How, then, do we stand? Why, sir, in relation to our right to slaves, we have to try that right before judges who are thus appointed, and appointed from a party who we know entertain these opinions. Why, sir, you might poll that party through the whole United States, and I would venture any thing upon the assertion that you cannot get one in a hundred thousand who would not deny that there could be property in man, especially under the common law. We thus lose the advantage of the Dred Scott decision. According to the Dred Scott decision, we can carry them into the territory of the United States and hold them, and it is decided that there is property in slaves—decided under the Constitution. The court maintain that the Constitution recognizes it. It is upon constitutional ground that we have made our claims, and so far, it is upon this that we have fought and won the battle, not upon common law; and now we are to abandon the advantages that we have got from that ground of title under the Dred Scott decision, and go into court and try a case that has been already decided in our favor; and under the common law, try it before judges who are to be selected by a party entertaining such opinions as I have just described; and I am sorry to say, without appeal to the Supreme Court; because, in the territorial bills which have been lately passed, that right has been taken from us. My friend from North Carolina will be kind enough to read an article in the Chicago platform, showing what is held on that subject by those who wield the power of this Government.
Mr. CLINGMAN read, as follows:
Eighth. "That the normal condition of all the territory of the United States is that of freedom; that as our republican fathers, when they had abolished slavery in all our national territory, ordained that 'no person should be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,' it becomes our duty, by legislation, whenever such legislation is necessary, to maintain this provision of the Constitution against all attempts to violate it; and we deny the authority of Congress, of a Territorial Legislature, or of any individuals, to give legal existence to slavery in any Territory of the United States."
Mr. HUNTER:—Thus much, Mr. President, in regard to the status; and it is to be observed that the same word is used in reference to persons who are now held to involuntary servitude in the Territories and to those whom we are to have the right to take into the Territories from the States recognizing slavery. So that we submit this question of our right to slaves, when it reaches the Territories, to be tried under the common law, by courts appointed by the party entertaining the opinions I have described, and that without appeal. This is in regard to the Territories which we now own. What is the settlement provided for in regard to territory hereafter to be acquired? Here it is, in the third section:
Section 3. Neither the Constitution, nor any amendment thereof, shall be construed to give Congress power to regulate, abolish, or control, within any State, the relation established or recognized by the laws thereof touching persons held to labor or involuntary service therein, nor to interfere with or abolish involuntary service in the District of Columbia without the consent of Maryland, and without the consent of the owners, or making the owners who do not consent just compensation; nor the power to interfere with or prohibit Representatives and others from bringing with them, to the District of Columbia, retaining and taking away, persons so held to labor or service; nor the power to interfere with or abolish involuntary service in places under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States within those States and Territories where the same is established or recognized.
That is, they shall not prohibit it as to future acquired territory, where it is established or recognized. Will not the inference be claimed from such an expression, that where it is not established and not recognized, they may prohibit it? Will it not be said that the expression of one exception to the power of Congress to prohibit slavery in the Territories excludes the idea of an exception to that power when slavery is not recognized in the Territories?
Mr. COLLAMER:—If the gentleman will indulge me a moment, I desire to say that is a section declaring that Congress shall not abolish slavery in the dock-yards, &c., in the States where it is recognized. There is nothing in it about future acquired territory.
Mr. HUNTER:—This third section applies not only to present but to future acquired territory. It is not confined, like the first section, to the territory at present acquired. It is not confined to dock-yards and arsenals in the Territories and States. If the Senator will examine it, he will find that it is applied to all places where the United States have exclusive jurisdiction. "Exclusive jurisdiction" is the word. Will it not be claimed that they have exclusive jurisdiction in the Territories of the United States? Will not those who have the power to construe, and carry out their construction, so construe it? Will they not say it is a prohibition to Congress to prohibit slavery where it is recognized in the Territories or States, but not a denial of the right to prohibit slavery in Territories where it is not recognized by law, although that Territory may be vacant and uninhabited?
Mr. COLLAMER:—That clause of the section is, that Congress shall not have power—