Mr. GOODRICH:—I understand no alteration is proposed in the ordinance; nor am I arguing against any such proposition. I am showing what the policy of 1787 was, and what the compact of the fathers was. And I am doing this because it is in the spirit of that policy and compact that Kentucky and Virginia tell us they wish to have this controversy adjusted. Massachusetts and the other Northern States meant to fix, and supposed they had fixed, a limit to their connection with, and responsibility for slavery. By consenting to the clause which secured the right of reclamation, they did become responsible for it to a certain extent. So far as it was supposed, when that clause was agreed to, that its effect would be the recapture of fugitive slaves, and their return to bondage, and so far as the purpose was to make such recapture and return lawful, so far the responsibility of adding to the security of slavery was voluntarily assumed. But this was limited to the existing States by excluding slavery from all United States territory. If any part of such territory had been left for slavery—enough for a single slave State—it might be said that its extension from a part was for reasons applicable only to a part, and so could not be considered as establishing the principle of non-extension. But now this cannot be said. Not a foot was left for slavery.
We thus see what the state of things would have been to-day if foreign territory had not been acquired. Such acquisitions were not originally contemplated, and of course not provided for. The first—Louisiana—was deemed unconstitutional by Mr. Jefferson, and yet it was made while he was President; but with no right, "according to the spirit of the compact of the fathers," to place the Federal Government or the States under any other relation to slavery in subsequently acquired territory than that which they sustained to it—the only one they would consent to sustain—in the Territories possessed at the time that compact was made.
A great deal is said about State rights. But the doctrine of State rights proves too much. Massachusetts had a clear and undoubted right originally to limit her obligations upon this subject. And she did limit them. The original compromise was "better security" to slavery in the original States, with no extension of it to the Territories and new States. This better security was the accepted consideration for waiving the right to extend, and Massachusetts may rightfully insist on this waived right to extend, so long as this "better security" is demanded of her.
Southern gentlemen in this Convention propose to be governed by the principles of the founders of the Government, and by the Constitution, or compact of union, as those founders understood it. By that they say they are willing to do as the fathers did, and adjust the present unhappy controversy by applying to new territory the same principles which the fathers applied to the old. Let me assure gentlemen from the slave States that if they are really in earnest in offering these terms of adjustment, this unhappy controversy can be settled in less than an hour's time. Having always claimed the right to recapture fugitive slaves in territory acquired since, as well as in that acquired before the adoption of the Constitution, the slave States have ever been bound, upon every principle of honor and fair dealing, to concede the original consideration for it, that is, prohibition. A purpose secretly entertained when that compromise was made, to use the Government in the manner it has actually been used, to enlarge the area of slavery and the obligation to guarantee it, would have been dishonest and fraudulent; but the fact that this purpose was conceived afterward, as it doubtless was, does not alter the case a whit. No man possessed of the facts can honestly claim that the bargain between the North and South, interpreted according to the true interest and meaning of both parties at the time of making it, can justify the extension of slavery a rod beyond the original States, or a particle of protection to it beyond the right to recover fugitives from such States.
Having thus shown, as I think I have, that an essential element in the basis of the "more perfect Union" on the question of slavery, was the principle of non-extension, we find the first failure to assert this principle was in the omission to apply it to the Louisiana purchase. The importation of slaves into that territory was immediately prohibited. That probably cut off the only source of supply from which danger of extension was then apprehended. The policy of the Government was well understood, and no apprehension of a practical departure from it existed. There was nothing in the circumstance of the purchase, or the reasons for making it, to excite such apprehension. But it was seen on the application of Missouri for admission, that the ordinance of 1787 should have been applied to it at the time of the purchase. If it had been, Louisiana, Missouri, and Arkansas would never have become slave States (the few slaves in New Orleans and vicinity being emancipated, as they should have been, upon some equitable principle), and the Missouri Compromise, which was the second departure from the original policy, would never have been made. The third was the annexation of Texas as a slave State, and the argument to divide it into three or four more. Annexation led to the war with Mexico, and the acquisition of a large part of her territory, and to the compromise of 1850, by which it was Congressionally agreed that the States formed in that territory might be admitted with slavery, if their Constitutions should so prescribe. This was the fourth departure from the original policy of prohibition. The fifth was the repeal of the Missouri Compromise in 1850, and the attempts to subjugate and enslave Kansas. That repeal made the change from the original policy radical and total. Certainly it is high time "to restore the Union and Constitution in the spirit in which they were established by the fathers."
