[199]. Count Muravieff’s remark to Sir N. O’Conor, the British Chargé at St. Petersburg, on March 28, 1898.—China, No. 1 (1898), No. 125.
[200]. Kiao-chau was occupied on November 17, three Russian war-vessels came to Port Arthur on December 18, 1897; the German-Chinese Agreement was concluded on March 5, the formal demand by Russia was presented about the 7th, and granted on the 27th of the same month, 1898.
[201]. Ibid., pp. 42–43, Nos. 95, 96, 98, 100. It is interesting to note that, on February 4, 1902, when negotiations were in progress between Russia and China, the former supporting large exclusive demands made by the Russo-Chinese Bank in Manchuria, M. Lessar, the Russian Minister, said that his Government was merely asking for privileges similar to those of Germany in Shan-tung.—U. S. 57th Congress, 2d Session, House Documents, vol. i. p. 274.
[202]. China, No. 1 (1898), p. 9, No. 231.
[203]. The statement made by Count Muravieff, on December 22, 1897, at his diplomatic reception, and reported by Mr. W. E. Goschen.—China, No. 1 (1898), pp. 12–13, No. 37.
[204]. See Ibid., Nos. 26, 43, 62. At the same time, M. Pavloff, the Russian Chargé at Peking, demanded the dismissal of Mr. Kinder, British chief engineer of the Northern Railway.—Ibid., No. 38; cf. Nos. 111, 115, 117.
[205]. M. Pavloff’s own story to Sir Claude MacDonald, on March 17, 1898.—China, No. 2 (1899), No. 2.
[206]. China, No. 1 (1898), No. 26.
[207]. Ibid., Nos. 30, 32, 43, 46. Some of the other terms were: (1) the maritime and native customs, salt tax, and likin, as security; (2) a railway from the Burmese frontier to the Yang-tsze valley; (3) a guarantee against the cession of territory in the Yang-tsze valley to any other Power; (4) the opening of some other ports; (5) the pledge that so long as the British trade with China was larger than the trade of any other nation, the inspector-general of customs should always be an Englishman; (6) a freer internal navigation; etc. These terms seem to have been framed so as to protect British interests in China strictly within the scope of the most-favored-nation principle. The demand for the opening of Talien-wan and Nanning strongly prejudiced England against Russia and France, while the Burma-Yang-tsze Railway was unpleasing to France, and the non-alienation of the river valley was sometimes regarded by Russia as a counterpart of her own claims beyond the Great Wall. The whole story of the loan negotiation, as well as that of the Northern Railway extension loan, is highly interesting and important in the recent history of China, but we are here concerned with the bearing of the first loan on the development of the Manchurian question.
[208]. It is highly interesting to note that during the latter part of 1903, when Russian aggression in Manchuria and on the northern frontier of Korea was feared, the American and Japanese Governments, with the moral support of the British, made successful efforts to open Mukden, Tatung-kao, and An-tung to foreign trade. This proposition had met a strong Russian opposition, which also delayed, till after the outbreak of the present war, the opening of Wiju on the Korean border.