[189]. The lease was later fixed for ninety-nine years. The leased territory covers about 540 square kilometres (208.4 square miles), including about 80,000 inhabitants.
[190]. Das Staatsarchiv, Band 61, No. 11518.
[191]. Meyers, pp. 281–282; China, No. 1 (1899), No. 65; Tokushu Jōyaku, pp. 359–360, 363–365.
[192]. For the extraordinary proceedings of the German Minister in his dealings with the Chinese Government, see China, No. 1 (1898), Nos. 5, 6, 17, 20, 34, 35, 40, 53, 70, 73, and 113. Also see Tokushu Jōyaku, pp. 355–357.
[193]. See China, No. 1 (1898), Nos. 39, 49, 74. It is interesting to observe that when, in order to restore the balance of power in the Gulf of Pechili, which had been disturbed by the lease of Port Arthur by Russia, England demanded the lease of Wei-hai-Wei, she took pains to explain to Germany that her acquisition of the port, the meaning of which was purely military, would in no way interfere with the German interests in Shan-tung, and that there would be no attempt to make railway connections with Wei-hai-Wei. An interesting diplomatic correspondence followed this explanation, which it is hardly necessary to describe. What is emphasized here is that England, in negotiating the lease of Wei-hai-Wei, largely reciprocated the cordiality Germany had shown in her occupation of Kiao-chau. See China, No. 1 (1899), Nos. 2, 8, 9, 10, and 31.
[194]. China, No. 1 (1898), p. 20.
[195]. Ibid., p. 14, No. 39. Sir Claude MacDonald had already written to the Tsung-li Yamên, on December 10: “I have the honor to inform your Highnesses and your Excellencies that I have received telegraphic instructions from Her Majesty’s Government to address the Yamên with regard to the concession in Shan-tung which it is reported that the German Government has asked from China. I am directed to state that Her Majesty’s Government will demand equality of treatment for British subjects according to the treaty rights possessed by Great Britain, and that Her Majesty’s Government will require compensation on any points in respect to which those rights may be disregarded.”—Ibid., p. 28, inclosure in No. 70.
[196]. See China, No. 1 (1899), p. 240, No. 322; China, No. 1 (1900), pp. 12–13, 35, 146–147, 106, 233, and 241–244.
[197]. It is unnecessary to recount the painful negotiations in 1898–9 concerning the Tien-tsin-Ching-kiang railway concession, in which the German claim in Shan-tung was strongly presented, and had to be recognized to a large extent by the British Government. See China, No. 1 (1900), pp. 14, 16, 17–18, 33, 118, 121, 175, 180.
[198]. Cf. China, No. 1 (1898), Nos. 1 and 15. China seems to have requested Russia to advise Germany to reconsider her action. Later, Russia is said to have reported that she had failed to change the mind of the Kaiser.