therein, whose vast interests in various parts of China were at once brought in many-sided contact, not only with Russia, but also with other Powers interested in China.
On December 20, 1897, a report reached the British Foreign Office that three Russian men-of-war had arrived at Port Arthur, and that three others were expected at Talien-wan and three more at Port Arthur.[[202]] Two days later it was officially explained by Count Muravieff “that the step taken was entirely a question of convenience for the ships, and had absolutely no connection with the occupation of the bay of Kiao-chau by Germany.” The Count added “that there had always been a difficulty about keeping more than a certain number of men-of-war at a time in Japanese ports, and that, consequently, the Imperial Government had been glad to accept the offer of the Chinese Government to allow the Russian squadron to winter at Port Arthur. This arrangement was all the more convenient as that port was within an easy distance of Vladivostok, and had an arsenal where their ships could undergo all necessary repairs. Moreover, it was an advantage that Port Arthur was quite free from ice in the winter, though this fact was not so important now, as Vladivostok was at present furnished with an exceptionally powerful ice-breaker, which it was hoped would make that port available for egress and ingress during the winter months. In fact, Vladivostok remained, as heretofore, their centre in the Far East, and the headquarters of their land and sea forces, so that the mere fact of the Russian squadron wintering at Port Arthur made no change whatever in the situation.”[[203]] On the same day that this pacific declaration was made, it was reported, as it was later confirmed by Chinese authorities, that Russia was offering to China a 4 per cent. loan of 16,000,000 pounds at 93, an extremely favorable term, to pay off the balance of the Japanese indemnity. The suggested security was the income of the land tax and likin, besides which Russia was said to have demanded as quid pro quo all future railway concessions in Manchuria and North China, as well as the succession of a Russian subject to Sir Robert Hart as Inspector-General of the Maritime Customs.[[204]] It was on this occasion that M. Pavloff, claiming that the Tsung-li Yamên had promised to employ Russian engineers and Russian capital in the construction of any railway between the Great Wall and the Russian frontier, undertook to record the alleged promise and express his gratification, and, seeing that the Yamên did not reply, took it for granted that the matter was settled, and notified the St. Petersburg Government to that effect.[[205]] Nor did the Russian Representatives at Peking fail thereafter to appeal to this agreement concluded by M. Pavloff in so striking a fashion, whenever China opened any discussion with another Power regarding any subject connected with railways north of Shan-hai-kwan. In the mean time, an Anglo-German syndicate had made an offer, last June, of a loan for the same purpose, and now Sir Claude MacDonald strongly supported a scheme of a new loan presented by the Hong-kong and Shanghai Bank, a British concern, in competition with the Russian proposals.[[206]] One of the terms of the British loan as matured between the Bank, Sir Claude, and the Marquess of Salisbury, was the opening of Talien-wan to foreign trade.[[207]] The British Minister’s intention obviously was, among other things, to forestall the possible Russian occupation of this port as well as Port Arthur.[[208]] The significance was well understood by the Tsung-li Yamên, which was, however, afraid to embroil China with Russia, for the latter’s Chargé d’Affaires “had protested, under instructions from his Government, against its [Talien-wan’s] opening in the strongest manner, and had warned the Yamên that it would incur the hostility of Russia by doing so.”