And now, sir, I propose to begin the work of "restoring the policy of 1787," by applying the ordinance of 1787 to every foot of organized and unorganized territory, wherever situated, which now belongs to the United States, precisely as the fathers applied it to every foot of such territory at the time the Constitution was made; and I ask, in all earnestness and seriousness, what any member of the Convention can have to say against this, who sincerely desires to "restore the Union and Constitution in the spirit in which they were established by the fathers of the Republic," and is "ready to adjust the present unhappy controversy" in the same spirit? What, I beg to know, can be said against this mode of adjustment by those who are in favor of a "restoration of the Constitution to the principles and landmarks of our fathers," and of a "return to the policy of 1787"? Can any man doubt that that ordinance would have been extended over all these territories in 1787, if they had belonged to the United States at that time? Let slavery, then, be prohibited now precisely as the fathers prohibited it then. Copy that old ordinance word for word, and give it legal force and effect, and make it the basis of all laws, and all constitutions, and all governments in these Territories forever, because the fathers gave it such force and effect, and made it the basis of all laws, and all constitutions and all governments forever in all the Territories of the Union, in 1787. If that would not be a return to the "principles and landmarks of the fathers," and to the "policy of 1787," then I beg to know what would be? How is it possible—I put it to you, gentlemen of the South—how is it possible to persuade yourselves that the principles and policy of 1787 can be restored by adopting the resolutions of the General Assembly of Virginia? By what process is it that the gentleman (Mr. Seddon) from Virginia, has come to believe that the South is entitled, according to the spirit of the compact of the fathers, "to the added guarantees" of which he speaks? According to the spirit of that compact it is manifest the slave States are entitled to no added guarantees.
But another of the Virginia Commissioners (Mr. Rives) tells us that this question of slavery in nowise concerns the free States. On this point I will quote from a very high authority, which Virginia, certainly, will respect. Mr. Madison was a member of the first Congress under the Constitution. A colleague of his, Mr. Parker, proposed a duty on the importation of slaves, and said he "hoped Congress would do all that lay in their power to restore to human nature its inherent privileges, and, if possible, wipe off the stigma under which America labors." Mr. Madison, in remarking on that proposition, among other things said:
"Every addition the States receive to their number of slaves tends to weaken and render them less capable of self-defence. In case of hostilities with foreign nations, they will be the means of inviting attack instead of repelling invasion. It is a necessary duty of the General Government to protect every part of their confines against danger, as well internal as external. Every thing, therefore, which tends to increase danger, though it be a local affair, yet, if it involve national expense and safety, becomes of concern to every part of the Union, and is a proper subject for the consideration of those charged with the general administration of the Government."
And we hear, too, a great deal about war, civil war, if this unhappy controversy is not satisfactorily adjusted, which means upon the terms proposed by the slave States. But do gentlemen mean that an appeal will be made to the sword, unless the Constitution shall be so amended as to "provide that slavery of the African race shall be effectually protected as property in all the territory of the United States, now held or hereafter acquired south of latitude 36° 30´"?—which is the proposition of Virginia. If that is what is meant, then let me, before I close, read an extract from one of the last speeches made by Henry Clay in the Senate of the United States. It is as follows:
"If, unhappily, we should be involved in war, civil war, between the two portions of this Confederacy, in which the effort upon the one side should be to restrain the introduction of slavery into the new Territories, and upon the other side to force its introduction there, what a spectacle should we present to the astonishment of mankind, in an effort, not to propagate rights, but—I must say it, though I trust it will be understood to be said with no design to excite feeling—a war to propagate wrongs!"