[267]. China, No. 3 (1900), No. 219 (June 16–26).
[268]. Ibid., No. 133; No. 4 (1900), No. 2 (evening, June 13).
[269]. China, No. 3 (1900), No. 122 (June 13).
[270]. Ibid., Nos. 132, 148, 157, and 186 (June 17).
[271]. Ibid., No. 157.
[272]. Ibid., No. 159. It is true that some of these events had not been known to Muravieff, but enough news had reached him to show the extreme gravity of the situation.
[273]. Ibid., No. 149 (June 16).
[274]. Ibid., No. 159. Also see Nos. 43, 45, 48, 65, 58, 114, 120, all indicating the optimistic view of the Count.
[275]. Cf. ibid., No. 120 (June 13).
[276]. China, No. 3 (1900), No. 149 (June 16). In the Czar’s reply to the Chinese Emperor’s appeal for a friendly intervention, it was stated that “the efforts of Russia had but one object in view, namely, to assist in the reëstablishment of order and tranquillity in the Chinese Empire, and, inspired by their traditional friendship for China, the Imperial Government have decided to render to the Chinese Government every assistance with a view to repressing the present troubles.” From the Russian Official Gazette, as reported by Sir Charles Scott on August 2, 1900; China, No. 1 (1901), No. 105. It is noteworthy that Russia had raised objections to sending large forces from Japan to the relief of Peking, one reason being that she supposed they would be commissioned, not only to rescue the Legations, but also to suppress rebellion and restore peace in Peking and Tientsin.—Ibid., No. 29.