[[209]] The reason for this strenuous opposition was, on January 19, 1898, explained by the Russian Ambassador at London, who “urged very strongly that if we [the British Government] insisted on making Talien-wan an open port, we should be encroaching on the Russian sphere of influence, and denying her in the future that right to the use of Port Arthur to which the progress of events had given her a claim.” These remarks were significant in showing how foreign was the idea of the open door to the Russian policy in Manchuria. When Lord Salisbury asked the Ambassador, in the same interview, what possible objection he could have to making Talien-wan a free port if Russia had no designs on that territory, the latter replied “that without any such designs it was generally admitted that Russia might claim a commercial débouché upon the open sea, and that in order to enjoy that advantage fully she ought to be at liberty to make such arrangements with China as she could obtain with respect to the commercial régime which was to prevail there.” Here is a clear indication that Russia had little faith in the compatibility of other nations’ commercial welfare in China with her own, or, in other words, in the ability of her people and the efficiency of their economic organization to compete with other nations in an open market. Else, she would not object to the opening of a port to the world’s trade. Lord Salisbury reminded the Russian Representative that “the most-favored-nation clause forbade China to give Russia at Talien-wan more favorable terms with regard to customs duties than she gave to other treaty Powers.”[[210]] England’s position, which was repeatedly shown to Russia, was that it was natural that Russia should open a port for her commerce on the coasts of the North Pacific,[[211]] but that it would be a contravention of the treaty rights[[212]] of other nations to make of the port an exclusive market for Russian trade. Under these persistent representations, Count Muravieff at last declared, on January 28, through M. de Staal, Ambassador at London, that any (tout)[[213]] commercial outlet secured by Russia “would be open to the ships of all the great Powers, like other ports on the Chinese mainland. It would be open to the commerce of all the world, and England, whose trade interests are so important in those regions, would share in the advantage.”[[214]] Then what was meant by “open”? M. de Staal stated on February 10: “I cannot in any way anticipate the decisions of my Government, which, in the event of acquiring an outlet in Chinese waters, naturally remains free either to establish a porto franco [i. e., a port where goods imported are exempt from all import dues] there, or to assimilate the port in question to the treaty ports of the Chinese littoral.”[[215]] It will be seen later that, through the Imperial Order of July 30 (August 11), 1899,[[216]] Russia declared Dalny a “free port” in the sense of a porto franco, under certain conditions. In the face of these elastic conditions, one would be slow, in spite of the Order, to admit that the question stated by M. de Staal in the quoted passage has been definitively settled by his government one way or the other, or in a third alternative.[[217]]
Up to this point, namely, about February 10, 1898, one can follow the gradual withdrawal of Lord Salisbury’s position. He at first seemed to have accepted Sir Claude MacDonald’s suggestion to insist upon the opening of Talien-wan as a condition of the British-Chinese loan, but, evidently at the Russian opposition, presently contented himself with giving the following instruction to the British Minister at Peking: “You are not bound to insist on making Talien-wan a treaty port if you think it impracticable, though we give it up with regret. Would it be possible to obtain a promise of such a concession if ever a railway was made to that port? You should maintain demand for opening of other ports.”[[218]] Then, when the Chinese Government was so pressed by the opposition of Russia and France as to declare on January 30 that unless England pledged herself to offer protection to China against Russia, she could not consent to accept the loan,[[219]] Lord Salisbury’s policy receded further than before. He now made representations to Russia not to infringe the most-favored-nation treatment in Talien-wan, if she should lease the port. It is needless to say that such a direct request to Russia was tantamount, on the part of England, to abandoning the desire of securing the opening of the port from China, which, save for Russian threats, was willing to comply with the desire; and to acquiescing in and even recognizing Russia’s right to lease the port, instead of opening it as a treaty port. Under these circumstances, it was not strange that the British Government was met by Russia with the ambiguous phrase, “open port,” which, in spite of Lord Salisbury’s attempt[[220]] to interpret it in the sense of a porto franco, was found, in M. de Staal’s statement of February 10, already quoted, to be still more uncertain than it appeared when it was first declared. Russia seemed to have gained all that England lost, but it was a mere prelude to a far more serious situation which was still to develop.
