A Detailed Account of the Battle of Austerlitz

by Karl von Stutterheim

BATTLE OF AUSTERLITZ.

The disposition for the attack of the French army was delivered to the general officers of the Austro-Russian army, soon after midnight, on the morning of the 2nd December. But the imperfect knowledge that was possessed of their position, although scarcely out of range of the enemy's musketry, naturally made the suppositions upon which the disposition of attack was founded also very indefinite. Some movements had been remarked, the evening before, on the enemy's left, but it was not known to be occasioned by the arrival of the corps under Marshal Bernadotte.[10] It was supposed that the French army was weakening its centre to reinforce its left. Several lines of smoke, which had also been perceived the evening before, between Turas and the lakes in rear of Sokolnitz, and Kobelnitz, and some others near Czernowitz, caused the belief that the French army had made these lakes the point of appuy for their right, and had placed a reserve in the rear. The left of the combined army outflanked the right of the French army. It was supposed, that by passing the defile of Sokolnitz, and of Kobelnitz, their right would be turned, and that the attack might afterwards be continued in the plain, between Schlapanitz and the wood of Turas, thus avoiding the defiles of Schlapanitz and Bellowitz, which, it was believed, covered the front of the enemy's position. The French army was then to be attacked by its right flank, upon which it was intended to move down large bodies of troops; this movement was to be executed with celerity and vigour; the valley between Tellnitz and Sokolnitz was to be passed with rapidity; the right of the allies (on which was the cavalry of Prince John de Liechtenstein, and the advanced corps under Prince Bagration) was to cover this movement.—The first of these generals on the plain between Krug and Schlapanitz, on each side of the causeway; and the other by protecting the cavalry, and occupying the heights situated between Dwaroschna and the Inn of Lesch, with his artillery.[11] For this purpose, the five columns, composed as before, received orders to advance in the following manner:

1st. Column. Lieut.-general Dochtorow, with 24 Battalions of Russians, from the heights of Hostieradeck, by Aujest, upon Tellnitz. After having passed the village and defile, the column was to move forward to the right upon the lakes, till its head became parallel with that of the 2d column.

2nd Column. Lieut.-general Langeron, with 18 Battalions of Russians, marching like the former column, by his left from the heights of Pratzen, was to force the valley between Sokolnitz and Tellnitz, and then dress by the 1st column.

3rd Column. Lieut.-general Przybyszewsky, with 18 Battalions of Russians, was also to move by his left, from the heights to the right of Pratzen, close by the castle of Sokolnitz; from whence the heads of the three columns were to move forward, between Sokolnitz and the lakes situated behind it, as far as the lakes of Kobelnitz.

4th Column. Lieut.-general Kollowrath, with 27 Battalions, 15 of which were Austrian, moving forward by his left, from the heights in rear of the 3d column, was to pass the same valley, and the lakes of Kobelnitz, and bring the head of his column parallel with that of the three former.

The advanced corps under M. Kienmayer, was to protect, with its infantry, the movements of the 1st column, so that this last was, in fact, reinforced by five Austrian Battalions, and composed altogether of 29 Battalions. The heads of these four columns of infantry were to present a large front, and four Battalions of the 1st column were to occupy the wood of Turas. The remainder, and all the other columns, were then to move forward between this wood and Schlapanitz, and to attack the right of the enemy with strong bodies of infantry, while three Battalions of the fourth column should be occupied in carrying the village of Schlapanitz.

5th Column. Lieut.-general Prince John de Liechtenstein, with 82 squadrons, was first of all to move from the foot of the hill, in rear of the 3d column, between Blasowitz and Krug, to protect the formation and march of the columns on the right, and afterwards to advance upon the plain on the right and left of the causeway, between Krug and the Inn of Lesch, as was before mentioned.

The advanced corps, under Lieutenant-general Prince Bagration, consisting of twelve Battalions and forty squadrons, was to maintain its position, and gain the heights between Dwaroschna, and the Inn of Lesch, in order to place strong batteries of cannon upon them.

The corps of reserve, under the Grand Duke Constantine, consisting of ten Battalions and eighteen squadrons, was to move from the heights in front of Austerlitz to the rear of Blasowitz and Krug; he was to serve as a support to the cavalry of Prince John de Liechtenstein, and to the corps under Prince Bagration.

The fortune of this day was made to depend upon the rapidity of the attack on our left, and on the driving back the enemy's right upon his left. It was imagined the battle would not be decisive if Prince Bagration was not enabled to oppose an obstinate resistance to the attacks the French might make upon him; and orders were given to the cavalry, under Prince John de Liechtenstein, to attack the enemy in any movement he might make, with a view to engaging this Russian general.

The cavalry, under Lieutenant-general Kienmayer, as soon as the first column should have passed the defile of Tellnitz, was destined to cover the left of the column, and to march between Turas and the Schwarza; observing well the convent of Reygern.

It was settled in the disposition, that in case the four columns were fortunate enough to advance as far as the causeway between Lattein and Bellowitz, and to drive the enemy back into the mountains, the Wood of Turas was still to remain occupied by the four Battalions destined to this purpose, in order to preserve the facility of manœuvring round it, and the means of retiring, if necessary, by Kobelnitz and Puntowitz into the position of Pratzen; which retreat was, in case of the worst, to be continued as far as the position of Hodiegitz, Niemtschen, and Herspitz.

If the attack made by the left proved successful, then Prince Bagration was to move against the enemy's left, and to establish a communication with the four columns of infantry; after which it was intended to unite the army in front of the village of Lattein, between Lesch and Nennowitz. The defiles of Schalapanitz, Bellowitz and Kritschen, being thus cleared, the cavalry under Prince John de Liechtenstein was to pass them with rapidity, in order to support the infantry; and, in case of success, to pursue the enemy between Brunn and Czernowitz.

The general-in-chief, Koutousoff, was in the centre with the fourth column.

The general of infantry, Buxhoevden, commanded the left of the army, and marched with the first column.

Having thus given the plan of attack, concerted by the allies, we are now about to see the manner in which it was deranged, and how it happened that the faults in the conception were not compensated for by the success of the execution.