A Report of the Debates and Proceedings in the Secret Sessions of the Conference Convention / For Proposing Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, Held at Washington, D.C., in February, A.D. 1861

by L. E. Chittenden

EVENING SESSION—FOURTEENTH DAY.

Washington, Thursday, February 21st, 1861.

The Conference was called to order at half-past seven o'clock, Mr. Alexander in the chair.

Mr. CHITTENDEN: I feel gratified by the kindness which has given me an opportunity of making a few observations to the Conference, and I shall not abuse it.

The delegates from Vermont have acted throughout the session under great embarrassment. We hold our appointments from the Executive of that State. Her Legislature was not in session when the Virginia Resolutions were adopted, and the day fixed for the meeting of the Conference was so early that no time was given to the Governor of Vermont for consultation, or for taking any other means of ascertaining the temper of the State in relation to the Virginia plan. We were summoned by telegraph—myself upon an hour's notice—to come here, and we obeyed the summons.

By the rules of the Conference we are prohibited from correspondence with our constituents upon the subject of its action, and we are entirely without recent information concerning their views and wishes. But one course remains to us, and that we must inflexibly pursue. That is, to apply the propositions upon which we are called to vote, to the known and established opinions of our people upon the principles involved in them; and if these principles coincide with their opinions, to give our assent; if they do not, to withhold it. We hold it our duty to respect and obey the opinions of our constituents; and in our action here, such obedience is a pleasure.

First of all, before referring to the merits or demerits of these propositions, I wish to be informed distinctly upon one point. One section of the Union requires guarantees; the other does not. Here are two parties having different interests, proposing to themselves different courses of action. One of them proposes these guarantees in the form of what it calls a compromise. There are many subjects which, in the experience of life, we are obliged to compromise. All of us understand the meaning of the term. It implies that when two parties differ upon a subject of common interest, each is to yield something to the other, until both reach an agreement upon a middle ground, and the difference is settled. But one consequence always follows, always must follow, or it is in nowise a compromise: Both parties are bound by the agreement.

There is another way in which compromises are effected. When opposing parties cannot come to an understanding, they agree to submit the matters in difference to some tribunal that can decide between them. A like consequence always follows from such a proceeding. The parties agree to submit to the decision, to be bound by it, and mutually undertake to carry it into effect, whatever the decision may be.

There is still another way in which a political compromise may be made. Its terms may be agreed upon, and then it may be submitted to the people for adoption. When adopted, it becomes the law of the land—equally binding upon all sections of the country. If it is rejected, the party which proposed it has secured its submission to the proper tribunal—it has been considered, and that party should, upon every principle of law or morality, acquiesce in the result.

Except in one of these three methods I know of no way in which a compromise can be made. Let us apply these methods to the questions before us. One of them must be adopted if we compromise at all.