In this perplexing state of affairs, when all deliberation was at a stand, and a kind of torpor had seized on men's minds, Laevinus, the consul, observed, that "as the magistrates were more honoured than the senators, and the senators than the people, so also ought they to be the first in taking upon themselves every thing that was burdensome and arduous. If you would enjoin any duty on an inferior, and would first submit yourself and those belonging to you to the obligation, you will find everybody else more ready to obey; nor is an expense thought heavy, when the people see every one of their principal men taking upon himself more than his proportion of it. Are we then desirous that the Roman people should have and equip a fleet? that private individuals should without repugnance furnish rowers? Let us first execute the command ourselves. Let us, senators, bring into the treasury to-morrow all our gold, silver, and coined brass, each reserving rings for himself, his wife, and children, and a bulla for his son; and he who has a wife or daughters, an ounce weight of gold for each. Let those who have sat in a curule chair have the ornaments of a horse, and a pound weight of silver, that they may have a salt-cellar and a dish for the service of the gods. Let the rest of us, senators, reserve for each father of a family, a pound weight only of silver and five thousand coined asses. All the rest of our gold, silver, and coined brass, let us immediately carry to the triumviri for banking affairs, no decree of the senate having been previously made; that our voluntary contributions, and our emulation in assisting the state, may excite the minds, first, of the equestrian order to emulate us, and after them of the rest of the community. This is the only course which we, your consuls, after much conversation on the subject, have been able to discover. Adopt it, then, and may the gods prosper the measure. If the state is preserved, she can easily secure the property of her individual members, but by betraying the public interests you would in vain preserve your own." This proposition was received with such entire approbation, that thanks were spontaneously returned to the consuls. The senate was then adjourned, when every one of the members brought his gold, silver, and brass into the treasury, with such emulation excited, that they were desirous that their names should appear among the first on the public tables; so that neither the triumviri were sufficient for receiving nor the notaries for entering them. The unanimity displayed by the senate was imitated by the equestrian order, and that of the equestrian order by the commons. Thus, without any edict, or coercion of the magistrates, the state neither wanted rowers to make up the numbers, nor money to pay them; and after every thing had been got in readiness for the war, the consuls set out for their provinces.
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Nor was there ever any period of the war, when both the Carthaginians and the Romans, plunged alike in vicissitudes, were in a state of more anxious suspense between hope and fear. For on the side of the Romans, with respect to their provinces, their failure in Spain on the one hand, and their successes in Sicily on the other, had blended joy and sorrow; and in Italy, the loss of Tarentum was an injury and a source of grief to them, while the unexpected preservation of the citadel with the garrison was matter of joy to them. The sudden terror and panic occasioned by the siege and attack of Rome, was turned into joy by the capture of Capua, a few days after. Their affairs beyond sea also were equalized by a kind of compensation. Philip had become their enemy at a juncture somewhat unseasonable; but then the Aetolians, and Attalus, king of Asia, were added to their allies; fortune now, in a manner, promising to the Romans the empire of the east. The Carthaginians also set the loss of Capua against the capture of Tarentum; and as they considered it as glorious to them to have reached the walls of Rome without opposition, so they were chagrined at the failure of their attempt, and they felt ashamed that they had been held in such contempt, that while they lay under the walls of Rome, a Roman army was marched out for Spain at an opposite gate. With regard also to Spain itself, the greater the reason was to hope that the war there was terminated, and that the Romans were driven from the country, after the destruction of two such renowned generals and their armies, so much the greater was the indignation felt, that the victory had been rendered void and fruitless by Lucius Marcius, a general irregularly appointed. Thus fortune balancing events against each other, all was suspense and uncertainty on both sides, their hopes and their fears being as strong as though they were now first commencing the war.
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What grieved Hannibal more than any thing was the fact, that Capua having been more perseveringly besieged by the Romans than defended by him, had turned from him the regard of many of the states of Italy, and it was not only impossible for him to retain possession of all these by means of garrisons, unless he could make up his mind to tear his army into a number of small portions, which at that time was most inexpedient, but he could not, by withdrawing the garrisons, leave the fidelity of his allies open to the influence of hope, or subject to that of fear. His disposition, which was strongly inclined to avarice and cruelty, induced him to plunder the places he could not keep possession of, that they might be left for the enemy in a state of desolation. This resolution was equally horrid in principle and in its issue, for not only were the affections of those who suffered such harsh treatment alienated from him, but also of the other states, for the warning affected a greater number than did the calamity. Nor did the Roman consul fail to sound the inclinations of the cities, whenever any prospect of success presented itself. Dasius and Blasius were the principal men in Salapia, Dasius was the friend of Hannibal, Blasius, as far as he could do it with safety, promoted the Roman interest, and, by means of secret messengers, had given Marcellus hopes of having the place betrayed to him, but the business could not be accomplished without the assistance of Dasius. After much and long hesitation and even then more for the want of a better plan than from any hope of success, he addressed himself to Dasius; but he, being both adverse to the measure and also hostile to his rival in the government, discovered the affair to Hannibal. Both parties were summoned, and while Hannibal was transacting some business on his tribunal, intending presently to take cognizance of the case of Blasius, and the accuser and the accused were standing apart from the crowd, which was put back, Blasius solicited Dasius on the subject of surrendering the city; when he exclaimed, as if the case were now clearly proved, that he was being treated with about the betrayal of the city, even before the eyes of Hannibal. The more audacious the proceeding was, the less probable did it appear to Hannibal and those who were present. They considered that the charge was undoubtedly a matter of rivalry and animosity, and that it had been brought because it was of such a nature that, not admitting of being proved by witnesses, it could the more easily be fabricated. Accordingly the parties were dismissed. But Blasius, notwithstanding, desisted not from his bold undertaking, till by continually harping upon the same subject, and proving how conducive such a measure would be to themselves and their country, he carried his point that the Punic garrison, consisting of five hundred Numidians, and Salapia, should be delivered up to Marcellus. Nor could it be betrayed without much bloodshed, consisting of the bravest of the cavalry in the whole Punic army. Accordingly, though the event was unexpected, and their horses were of no use to them in the city, yet hastily taking arms, during the confusion, they endeavoured to force their way out; and not being able to escape, they fell fighting to the last, not more than fifty of them falling into the hands of the enemy alive. The loss of this body of cavalry was considerably more detrimental to Hannibal than that of Salapia, for the Carthaginian was never afterwards superior in cavalry, in which he had before been most effective.
