In this connection, it may be noted that the Russian Government considered, according to Count Muravieff, “that China owed them this [the lease of the ports] for the services they had rendered her in her war with Japan, and these services must be properly requited.”[[243]] It was no matter of surprise to Japan that Russia now secured for herself the most strategic portion of the territory, the retention of which by Japan was, three years ago, declared by the same Power to be imperiling the position of Peking, rendering Korean independence nominal, and interfering with the permanent peace of the Far East. When it was announced by Russia, in December last, that Port Arthur had been lent to her by China only temporarily as a winter anchorage, the Japanese Government merely “credited this assurance, and accordingly took note of it.”[[244]] When the negotiations for the lease were in progress, the Japanese Government made no protest, and when they were consummated, it manifested no appreciable sentiment. At the same time, it quietly approved of the British lease of Wei-hai-Wei,[[245]] which the Japanese troops had still held pending the final payment of the Chinese indemnity. Then they speedily evacuated the port in favor of England, leaving behind them every accommodation to the successor.[[246]]

The Agreement concluded, on March 15/27, 1898, between Li Hung-chang and the Russian Chargé, M. Pavloff, has never been published by the Russian Government, and the only sources to which we can turn are an English translation of a Chinese précis forwarded by Sir Claude MacDonald more than a month after the conclusion of the Agreement,[[247]] and the Chinese text that appears in the Tō-A Kwankei Tokushu Jōyaku Isan.[[248]] Port Arthur and Talien-wan, with their adjacent waters, were leased to Russia for twenty-five years, subject to renewal by mutual agreement, the lease not affecting the sovereign rights of China (Articles 1 and 3); within the leased territory, Chinese citizens might continue to live, but no Chinese troops should be stationed, and the responsibility of military affairs should be vested in one Russian officer, who should not bear the Chinese title of governor-general or governor (Article 4); Port Arthur would be a naval port open only to the Russian and Chinese men-of-war, but closed against the commercial and naval ships of other nations, while Talien-wan, except the portion used exclusively for naval purposes, would be a trading port open freely to the merchant vessels of all nations (Article 6); the Russians would be allowed to build forts and barracks, and provide defenses (Article 7); there should be a neutral territory to the north of the leased ground, which would be administered by Chinese officials, but into which no Chinese troops should be sent without consulting the Russian authorities (Article 5); the railway contract of 1896 might be extended so as to cover a branch line to Talien-wan and, if necessary, another line between Niu-chwang and the Yalu, but the construction of the railways should not be made a ground for securing territory (Article 8). Sir Claude Macdonald presented also, on June 14, what he believed to be an authentic version of the Special Russo-Chinese Agreement concluded on April 25 (May 7), 1898, to supplement the Agreement of March 15.[[249]] It defined the extent of the leased territory, and of the neutral territory to the north of the former (Articles 1 and 2).[[250]] Within the latter, it was agreed, no ports should be open to the trade of other nations, and no economic concessions made to them, without Russian consent (Article 5). At Kin-chow, the administration and police were to be Chinese, but the military, Russian (Article 4). Regarding railways, it was provided that Port Arthur and Talien-wan should be the termini of the conceded line, along which no railway privileges should be given to other nations. Russia would, however, have nothing to say if China herself should undertake to construct a railway from Shan-hai-kwan to a point near the Russian line (Article 3).

These agreements were accompanied by some characteristically pacific and magnanimous utterances by the Czar, professing his firm friendship with China, extolling the wise decision of the Son of Heaven in granting the lease, and emphasizing that the direct communication by means of the great Siberian Railway with the hitherto closed-up country would largely contribute to the peaceful intercourse of the peoples of the East and West, to which task Russia was called by Divine Providence.[[251]]

