"To interfere with or abolish involuntary service in places under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States within those States and Territories where the same is established or recognized."

That, so far as I have read, is confined only to where they have local jurisdiction in the States holding slaves.

Mr. HUNTER:—I thought so at first myself; but the Senator will find, on a further examination, I think, that he is mistaken. They shall not prohibit it wherever they have exclusive jurisdiction in places where slavery "is established or recognized." It is not confined to dock-yards, forts, and arsenals. Why should it be in the Territories? They have exclusive jurisdiction over the whole. There is reason for confining it to dock-yards in the States; but there is no reason for confining it to dock-yards, &c., in the Territories. But that is not the construction which will be given; the construction given to it will be, that they shall not prohibit it where they have exclusive jurisdiction, if it is recognized in such places; but if it be not recognized in such places, where they have exclusive jurisdiction, I say the inference will be drawn, plausibly, if not justly, that they shall have power to prohibit; and I say if this be so, then it is a power (so far as Mexican territories are concerned, if there should be any acquisition there) by which the South will be forever estopped; because there the Mexicans have abolished slavery, and there, under this clause giving in that territory exclusive jurisdiction, the party now controlling the Government would claim the right to prohibit it. And what a difference between our position then and our position now under the decision of the Supreme Court! Under the decision of that court, all the people of all the States have a right to go into the common territory with their institutions. It belongs to all in common, and Congress cannot prohibit them from taking their property there.

I say that those who have the power to carry out any construction they choose to give, would be interested in putting upon it the construction which I fear; and it would be difficult to raise an argument which they would deem conclusive against it. But take it the other way; suppose that the Senator from Vermont is right in his first supposition, that it was only meant to be applied to forts, arsenals, and dock-yards, then I ask what settlement does this proposition give us in regard to future acquired territories; what earthly settlement is it? We have all the old difficulties to encounter that we have to meet now, every one of them. We not only have all the old difficulties to encounter, but the slaveholder would have an additional obstacle which this first clause would put in his way. It requires that the right to slaves in the present territory shall be tried by the common law, and it might be said in court that the inferences drawn heretofore from those provisions of the Constitution recognizing slavery were to be overruled by the fact that the people in their latest action—by way of constitutional amendment—had introduced another rule in order to determine the status of those held to involuntary service or labor, and the consequence of that would be that the South never could acquire another foot of territory; that is, the few southern States who are left in the Union.

I am told that here is a provision that you cannot acquire territory except by the assent of a majority of the Senators from both sections. Does any man believe that the North, with its eighteen, soon to be twenty, or thirty, non-slaveholding States, would allow a majority of six, or seven, or eight slave States, that are now attached to them, to prevent them from acquiring any territory hereafter? Would they agree to such an amendment, in the first instance; and if they did, how long before they would change this restriction in the Constitution? Indeed, it is hardly to be supposed that they will agree to it in the first instance, so far as it regards the acquisition of territory; but of what avail would it be to the South? There is but one conceivable acquisition—I speak of possible things, and I hope gentlemen will not understand me as coveting my neighbor's goods, or desiring to lay violent hands on the property of any other States or nations—but, if things should so happen that we could rightfully acquire Cuba, under my view of the probable construction to be given to this clause, and because slavery there is recognized, Congress might be prevented from prohibiting it; but, everywhere else, the South would be shut out and excluded.

Then, sir, what would be its position? It would be prevented from acquiring any territory under this Government as an outlet for its slaves; and the only chance of securing that necessity of its condition would be to quit this Union and join the Southern Confederacy, which can acquire territory. It would be an inducement to disunion so strong as would almost force them to it.

Let us go a little further. Here is another clause holding out the same temptation:

"The foreign slave-trade is hereby forever prohibited, and it shall be the duty of Congress to pass laws to prevent the importation of slaves, coolies, or persons held to service or labor, into the United States and the Territories from places beyond the limits thereof."

This is to be the duty of Congress. As it now stands, it is in the power of Congress. When it was merely given as a power to Congress, was there a failure to execute that power? Do we not know that every State in the present Confederation has desired to suppress the African slave-trade? Some do it from sentiment and principle; some from interest; but there is a controlling motive with each and all of them. It is safe enough to leave it where it stood, giving Congress the power merely. Here you make it their duty. Suppose this case: the States that have left us have set up another Government, another Confederation; under this clause you forbid us to buy their slaves, to interchange and trade in slaves with them: what will be the consequence? They will exclude us from selling our slaves in their territory, and where then do we stand? If you should think it prudent, if you should think it politic, you would have no means, under this proposed amendment, of allowing that to be done between these two coterminous countries. Though it would be to the advantage of both Confederacies that there should be this interchange, you preclude Congress from allowing it; and then where would that place the border slave States? They would not be able to sell their slaves in the States further South; and if they carried them there, they would have to emigrate with them. You would thus prevent Congress from adopting a regulation which would make it possible for them to remain in this Union with safety, with advantage, to themselves. Why was this put in? Why not have left it where it stood, giving Congress the power, when we all know that there is no State in the present Confederation that would not exercise that power for the purpose of suppressing the slave-trade from Africa? This probably would constitute the only exception. Why shut ourselves out from allowing the exception?

But, Mr. President, my desire is to be brief; I do not want to consume the time of the Senate; I am merely endeavoring to state the points of objection as briefly as I can. Here is, at the close of it, another provision which, it seems to me, contains the seeds of civil war; and that is this: "Congress shall provide by law for securing to the citizens of each State the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States;" that is to say, Congress shall have power to pass laws to force the States to receive those persons whom they have excluded from police considerations—considerations of domestic safety. Yes, sir, to force the States to receive persons who would be dangerous to their peace; to force upon them, if you will, abolition lecturers; to force upon them persons whom they regard as the most dangerous emissaries that could be sent among them; to enable Congress to obtrude, in fact, into all the business of the States. That was not intended when the Constitution was framed, and never ought to have been. The present provision in regard to the rights of citizens in the several States, I regard as in the nature of an inter-treaty stipulation. It is a duty imposed on each State, for the violation of which there is no remedy; no remedy, unless the State aggrieved may resort sometimes to retaliation.