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During this time the scarcity of provisions in the citadel of Tarentum was almost intolerable; the Roman garrison there, and Marcus Livius, the praefect of the garrison and the citadel, placing all their dependence in the supplies sent from Sicily; that these might safely pass along the coast of Italy, a fleet of about twenty ships was stationed at Rhegium. Decius Quinctius, a man of obscure birth, but who had acquired great renown as a soldier, on account of many acts of bravery, had charge of the fleet and the convoys. At first he had five ships, the largest of which were two triremes, given to him by Marcellus, but afterwards, in consequence of his spirited conduct on many occasions, three quinqueremes were added to his number, at last, by exacting from the allied states of Rhegium, Velia, and Paestum, the ships they were bound to furnish according to treaty, he made up a fleet of twenty ships, as was before stated. This fleet setting out from Rhegium, was met at Sacriportus, about fifteen miles from the city by Democrates, with an equal number of Tarentine ships. It happened that the Roman was then coming with his sails up, not expecting an approaching contest, but in the neighbourhood of Croto and Sybaris, he had supplied his ships with rowers, and had his fleet excellently equipped and armed for the size of his vessels, and it also happened, that just at the time when the enemy were in sight, the wind completely fell, so that there was sufficient time to furl their sails, and get their rowers and soldiers in readiness for the approaching action. Rarely elsewhere have regular fleets engaged with so much spirit, for they fought for what was of greater importance than the fleets themselves. The Tarentines, in order that, having recovered their city from the Romans after the lapse of almost a century, they might also rescue their citadel, hoping also to cut off the supplies of their enemy, if by a naval battle they could deprive them of the dominion of the sea. The Romans, that, by keeping possession of the citadel, they might prove that Tarentum was lost not by the strength and valour of their enemies, but by treachery and stealth. Accordingly, the signal having been given on both sides, they charged each other with the beaks of their ships, and neither did they draw back their own, nor allow the ships of the enemy with which they were engaged to separate from them, having thrown then grappling irons, and thus the battle was carried on in such close quarters, that they fought not only with missile weapons, but in a manner foot to foot even with their swords. The prows joined together remained stationary, while the sterns were moved round by the force of their adversaries' oars. The ships were crowded together in so small a compass, that scarcely one weapon fell into the sea without taking effect. They pressed front against front like lines of troops engaging on land, and the combatants could pass from one ship to another. But the contest between two ships which had engaged each other in the van, was remarkable above the rest. In the Roman ship was Quinctius himself, in the Tarentine, Nico, surnamed Perco, who hated, and was hated by, the Romans, not only on public grounds, but also personally, for he belonged to that faction which had betrayed Tarentum to Hannibal. This man transfixed Quinctius with a spear while off his guard, and engaged at once in fighting and encouraging his men, and he immediately fell headlong with his arms over the prow. The victorious Tarentine promptly boarded the ship, which was all in confusion from the loss of the commander, and when he had driven the enemy back, and the Tarentines had got possession of the prow, the Romans, who had formed themselves into a compact body, with difficulty defending the stern, suddenly another trireme of the enemy appeared at the stern. Thus the Roman ship, enclosed between the two, was captured. Upon this a panic spread among the rest, seeing the commander's ship captured, and flying in every direction, some were sunk in the deep and some rowed hastily to land, where, shortly after, they became a prey to the Thurians and Metapontines. Of the storeships which followed, laden with provisions, a very few fell into the hands of the enemy; the rest, shifting their sails from one side to another with the changing winds, escaped into the open sea. An affair took place at Tarentum at this time, which was attended with widely different success; for a party of four thousand men had gone out to forage, and while they were dispersed, and roaming through the country, Livius, the commander of the citadel and the Roman garrison, who was anxious to seize every opportunity of striking a blow, sent out of the citadel Caius Persius, an active officer, with two thousand soldiers, who attacked them suddenly when widely dispersed and straggling about the fields; and after slaying them for a long time on all hands, drove the few that remained of so many into the city, to which they fled in alarm and confusion, and where they rushed in at the doors of the gates, which were half-opened that the city might not be taken in the same attack. In this manner affairs were equally balanced at Tarentum, the Romans being victorious by land, and the Tarentines by sea. Both parties were equally disappointed in their hope of receiving provisions after they were within sight.