The leased territory was named Kwan-tung[[252]] by the Russians, and the Provisional Regulations for its administration were published at St. Petersburg through the Bulletin des Lois of August 20 (September 1), 1899.[[253]] By these regulations, the Kwan-tung region was placed under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of War, with its chief seat of administration at Port Arthur (Articles 4 and 6). The Administration was headed by a Governor, appointed and removed at the immediate will of the Czar, who was also Commander-in-Chief of the army forces of the territory and entered into immediate communication with the commander of the cis-Amur region, and in addition commanded the navy at Port Arthur and Vladivostok; the latter port, however, retained its Commander of the port, who was subservient to the Governor (Articles 3, 7, 12, 13, and 14). In matters concerning frontier and foreign relations, the Governor directly communicated with the Russian Representatives at Peking, Tokio, and Seul, and with the Russian military and naval agents (Article 22). At the creation on August 13, 1903, of a Vice-regency in this region, which will receive attention later, it became necessary to make some changes in the administrative rules, which had not been completed at the outbreak of the present war.

Talien-wan being mainly open to foreign trade, its organization and administration were set on a separate basis from the rest of the Kwan-tung. At the instance of M. Witte, then the Minister of Finance, an Imperial Order was promulgated on July 30 (August 11), 1899, ordering that near Talien-wan a new town named Dalny should be built, which was simultaneously declared a free port under the following conditions, namely, that the importation and exportation of merchandise should be allowed free of customs dues in Dalny within the limits determined, and liable to modification, by the Minister of Finance; but that goods imported into Russia from Dalny should pay the regular import duties in force in the Russian Empire.[[254]] By the Provisional Regulations already referred to of August 20 (September 1) of the same year, the organization of Dalny was assigned to the Eastern Chinese Railway Company, under the chief direction of the Minister of Finance, and its administration was intrusted to a Prefect, to be appointed and dismissed by Imperial orders and subordinate to the Governor of the Kwan-tung (Articles 99 and 101).[[255]] It is already well known that Dalny, now covering about 100 square versts in area, was, according to M. Witte’s plan, intended to be the commercial terminus of the great Siberian Railway, and eventually the mercantile outlet on the Pacific of the vast Russian Empire. Before the war, the works at Dalny, including its large docks and piers, had cost already nearly 20,000,000 rubles. Part of this immense expenditure was to have been met by the income of the public sales at auction of land-lots, held three times since 1902, in spite of the fact that the twenty-five year lease of the territory to Russia would hardly justify her in alienating portions of it permanently.[[256]]

