These were skilful dispositions; the object of which was, to oppose equal force to the enemy, although in reality superior in numbers to the French army.
When the Russians assumed the offensive, it was known that Michelson had not joined them. The Emperor Napoleon was of course astonished, and immediately saw how ill combined was the system of the allies. It was not till after the battle of Austerlitz, and by reports from Galicia, that it became known that Michelson had no army; that he was only the Inspector of the two other corps; and that the Russians, after the arrival of the Grand Duke Constantine, had nothing more to receive.
As soon as he learnt the offensive movement of the Russians, the emperor recalled Marshal Bernadotte, the remainder of the corps of Marshal Davoust and General Marmont. If he gave battle at Austerlitz, without having been rejoined by the last divisions of Marshal Davoust, and those of Marshal Mortier, it was because he saw so favourable an opportunity, that he not only was persuaded he should gain the battle without these reinforcements, but even had he 30,000 men less.
The allies then did well to wait the arrival of their reinforcements before they resumed the offensive. They calculated rightly, in letting the emperor be the first to make his movements, and must have conceived the hope of afterwards gaining by it, when they should themselves come to act upon their own plans.
[2] Note by a French officer.—This disposition, of which the Austrian officer makes mention, and which is accurate, shews that the emperor had foreseen, that the enemy might manœuvre on the line of operation from Olmutz, along the March; in this case, the Russian army must pass at Shadish, whence it was farther distant than Marshal Soult, who had some infantry at Gaja, and detachments of cavalry, observing all the route, necessary to this movement.
Whenever the enemy's movement had been known, they would have been allowed to advance. The corps of Marshals Mortier and Davoust, would have been at Goeding, and the enemy would have had 30,000 men to contend with more than at Austerlitz.
In all the enemy's manœuvres upon Vienna, he moved upon the wings of the French army, which, by calling in all its detachments, concentrated itself, and opposed its whole force to that of the enemy.
It is more particularly in discussing, what it was possible for the enemy to have done, that we are convinced of the science, and deep calculation shewn by the emperor, in a country so new, and so little known. We see that all his dispositions, even those which appeared to be the most trivial, and to have had no other object in view than the subsistence of the troops, were the result of premeditated design, the chances of which had been already calculated.
[3] Note by a French Officer.—There is here the mistake of a day. Marshal Bernadotte arrived two days before the battle of Austerlitz.
[4] 15 of these were Cosacks.