[5] Note by a French officer.—It is evident that the author here diminishes the real strength of the combined army, by one-fifth.
[6] Note by the Austrian general.—The Austrian battalions, of which this column was partly composed, were extremely weak, in consequence of the new formation introduced by M. Mack, who, from three battalions to each regiment, made five: and, as before stated, they were new levies, with the exception of the regiment of Salzbourg, and the frontier troops. This corps of infantry was composed as follows:
2 bat. 1st reg. of Szeckler.
2 do. 2d do.
1 do. Brooder.
6 do. Salzbourg.
1 do. Auersperg.
1 do. Kaunitz.
1 bat. reg. of Lindenau.
1 —————— Kerpen.
1 —————— Beaulieu.
1 —————— Wurtembourg.
1 —————— Reuss. Graitz.
1 —————— Czartorisky.
1 —————— Kaiser.
—
20
[7] I am inclined to think the word, regiment has here been, inadvertently, substituted for brigade. Translator.
[8] Note by a French officer.—The corps under Marshal Soult had evacuated Austerlitz at three o'clock in the morning; and was posted at seven o'clock in rear of Puntowitz and Schlapanitz. There are some inaccuracies in the detail of the movements, and the partial attacks; but the narrative is generally correct, and well told.
[9] Note by a French officer.—There is no foundation for the remark here made by the Austrian officer; since the Emperor, who intended to act upon the centre of the enemy, had an interest in remaining master of these defiles, that no obstacle might be opposed to the bringing his army into action: it was with this view he occupied the fine position of the Santon, situated in front of all the small streams: besides, the Emperor had posts upon these rivulets two days before; and the left of the French army was between the Santon and the village of Girshikowitz, which was the rendezvous of almost the whole cavalry; consequently, from that moment, it was no longer necessary to pass the defiles in order to attack the heights.
This observation of the Austrian officer, only serves to mark more strongly to every French officer, who was a witness of the affair, both the prudence and military eye of their general. He made the Santon, the point of appuy, for his left flank; not because it was a fine defensive position; there were others in the rear equally good; but, because it was the key to all offensive operations. If, on the contrary, the French general had neglected the Santon, the whole of the left wing of the French army would have been prevented from resuming the offensive, unless they passed the defiles.
Eight days before the battle, the Emperor returning from Wischau, ascended the Santon, notwithstanding the extreme cold; and said to the officers about him: "Examine this position well; it will probably play a conspicuous part before two months are over our heads."
The Emperor having always had it in view, during the campaign in Moravia, not to allow his left to be turned, and to abandon his right; that alone would have been a sufficient reason for resting his left on a position not defensive, but offensive, such as was that of the Santon. The fact is, the more we discuss the plan of the campaign, the more we perceive the judgment and military eye of a master in the science of war.