CHAPTER V
SECRETARY HAY’S CIRCULAR NOTE

It is unnecessary for us to describe how, between 1897 and 1899, other so-called spheres of influence and of economic concessions than those already mentioned were marked out in China by the Powers, for, important as they are in the general history of the modern East, they have little bearing upon our immediate subject. It suffices to recall that the process was begun by the German seizure of Kiao-chau; that unfortunately Great Britain felt obliged to have recourse to the policy of the balance of power; and that no other “sphere” had the grave significance and the evil forebodings of the Russian territory of the Kwan-tung in Manchuria. It was during this period that a Power whose position was so unique as to justify the act appealed to the other interested Powers, in September, 1899, to make declarations that they would observe the principle of the equal economic opportunity for all nations in their respective spheres of interest in China. The principle thus proposed by the United States was stated to imply (1) non-interference with the treaty rights and vested interests of each other; (2) the maintenance of the Chinese treaty tariff, except in “free ports,” under the Chinese management; and (3) no differential treatment in the harbor duties and railway charges, in the spheres. The phrase “leased territory” was used in connection with only the first of these three points, while the words “spheres of interest” were applied to all three, so that it was uncertain whether the second and third points were intended by Secretary Hay to cover the leases, as well as the spheres.[[257]] In reply to this proposition, Great Britain, which had stronger reason than the United States to indorse a policy which had originated with her and which she had long upheld in China at enormous cost, and Japan expressed their unequivocal adherence to the proposed principle. Germany, France, and Italy also assented, all except Italy, however, with the natural reservation that the desired declarations would be made if all other interested Powers acted likewise.[[258]] As regards the question whether the three points applied to the leases and spheres alike, it is interesting to note that Germany, France, and Great Britain replied, in effect, in the affirmative, Germany using the expression “its Chinese possessions,” and France employing the phrase “the territories which were leased to her.” The statement used by Great Britain was the most explicit and comprehensive, for she mentioned “the leased territory of Wei-hai-Wei and all territory in China which may hereafter be acquired by Great Britain, by lease or otherwise, and all ‘spheres of interest’ now held, or that may hereafter be held in China.” Beside these assurances, the Russian assent was highly significant, which, with the reservation similar to that of the other Powers, stated: “As to the ports now opened, or hereafter to be opened, to foreign commerce by the Chinese Government,[[259]] and which lie beyond the leased territory to Russia, the settlement of the question of customs duties belongs to China herself, and the Imperial Government [of Russia] has no intention whatever of claiming any privileges for its own subjects to the exclusion of foreigners.” But “in so far as the territory leased by China to Russia is concerned, the Imperial Government [of Russia] has already demonstrated its firm intention to follow the policy of the ‘open door’ by creating Dalny (Talien-wan) a free port; and if at some future time that port, although remaining free itself, should be separated by a custom-limit from other portions of the territory in question, the customs duties would be levied, in the zone subject to the tariff, upon all foreign merchants without distinction as to nationality. With the conviction,” the Russian note concluded, “that this reply is such as to ratify the inquiry made in the aforementioned note [of the United States], the Imperial Government is happy to have complied with the wishes of the American Government, especially as it attaches the highest value to anything that may strengthen and consolidate the traditional relations of friendship existing between the two countries.”[[260]] On the strength of the various replies from the Powers, however, the United States Government considered that “the Declaration suggested by the United States on that subject [i. e., the proposals about the Chinese trade] had been accepted by those Powers,” and regarded the assent given by them “as final and definite.”[[261]] It is interesting to note that no Power made a formal declaration[[262]] suggested by Secretary Hay, who, however, seems to have deemed the replies with reservations as equivalent to such a declaration. It is problematical whether this exchange of notes did in the slightest degree have the effect of changing the actual situation, at least so far as Russia was concerned.

