A history of England principally in the seventeenth century, Volume 2 (of 6)

by Leopold von Ranke

This enterprise corresponded exactly with the views of the King. He hoped to achieve his great end by cleverly A.D. 1639. availing himself of a favourable moment, while at the same time he made no great efforts, and did not actually participate in the war itself, or come to a breach with Spain, with which on the contrary he carried on constant negotiations. If he had succeeded in his design, he would have attained to a different position in foreign, and perhaps even in domestic, affairs.

A difficulty however stood in his way, which might be regarded as insuperable: namely, the opposition to be expected on the side of France.

The court of France had hitherto regarded the army of Bernard of Weimar as half its own, inasmuch as the Duke owed the means of keeping it together in a great measure to French subsidies: how then could it be even imagined that France was to stand by quietly when this army not merely claimed to act for itself, but even made itself dependent on another power? Cardinal Richelieu on the contrary intended to acquire both the army itself, and its conquests, permanently for France. This was what he had most at heart: he was nearer to the scene of action; he had long formed relations with its leaders; he was better provided with money: how could he fail to anticipate and nullify the negotiations of England?

This obstacle to his plans did not escape the notice of King Charles: but owing to the peculiar complication of circumstances he expected to get into his hands a means of removing it by a counter-concession.

Just at that time, in the middle of September, 1639, the Spanish fleet appeared at sea. Long as it had been prepared beforehand, it was not at starting sure of success, and reckoned on the protection of England. King Charles had been entreated, as we have seen, to grant it hospitable reception in English harbours, if matters so turned out as to make this necessary. And straightway this contingency occurred. The fleet on this occasion, as before, consisted principally of huge galleons, whose tackling was too weak long to resist wind and tide in those narrow seas: nor was the fleet adequately provided with artillery and seamen. On the first collision with a much smaller Dutch squadron, which was A.D. 1639. cruising in the Channel under Van Tromp, the Spanish admiral Oquendo found himself compelled to seek a refuge on the English coast in the Downs near Dover. And as his preservation from a superior enemy now depended on the protection which Charles I would accord him there, the admiral entreated it most urgently, saying that the honour of the Spanish monarchy and the maintenance of its dominion in the Netherlands were dependent on the King. Charles I appeared strongly inclined to grant his prayer. He opened a negotiation with the ambassador Cardenas, in which the affair of the Palatinate was brought forward afresh: and Cardenas promised him all possible compliance and assistance in the matter.

The Dutch and French ambassadors, however, urged an opposite course on the King. They called his attention to the fact that he stood in close relations with their governments as well as with Sweden, and had all but concluded a treaty with them: they suggested to him that he ought not to incur their hostility by preventing them from annihilating the Spaniards here on his coasts; that he ought to remember that he had never hitherto experienced any benefit at the hands of the Spaniards, and that even on the present occasion he could not hope that they would fulfil their promises.

This was one of the most important moments in the life of Charles I. The two great conflicting forces which divided the world, and with each of which he had some connexion, now called upon him to choose between them without delay. This was even a source of moral embarrassment, inasmuch as the King by his previous attitude had given both parties a certain right to expect his support: but the political embarrassment was the most conspicuous, and seems to have been the only one felt by the King. He had now to put an end to all wavering, and in one decisive instant to throw himself on the side of one of the two parties.

Bellièvre once more brought into play the whole of the influence which he claimed to exercise on Queen Henrietta Maria as the ambassador of her family. He reports that she had favoured an adverse policy, but that he had spoken with her in a manner which might certainly have provoked her displeasure, but which however had in fact changed her A.D. 1639. opinion. Negotiations were opened between the ambassador and the King himself through the mediation of the Queen.

But if the promises which the Spaniards gave with regard to the affair of the Palatinate supplied a motive for extending shelter to them, how much stronger a motive, under the circumstances which we have mentioned, must the King have had for attempting to win over the French government!

Bellièvre, when informed of the negotiations that were being carried on with Spain, acted on the hint that France must oppose promises on her own part to those made by Spain, and at last asked to be informed what was expected of him. We learn nothing of the deliberations that may then have been carried on between the King and Queen. But the preference was given to the plan of purchasing support for the Elector Palatine, in the projects that were being agitated, by making concessions to France. In answer to the French ambassador, the Queen expressed a hope of obtaining a promise from him that the Elector Palatine should be placed at the head of the army of Bernard of Weimar. She added that in this event the King on his part would offer no resistance to the wishes of the French: that he would not break with the Spaniards it is true, but that he would not interfere with any steps which the Dutch might take against the Spanish fleet[149]. Bellièvre said that he was not commissioned to make proposals; still he by no means set aside those which had been submitted to him: he merely asked how many troops the King was willing to give the Elector to take with him to Germany. Charles I replied that he rather left the King of France to support the Elector with troops; that he could do no more in this way than have some 6000 men enlisted in England and transported to the coast of France, where he intended that they should be taken into the pay of the French: that in return for this however, A.D. 1639. and especially for that other far greater service of allowing the Spanish fleet to be destroyed on his coasts, he required the King of France to promise that he would conclude neither truce nor peace which did not comprise the restitution of the Palatinate. This was the same object which he had already attempted to gain in the former negotiations: open hostilities against Spain had been demanded of him in return. His intention was to extract the desired engagement from France, without committing himself to this extent, by means of the concessions which he now expressed his readiness to make. He allowed the ambassador fourteen days for procuring the consent of his court: if this period expired without any result, he intended to be at liberty to make terms with Spain.