It would have been plain to any one, had he been susceptible to certain unmistakable signs, that Russia’s desires in Manchuria were more extensive than the mere acquisition of a lease of a commercial outlet on the Yellow Sea. The same Count Muravieff, who had said three weeks before that the presence of Russian ships at Port Arthur late in 1897 was purely for the sake of wintering there, and that the fact that Port Arthur was ice-free was not very important, now declared, on January 12, 1898, that when the Russian fleet had left the port, after wintering there, the Chinese Government had given the Russians a prior right of anchorage—le droit du premier mouillage.[[221]] The question so gently broached was more clearly pronounced a week later, when M. de Staal strongly maintained that the opening of Talien-wan would result in an encroachment upon the Russian sphere of influence, and in “denying her in the future that right to the use of Port Arthur to which the progress of events had given her a claim.”[[222]] In the face of these official remarks, it would be impossible to deny that Russia wished to use, not only Talien-wan, but also Port Arthur, and the latter for purposes clearly other than commercial. Yet the British Government does not seem to have taken any action in the matter, but, on the contrary, its tacit recognition of Russia’s demand of the lease of Talien-wan was not of a nature to discourage her design upon Port Arthur. On February 14, China made concessions to Great Britain regarding internal navigation, the non-alienation of the Yang-tsze Provinces, and the appointment of an Englishman to the inspectorate-general of customs so long as the British trade was preponderant in China;[[223]] on the 19th, the preliminary agreement of the British loan was signed;[[224]] and March 6 saw the conclusion of the German agreement concerning the lease of Kiao-chau and privileges in the Province of Shan-tung. Russia immediately seized this opportunity in bringing forward her long cherished design, for, on March 7, it was simultaneously reported in the London Times and by Sir Claude MacDonald, soon to be confirmed by the Tsungli-Yamên and admitted by Count Muravieff, that M. Pavloff was pressing the Peking Government to grant the lease of Port Arthur and Talien-wan and the railway concession from Petuna on the trans-Manchurian Railway to the ports.[[225]] The report appears to have made a profound impression upon the British Government, which, on the day it was received, was compelled to say that, if the Russian demands were granted, “her influence over the Government of Peking would be so increased, to the detriment of that of Her Majesty’s Government, that it seemed desirable for them to make some counter-move. The best plan would perhaps be, on the cession of Wei-hai-Wei by the Japanese [who had been holding it, according to the treaty, pending the final payment of Chinese indemnity], to insist on the refusal of a lease of that port on terms similar to those granted to Germany.”[[226]] This view was sounded, it is true, to the British Minister at Peking, and not to the Russian Government, but the latter was not to encounter an effective protest from a government which had so soon made up its mind that the protest might fail and be compensated by itself reproducing the evil at China’s expense.[[227]] At any rate, Count Muravieff deemed it now safe to declare, beginning with March 8, that no alternative had been left to Russia, under the uncertainty attending the development of affairs in the Far East and other circumstances, but to demand a cession both of Talien-wan and Port Arthur, the former only to be opened to foreign trade; that one of these ports without the other would be of no use to Russia, while the use of both was of vital necessity to her; and that the lease would not interfere with the sovereign rights of the Chinese Empire. To the last pledge was added, probably at the persistent representations of England, that the treaty rights acquired by the Powers in China would be respected.[[228]]
The distinction made by Count Muravieff between Port Arthur and Talien-wan at once brought home to the British Government the gravity of the situation. The first impulse on the part of Lord Salisbury was to fall back upon M. de Staal’s statement of February 10, that any (tout) port which Russia might acquire on the Chinese coast should be open to the foreign trade.[[229]] Count Muravieff, however, explained that the statement applied only to Talien-wan, but no promise had been made regarding Port Arthur.[[230]] On March 15, however, he was authorized by the Czar to give to Sir N. O’Conor “an assurance that both Port Arthur and Talien-wan would be open to foreign trade, like other Chinese ports, in the event of the Russian Government’s obtaining a lease of these places from the Chinese Government.” The Count intimated next morning that it would be desirable for the British Government not to repeat this assurance in the House of Commons, for “it might be considered as a want of courtesy toward the Chinese Government, who had not yet formally agreed to give the Russian Government a lease of the ports in question.”[[231]]