CHAPTER VI
THE OCCUPATION OF MANCHURIA

We have given only an incomplete account of the manner in which certain Powers seemed, during the years 1897 and 1898, to vie with one another in transgressing, in effect, the principle of the territorial integrity of the Chinese Empire, to which they at the same time professed their adherence. Another principle, however,—that of the open door, or of the equal opportunity in China for the commercial and industrial enterprise of all nations,—was, as we have seen, not as openly ignored even by the most aggressive Powers. The time arrived, in 1900, when the observance of both principles appeared to be the only safeguard against a general partition of China and an internal revolution through the length and breadth of the vast Empire. The story of the Boxer trouble is too fresh in every one’s memory to need to be retold. It was during this insurrection, and during the march of the allied forces toward Peking and the long negotiations which followed it, that all the Powers concerned repeatedly and unequivocally pledged themselves to one another to maintain the two cardinal principles of Chinese diplomacy. It now belongs to us to relate, however, that it was in the midst of this reiterated promise of fair play that the most acute stage of the Manchurian question was reached. Evidence is abundant to show that Russia was inclined greatly to underestimate the seriousness of the troubles in North China, where a concerted action of all the interested Powers was imperative, while in Manchuria, which Russia had for years regarded as her sphere of influence,[[263]] she carried forward aggressive measures with great rapidity and on an enormous scale. Thus, even so late as June 20, when the railway communication of Peking with Tientsin had been cut for three weeks;[[264]] when Prince Tuan and his anti-foreign counselors swayed the Court, and the Tsung-li Yamên had long proved utterly impotent to cope with the situation;[[265]] when the 6000 Chinese soldiers sent against the Boxers around Tientsin betrayed themselves into inaction;[[266]] when the international relief corps of marines led by Admiral Seymour had already been forced backward;[[267]] when the Boxers had at last poured into Peking[[268]] and held the foreigners in siege for a week, killing many Chinese as well as the Japanese Chancellor Sugiyama;[[269]] and when the Taku forts had been taken by the allied squadron,[[270]] only to infuriate the anti-foreign sentiment all over North China;[[271]] when no news had been received by him even from Tientsin and Taku for the past four days,[[272]] and after he had dispatched 4000 Russian soldiers for the disposal of M. de Giers at Peking,[[273]]—Count Muravieff still held an optimistic view, and supposed that the trouble would be over within two weeks, saying that Middle and South China were under a greater peril than the North.[[274]] This last assertion, which he made more than once,[[275]] is significant when we consider that Middle and South China included regions where British interests were predominant. Although Russia persistently declared her firm intention to act in concert with other Powers in North China, it is not altogether impossible to suppose, as it has been alleged, that she was not unwilling to divert the attention of Great Britain and others from North China, where Russia would not have hesitated, if possible, to render her sole assistance to China to suppress the insurrection. At least, Russia declared it to be one of her objects in China to “assist the Chinese Government in the work of reëstablishing order so necessary in the primary interest of China herself;”[[276]] at least, the pro-Russian Li Hung-chang expressed, on June 22, an otherwise inexplicable confidence in his ability to restore peace.[[277]] The real siege and firing of the Peking Legations had begun two days before, on June 20, the day when Count Muravieff uttered his optimistic remarks at St. Petersburg. The latter died the next day, and was succeeded in the Foreign Ministry by Count Lamsdorff. On June 26, the Russian Government ordered the mobilization into Manchuria of six large corps of troops from Hailar, Blagovestchensk and Habarofsk, Vladivostok and Possiet, and European Russia.[[278]] One estimate put the number of the Russian soldiers who had arrived in Manchuria by August at 30,000.[[279]] It is not easy to determine whether Russia took the offensive in the great Manchurian campaign which now began, or whether hostile acts of the Chinese precipitated it, but it seems safe to say that rumors of impending dangers had been abundant before the Russian troops poured into the territory,[[280]] and also that the dispatch of the latter apparently provoked more extensive outrages of the rioters than would otherwise have been the case. We hear of the destruction of the railway and burning of religious establishments near Liao-yang and Mukden only from the end of June and beginning of July,[[281]] and the alleged determination of the Chinese troops to drive out all Russians from Manchuria was reported in the Russian Official Messenger toward the middle of July.[[282]] Just at this time riots occurred in the Liao-tung and its vicinity, communication by the Amur ceased, and Blagovestchensk was suddenly bombarded by the Chinese, followed by the slaughter of thousands of Chinese inhabitants by the Russian soldiers under General Gribsky.[[283]] Toward the south and east, the depot of Ninguta was destroyed, and several Russians were murdered at An-tung, about July 20. The Russian troops, many of whom had now arrived at different points in Manchuria, captured Hun-chun on July 27, Argun on July 30, Haibin on August 3, and Aigun and San-sin soon afterward.[[284]] Even the treaty port of Niu-chwang had also been seized, for which conduct the British and American consular agents could not find sufficient justification. On August 5, the port was placed under the civil administration of Russian authorities, under which injustice and disorder were said to have much increased.[[285]] It was on August 14, the day when the allied forces had almost reached Peking, that General Groderkoff in command of the northern army of the Manchurian invasion wrote to the Minister of War at St. Petersburg: “Fifty years ago Nevelskoy raised the Russian flag at the mouth of the Amur, on its right bank, and laid the foundation for our possessions on that great river. Now, after hard fighting, we have taken possession of the right bank, thus consolidating the great enterprise of annexing the whole of the Amur to Russia’s dominions, and making that river an internal waterway and not a frontier stream, whereby free and unmolested navigation of that artery through one of the vastest regions of the Empire has been secured.” Indeed, by the time when the Peking Legations were relieved, the major part of Manchuria had been reduced under a military occupation by Russia.[[286]] This may be said to mark a new stage in the development of the Manchurian question, for no longer was this vast territory a mere sphere of Russian influence; it was a prize of conquest.[[287]] The problem for the Government of the Czar henceforth seemed to the outside world to be not so much how it might tighten its hold upon Manchuria, as how it might convert the temporary occupation into a permanent possession.