A Report of the Debates and Proceedings in the Secret Sessions of the Conference Convention / For Proposing Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, Held at Washington, D.C., in February, A.D. 1861

by L. E. Chittenden

Slavery was regarded, South as well as North, when the Constitution was adopted, as a moral and political evil. This had been the general sentiment of the country many years before, and continued to be long after that period. The representatives of the extensive district of Darien in Georgia, on the 12th of January, 1775, spoke of slavery as "founded in injustice and cruelty, and highly dangerous to our liberties." Jefferson pronounced it "an injustice and enormity." The present Chief Justice of the United States, Mr. Taney, who acted many years ago as counsel of Rev. Mr. Gruber, who was indicted in the State of Maryland for preaching a sermon on the evils of slavery, spoke as follows in his defence:

"Mr. Gruber did quote the language of our great act of National Independence, and insisted on the principles contained in that venerated instrument. He did rebuke those masters who, in the exercise of power, are deaf to the call of humanity, and he warned them of the evils they might bring upon themselves. He did speak in abhorrence of those who live by trading in human flesh, and enrich themselves by tearing the husband from the wife, the infant from the bosom of the mother, and this was the head and front of his offending. So far is he from being the object of punishment in any form of proceeding, that we are prepared to maintain the same principles, and to use, if necessary, the same language here in the Temple of Justice, and in the presence of those who are the ministers of the law."

"A hard necessity, indeed, compels us to endure the evils of slavery for a time. While it continues it is a blot on our national character; and every real lover of freedom confidently hopes that it will be effectually, though it must be gradually, wiped away, and earnestly looks for the means by which the necessary object may be best obtained. And until it shall be accomplished, until the time shall come when we can point, without a blush, to the language held in the Declaration of Independence, every part of humanity will seek to lighten the galling chain of slavery, and better, to the utmost of his power, the wretched condition of the slave."

Mr. JOHNSON, of Maryland:—Where did you get that?

Mr. GOODRICH:—I got it from a printed sermon recently preached by Dr. Orville Dewey, of Boston.

And Mr. Calhoun, in the United States Senate, in 1838, said that "many in the South once believed that slavery was a moral and political evil;" and Mr. Butler, late a United States Senator from South Carolina, said in the Senate in 1850, that he "remembered the time when slavery was regarded as a moral evil, even in South Carolina."

In such a state of public sentiment, it is certainly no marvel that slavery was not allowed to extend into the Territories and new States. It was not prohibited in the northwest territory, because it was supposed to be, or would become, an evil in that territory particularly, or a greater evil there than anywhere else; but because it was regarded as an evil everywhere, and therefore wrong to permit its extension anywhere, when there was power to prevent it. There can be no doubt it would have been prohibited in the Territories and new States of Alabama, Mississippi, and Tennessee, if Georgia and North Carolina, previous to the Federal Convention, had ceded them to the United States upon the same conditions Virginia had ceded the northwest territory. Proof of this is found in the fact that the plan of territorial governments interdicting slavery forever after 1800, embraced all territory ceded, or to be ceded by individual States; and still further proof is in the fact, that the cessions by Georgia and North Carolina, after the adoption of the Constitution, were upon the express condition that slavery should not be prohibited; thereby showing that the policy of the Federal Government, as they understood it, was restrictive of slavery in the far southern latitudes as well as in the more northern, and that they expected the power to restrict would be exercised, if not withheld in the deeds of cession. A proposition was, in fact, made to apply the anti-slavery clause of 1787, to all the southern part of the Mississippi territory, now the southern parts of Alabama and Mississippi, by the act of April 7th, 1798, it being supposed at one time that it belonged to the United States; but the debate shows that the proposition was withdrawn because the jurisdiction was in Georgia, or because not five members of Congress, after the question was examined, believed otherwise. Georgia claimed absolute title and right of jurisdiction, and denied all right on the part of the United States to interfere with slavery. Congress did, however, prohibit the importation of slaves into the territory, and declare every slave so imported to be entitled to his freedom. This was probably wholly unauthorized, as it was six years before Georgia ceded it to the United States, and ten years before Congress had power to prohibit the importation of slaves into that State. But these facts show a strong disposition on the part of "the fathers" to curtail and circumscribe slavery, even in the far south, and at the hazard, too, of exercising doubtful power.

Nothing can be clearer than that the original States had a right to form a Federal Government on such terms as to themselves as they could mutually agree upon, and to fix the terms upon which they would permit new members to be admitted. The Northern States were under no obligation to protect slavery at all, not even by permitting fugitives to be reclaimed within their limits. If, then, they were willing to concede that right to the original States, only upon condition that slavery should not be allowed to extend, who will say they had not a right to make that condition, or that, if agreed to, it would not be valid and binding? With their views of slavery, believing it to be a moral and political evil, it was certainly their first and highest duty to make effectual provision against its extension, before undertaking, for any reason, to give the least protection to it. Such provision they supposed they had made, and it was this that justified them, if any thing could, in conceding the right of reclamation.

The free, or northern States, in the exercise of their admitted right in deciding upon the terms of Union, insisted on making it a fundamental and ever-binding condition that no obligation to protect slavery in Illinois should ever exist; and this was done for reasons which render it morally certain that they would have insisted on the same condition in reference to Missouri, if Missouri had been part of the original territory. It would be preposterous to suppose that while they would not consent to guarantee slavery in any manner in Illinois, because they believed it to be a moral and political evil, they meant at the same time to make a Government that could obligate them to guarantee it in the adjoining Territory or State of Missouri, either by the return of fugitive slaves, or in any other manner. They meant no such thing, nor can an honest interpretation of the terms of union bind them to such guarantee now. The right to recapture fugitive slaves could not exist without the consent of the free States; and as that consent was given upon conditions and with limitations, by necessary implication and every sound principle of construction, they reserved the right to say whether it should exist upon other conditions and with other limitations, or without either condition or limitation.

Mr. WICKLIFFE:—No one from Kentucky or Virginia wishes to alter the ordinance of 1787. For God's sake spare us the argument.