“Article 2. The Imperial Government of Japan shall, in a spirit of firm friendship, insure the safety and repose of the Imperial House of Korea.
“Article 3. The Imperial Government of Japan firmly guarantee the independence and the territorial integrity of the Korean Empire.
“Article 4. In case the welfare of the Imperial House of Korea, or the territorial integrity of Korea, is endangered by the aggression of a third Power, or internal disturbances, the Imperial Government of Japan shall immediately take such necessary measures as circumstances require, and in such case the Imperial Government of Korea shall give full facilities to promote the action of the Imperial Japanese Government.
“The Imperial Government of Japan may, for the attainment of the above-mentioned object, occupy, when circumstances require it, such places as may be necessary from the strategic point of view.
“Article 5. The Government of the two countries shall not, in the future, without mutual consent, conclude with a third Power such an arrangement as may be contrary to the principles of the present Protocol.
“Article 6. Details in connection with the present Protocol shall be arranged as the circumstances may require between the Representative of Japan and the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Korea.”
It is impossible to imagine in the history of the Russo-Japanese conflict a more striking indication of the new situation it has opened than this Protocol of February 23, 1904. It is at once a culmination of past events and a background for future activities. It sums up the failures of the past experience and calls forth innumerable new problems and difficulties. It will be seen, in the first place, that the agreement is limited by no fixed term; it exists for all time. Then the fundamental problem of the Japanese-Korean relations is revealed here in this Protocol in a clear outline, and is solved in the most logical manner. The problem may be stated thus: Japan’s interest and conviction demand that Korea should be independent, prosperous, and powerful; but Korea neither could nor would be so. One remembers how Japan had struggled to solve this problem, ever since she overthrew the feudal régime of her own Government in 1868 and entered upon a new career as a nation. At first, in 1876, she declared Korea independent, and opened a few of her ports to the world’s trade. Korea did not desire and China could not tolerate the independence. The result was the war of 1894–5, which succeeded in forcing the independence of Korea. The latter, however, proved neither more desirous nor more capable of an independent career than she was under Chinese sovereignty, while at the time China’s position was merely replaced by that of a more active Power, Russia. Japan seemed, after her costly war, which, it is not too much to say, alone had earned the sovereign rights of Korea, to acquiesce in the altered situation to such an extent as to admit Russia into a partnership with herself in the nonintervention in Korea.[[685]] Bitter was Japan’s experience in this artificial arrangement. Korea would not strive for a freer life any more than Russia would abstain from incessant interference.[[686]] Thus the conviction was every year more forcibly and painfully impressed upon Japan’s mind that the threatening situation in the East arose from the two fundamental defects of the existing arrangement: first, Korea’s independence would be illusory so long as her administrative system remained, as it did, corrupt to the core, but no reform would result from a system of non-interference; second, no joint reform in Korea would be possible so long as one of the contracting parties to the agreements of 1896 and 1898 found in Korea’s decay the source of its influence over her. In short, in order to guard the common interests of Japan and Korea, the former would be constrained to reform the latter even against her will; and, again, in order to effect a thoroughgoing reform, Japan would be obliged to part ways with Russia in Korea. One half of the Russo-Japanese negotiations in 1903–4 hinged on Japan’s desire for a free hand in Korea in the interest of reform. The negotiations having failed, and Russia having withdrawn from Korea, Japan suddenly found herself alone with the latter, and hastened to conclude with her an agreement which seemed to embody the only possible logical solution of the great historic problem of the Japanese-Korean relations.
Let us look this solution more squarely in the face. Japan’s ardent desire for the independence and strength of Korea, as a means of insuring the mutual benefit of the two Powers and of establishing a lasting peace in the East, would seem to constitute the guiding principle of the entire document. The historic inability of Korea to be independent and strong is met in three different methods, each one of which will not fail to bring about far-reaching consequences. In the first place, the political influence of a third Power is absolutely excluded (Article 5), for the latter’s interest might lie in the direction of the dependence and weakness of Korea. In the second place, Japan alone guarantees, for all time, the security and repose of the reigning house of Korea and the independence and territorial integrity of the Empire (Articles 2 and 3). For the practical execution of this principle, Japan further pledges herself to defend Korea from dangers, and Korea in return allows to Japan necessary strategic facilities (Article 4). Finally, and immediately the most important of all, Japan undertakes to institute reforms in Korea, for which she shall be invested with the full confidence of Korea (Article 1). These three important methods, it is needless to repeat, are subservient to the central principle: the independence and integrity of Korea. This large issue must always prevail over minor incidents.
Coming still nearer to the practical side of the Protocol, it is not difficult to see that, of the three methods already explained, one stands out as the most important and most difficult,—the reform. No greater burden and no more delicate work for a nation can be imagined than that of regenerating another whose nobility has grown powerful under corruption, and whose lower classes do not desire a higher existence. On the other hand, the inertia and resistance of Korea would be tremendous, in which her “full confidence” would give place to hatred and rancor. The proverbial machinations of the peninsular politicians would be set in motion in all their speed and confusion. It would not be surprising if, under the circumstances, even a military control of Korea of a temporary and mild nature should become necessary in order to cure her malady and set her house in order. On the other hand, when the necessary reform should be so deep and wide as is required in the present instance, the temptation of the reformer would be great, and the suspicion of the reformed even greater, where political reformatory enterprises border upon the economic.[[687]] Here and everywhere, Japan would save herself from the gravest of errors, in spite of her best intention in the large issue, only by the severest self-control and consummate tact. Great is the penalty of Japan that arises from her peculiar position. She has never encountered in her long history a greater trial of her moral force as a nation than in the new situation opened by the Protocol. As to the world at large, it will look forward to an intensely interesting experiment of human history.