[257]. China, No. 2 (1900), No. 1.
[258]. Ibid., Nos. 2, 3, 4, and inclosures 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, in No. 5.
[259]. The italics in the quotations are the author’s.
[260]. China, No. 2 (1900), inclosure 6 in No. 5.
[261]. Ibid., No. 5, White to Salisbury, March 30, 1900.
[262]. Cf. ibid., No. 6.
[263]. It may reasonably be said that the meaning of the intervention of Russia, France, and Germany, in 1895, in regard to Japan’s claim upon the Liao-tung Peninsula may be gathered, in a retroactive way, from Russia’s conduct in Manchuria since 1896. At any rate, M. Pavloff declared, in October, 1897, that “the Russian Government intended that the provinces of China bordering on the Russian frontier must not come under the influence of any nation except Russia.”—China, No. 1 (1898), p. 6. This declaration throws light not only on the trans-Manchurian railway concessions and the lease of ports, but also on Russia’s action respecting the Northern Railway extension and the consequent Anglo-Russian agreement of April, 1899. In May, 1898, there were already 200 Russian soldiers in Kirin, and in December, 2000 in Port Arthur and Talien-wan, while many Cossacks guarded railway construction, and many barracks were being hurriedly built, so that there were sufficient indications even before 1900 that Russia regarded Manchuria as her sphere of influence.
[264]. May 29.—China, No. 3 (1900), No. 5.
[265]. Cf. China, No. 4 (1900), No. 1 (June 5).
[266]. China, No. 3 (1900), No. 94; No. 4 (1900), No. 1 (June 8).