It is indeed possible that King Charles was incensed afresh against Spain by the tidings, which he then received, of a renewal of the connexion between the Spaniards and the malcontents in Ireland; and that he called to mind their former breaches of faith. He had also certainly not given them any definite promise of protection. Still it remains a most odious imputation on the sovereign who laid claim to maritime supremacy that he resolved to deliver over the weaker party, who had come to his coast entreating shelter, into the hands of the stronger in return for an advantage which he bargained to obtain from them. What seduced him was the consideration that he need not interfere decisively: he thought that, without breaking with the Spaniards, he could bind their adversaries to him, and carry off the fruits of the victory without drawing the sword himself. And moreover this was after all but a project, not a settled conclusion. Meanwhile he continued his negotiations with the Spaniards, from whom he claimed a large sum of money in return for the armament which he had been forced to equip for their protection.
But how could these counsels have had any good result, inspired as they were by weakness and the love of peace on the one side, and on the other by the intention of turning an accidental combination of circumstances to the greatest possible advantage?
The French felt the advantage of the position of general A.D. 1639. superiority in which they found themselves placed. Even under existing circumstances they did not feel in any mood to accede to these proposals of Charles I. They adhered to their wish that he should at last sign the offensive and defensive alliance, which had been so long talked of, and which was still kept in prospect. If he would then support his nephew the Elector Palatine with an army, which he would be expected always to keep in an effective condition, and if he would further himself contribute to the actual destruction of the Spanish fleet, they thought that he might feel assured that France would conclude no arrangement without stipulating for the restitution of the Palatinate, and procuring satisfaction for the Elector. The French court passed over in silence the proposal for helping the Elector to become commander-in-chief of the army of Bernard of Weimar: it thought it best not to express any opinion at all upon that subject. It certainly expected no result from the renewal of former demands; but it was already satisfied with the maintenance of the negotiations: above all it wished Bellièvre to take care that King Charles did not come to an agreement with the Spaniards, as the Dutch fleet would meanwhile gain time to annihilate the Spanish[150].
The interval which Charles I had allowed for the answer of the French court had not yet expired: he was still able to think that he had the matter in his own hands, when the Dutch admiral Van Tromp, empowered by a resolution of the States-General to that effect, proceeded to attack the Spanish fleet in the English roads. The English vice-admiral Pennington was neither strong enough to prevent the conflict, nor had he any orders to do so. The Dutch sank a number of Spanish ships, and burned others: the number of those which they captured was about eleven[151]: the greater part, however, with Oquendo himself on board, favoured by a thick fog, escaped to the opposite coast and ran into Dunkirk harbour.
The Spanish fleet was not, strictly speaking, annihilated; A.D. 1639. the booty which the Dutch carried off hardly equalled the outlay which their armament had cost them. The event must however be regarded as decisive. A similar fleet never again set sail from Spain for the Netherlands.
Charles I, in allowing this transaction, had rendered a great service to the Protestant cause; but at the same time he had played an uncertain part unworthy of his great position, from which none but consequences disadvantageous to him could arise.
The suspicion entertained against him by his subjects went so far that they even inferred from his dubious attitude a secret understanding, to the prejudice of their religion, between him and the Spaniards. They hailed the occurrence as a victory over the King himself. True Englishmen felt annoyed that a great battle had been fought out on their coasts without their participation.
The Spanish ambassador complained loudly and bitterly. Charles I answered him with contemptuous remarks on the slight power of resistance displayed by the Spanish Armada. The Dutch ambassador, on the other hand, who attempted to excuse the enterprise of his countrymen, was rebuffed by the King with harsh expressions. Disagreeable incidents encountered him on every side.
But the most annoying of the quarrels in which he was involved arose out of his design upon the army of Bernard of Weimar, which he attempted to carry out even before the defeat of the Spanish fleet. He did not even wait for the French court to state its views in reply to his application. As soon as a favourable answer arrived from the Directors of that army he allowed the Elector, Charles Louis, to set out without delay to take possession of the command.
And indeed the intention was that the Elector, attended by only a few trusty companions, should take the route through France to Breisach, which was both the nearest way, and was least exposed to the disturbances of war. The King said to the French ambassador, that the Elector should make his appearance with the army merely as a volunteer; and that any further steps should be dependent on the answer of the French court, which was still looked A.D. 1639. for. The ambassador called his attention to the impropriety of a prince of such high rank travelling through France without previously giving notice to the King, in fact without even so much as a safe conduct from him. But Charles I would hear of no delay: he professed to think that his ambassador, the Earl of Leicester, would still have time enough to make a communication to the French court on the subject. Bellièvre, however, did not himself believe that the King was serious in his professions. In his report he says, that such a communication, if made, would be made only after the event; that the intention was that the Prince should travel through France incognito, without seeing the King, or any of his ministers. In reality, people in England thought that if he went to Court, he would be detained there until matters had been settled in the army to his disadvantage: that if on the contrary he made his appearance at the right moment, and, what was more, with sufficient supplies of money, the greater part of the officers would declare in his favour. And it appeared quite possible to go through France unrecognised, as the King himself had succeeded in doing in his youth.