Presently, however, the British Government awoke to the conviction that Port Arthur was “not a commercial harbor,” and “it was doubtful whether it could be converted into one.” “But,” stated the Marquess of Salisbury, “though not a commercial harbor, Port Arthur supplies a naval base, limited indeed in extent, but possessing great natural and artificial strength. And this, taken in connection with its strategic position, gives it an importance in the Gulf of Pechili and therefore at Peking, upon which, in their representation to Japan at the close of the war with China, the Russian Government laid the greatest emphasis.... The possession, even if temporary, of this particular position, is likely to have political consequences at Peking of great international importance, and the acquisition of a Chinese harbor notoriously useless for commercial purposes by a foreign Power will be universally interpreted in the Far East as indicating that the partition of China has begun.... It may, perhaps, be proper to observe that a great military Power which is conterminous for over four thousand miles with the land frontier of China, including the portion lying nearest to its capital, is never likely to be without its due share of influence on the councils of that country. Her Majesty’s Government regard it as most unfortunate that it has been thought necessary, in addition, to obtain control of a port which, if the rest of the Gulf of Pechili remains in hands so helpless as that of the sovereign Power, will command the maritime approaches to its capital, and give to Russia the same strategic advantage by sea which she already possesses in so ample a measure by land.”[[232]] In this spirit, the British Government asked Count Muravieff through Sir N. O’Conor, on March 23, to reconsider the advisability of pressing demands upon China in regard to Port Arthur. England would not object to the Russian lease of an ice-free commercial harbor connected by rail with the trans-Siberian Railway, but questions of an entirely different kind were opened if Russia obtained control of a military port in the neighborhood of Peking. England, on her part, was prepared to give assurances that beyond the maintenance of the existing treaty rights she had no interests in Manchuria, and to pledge herself not to occupy any port in the Gulf of Pechili as long as other Powers maintained the same policy.[[233]] To this protest, so plainly attended by a second wish of Great Britain to make a counter-move when the prime move of Russia could not be checked, Count Muravieff made, on March 23, a firm reply, refusing absolutely to admit that the integrity of the Chinese Empire was violated by the proposed lease of Port Arthur, and repeating his assertion that the possession of that harbor was a question of vital necessity to Russia. Sir N. O’Conor confessed the futility of his protest.[[234]] About the same day, M. Pavloff informed the Peking Government that Russia could not consider the question of Port Arthur and Talien-wan apart, and insisted upon their lease before the 27th, failing which, Russia would take hostile measures.[[235]] Now England definitely resolved, on March 25, to obtain speedily the lease of Wei-hai-Wei in terms similar to those granted to Russia for Port Arthur, and ordered the British fleet to proceed from Hong-kong to the Gulf of Pechili,[[236]] and, three days later, notified the Russian Government that she would retain her entire liberty of action to take steps to protect her interests, and to diminish the evil consequences which she anticipated.[[237]] On the preceding day, however, a Russo-Chinese Agreement had been signed, incorporating all the points upon which Russia had insisted and against which England had vainly protested. Count Muravieff at once briefly announced to the Powers the successful conclusion of the Agreement;[[238]] and, when the British Government called upon him to fulfill his promise to give a written assurance of Russia’s declared intention to respect the sovereign rights of China and the treaty privileges of the other Powers in the leased territory, he calmly replied that what was interpreted as promises was in fact “very confidentially” expressed views, and that “the time was not opportune” for making the assurances public. Russia would not, he added, so “abuse the lease granted by a friendly Power” as “to arbitrarily transform a closed and principally military port into a commercial port like any other.”[[239]] The triumph of Russia was tardily followed, on April 3, by the promise England secured from China to lease Wei-hai-Wei to her for the same period as Port Arthur,[[240]] thus again substituting for an effective prevention of evils the “balance”[[241]] and retaliation between the Powers at the expense of China.[[242]]