A history of England principally in the seventeenth century, Volume 2 (of 6)

by Leopold von Ranke

It is quite true that Charles I was at this time engaged, as he had been at an earlier period, in carrying on negotiations with the Spanish court which might easily have led to an open quarrel with France.

In the autumn of 1638 a contract was drawn up at Brussels, according to which Spain and England were to unite in order to wrest from the French their conquests in Germany and Italy; indeed it was the great interest which the two crowns had in this object which brought them together. On the other hand the Emperor Ferdinand III was to be induced by the Spanish court to recall the ban which had been issued against Frederick Count Palatine, and to restore the Electorship to the heirs of that prince. King Charles was quite ready to accede to the contract, if only trustworthy security were given to him with regard to the Palatinate[146].

In the spring of 1639 accordingly the intention of Charles I to take troops from the Spanish Netherlands into his service, as formerly mentioned, was much discussed. The Cardinal-Infant asked a question on the subject in Spain.

A third point on which negotiations took place was still more urgent. The Spanish monarchy was once more collecting all its resources to send a great fleet with troops and the A.D. 1639. necessaries of war to the Netherlands. The Spaniards indeed boasted that they desired to chastise the insolence of the Dutch and French: but in fact they were conscious of the superiority of their adversaries. They sought to assure themselves beforehand, if not of the alliance of the English, yet at least of their protection within English waters, if disaster or too strong a resistance should drive their fleet thither. Charles I did not refuse this request, always provided that satisfaction should be done to him in return in the affair of the Palatinate, with regard to which the Spaniards made fresh proposals[147].

What injustice is done to Charles I by any one who accuses him of having negligently lost sight of the cause of his nephews! It is true that he would not draw the sword in their behalf: but they supplied the principal motive which guided him in his diplomatic transactions. His relations with the great parties and powers who were fighting for ascendancy on the Continent, were principally determined by regard for them: the ceaseless vacillation of his policy was due to nothing but the multiplicity of the circumstances which affected them.

It certainly seemed that he might expect the Spaniards to do most for them; for Spain, by its influence on Austria, could act most effectually in support of the restoration of the Elector Palatine. But we know how often he had been deceived in this hope: the relation between German Austria and Bavaria especially made the designs suggested by the Spanish ambassador impracticable. Had the King been willing to give his unreserved support to the interests of Spain, which were so closely connected with those of Catholicism, he would never have effected anything. He therefore sought an alliance with the French court: the affair of the Palatinate formed the principal subject of the stipulations he made with it. But Charles I could not and dared not side unconditionally even with France: for by taking this step he would have been compelled to come to an open breach with Spain, which would have disturbed the profitable traffic of the A.D. 1639. English nation with the distant possessions of that monarchy: and he would thereby have promoted the general ascendancy of France, which was in the highest degree disadvantageous to the position of England. Moreover he would not even have reached his end by this path, for the final decision still rested with the Emperor.

In these embarrassments it was the policy of King Charles to make advances to those powers which were striving to resist the Austro-Spanish house, while he did not exactly make common cause with them: he hoped, as it seems, to make such use of the fluctuations of fortune and of war as to induce the Emperor himself at last, for the sake of his own interest, to grant the wished-for indulgence.

The affair of the Palatinate forms as it were the woof in the web of Charles I’s history, running through it in all directions. And never at any time had it been of more importance. In one of the most remarkable entanglements of European relations, the considerations arising out of it decided his line of policy.

The conquest of Breisach by Duke Bernard of Weimar in December 1638 was hailed with as much joy in England as in every other Protestant country. The establishment of this brave general on the great continental line of communication between the different parts of the Spanish monarchy, could not but determine that power to devise some way out of the difficulty. The occupation of this place too threatened Bavaria with an immediate danger, which could not fail to make an impression on the Elector Maximilian, on whom everything depended. A project was even entertained of marrying the victorious Duke of Saxe-Weimar to a princess of the Palatinate, so as to attach him as closely as possible to the interest of that family. Duke Bernard for his own part sought to make himself a little more independent of France: not that he had in view the foundation of a third party, which would have brought everything into confusion; he was only unwilling to be a vassal of France: he thought of taking his place beside that power as an independent ally. In this enterprise he had Protestant Switzerland on his side, which was very unwilling to see the French establish A.D. 1639. themselves in Lorraine. This design moreover exactly suited the policy of Charles I, to whom the aggrandisement of France was displeasing.

The unexpected death of Duke Bernard in July 1639, whilst he was preparing to assume so great a position, must be regarded as a general calamity. At first however it seemed as if this casualty would even have consequences favourable to the plans of England and the Palatine house. Many Englishmen had already made preparations for taking service in Bernard’s army: the project was now mooted of putting the Elector Palatine at its head, by which means he would at once have regained the position of a military power. Charles Louis seized this idea with ardour. While he opened negotiations on the subject at the court of Sweden through his ambassador, he came himself to England in order to gain for his enterprise the support of the King. The ambassador accredited by Switzerland, who had just arrived in England, displayed especial zeal: he tried every expedient to move the Cantons to action in the Elector’s behalf. Letters were instantly written to the directors of the army, who at once returned an answer. They showed themselves quite ready to accept the Elector as commander-in-chief, when he should appear amongst them, but on condition that the King of England paid them a definite subsidy monthly, in order to maintain the efficiency of the troops and keep them in good spirits. In spite of the want of money, which had been rendered doubly pressing by the Scottish campaign, we learn that the sum required for taking over the command of the army was nevertheless got together, and hopes were held out of further advances. A private individual, Lord Craven, who had most abundant means at his command, and had formed the resolution of applying them to the service of the Palatine family, was ready to attend the Elector to Germany[148].