On the approach of the Roman praetor, the Carthaginians retired from the territory of Nola and marched down to the sea close upon Naples, eager to get possession of a maritime town to which there would be a safe course for ships from Africa. But hearing that Naples was held by a Roman prefect, Marcus Junius Silanus, who had been invited thither by the Neapolitans themselves, he left Naples as he had left Nola, and directed his course to Nuceria, which he at length starved into capitulation, after having besieged it for a considerable time, often by open force, and often by soliciting to no purpose sometimes the commons, at other times the nobles; agreeing that they should depart with single garments and without arms. Then, as wishing to appear from the beginning to show lenity to all the inhabitants of Italy except the Romans, he proposed rewards and honours to those who might remain with him, and would be willing to serve with him. He retained none, however, by the hopes he held out; they all dispersed in different directions throughout the cities of Campania, wherever either hospitable connexions or the casual impulse of the mind directed them, but principally to Nola and Naples. About thirty senators, including as it happened all of the first rank, made for Capua; but being shut out thence, because they had closed their gates on Hannibal, they betook themselves to Cumae. The plunder of Nuceria was, given to the soldiery, the city sacked and burned. Marcellus continued to hold possession of Nola, relying not more from confidence in his own troops than from the favourable disposition of the leading inhabitants. Apprehensions were entertained of the commons, particularly Lucius Bantius, whose having been privy to an attempt at defection, and dread of the Roman praetor, stimulated sometimes to the betrayal of his country, at others, should fortune fail him in that undertaking, to desertion. He was a young man of vigorous mind, and at that time enjoying the greatest renown of almost any of the allied cavalry. Found at Cannae half dead amid a heap of slain, Hannibal had sent him home, after having had him cured, with the kindest attention, and even with presents. In gratitude for this favour, he had conceived a wish to put Nola under the power and dominion of the Carthaginian; but his anxiety and solicitude for effecting a change did not escape the notice of the praetor. However, as it was necessary that he should be either restrained by penal inflictions or conciliated by favours, he preferred attaching to himself a brave and strenuous ally, to depriving the enemy of him; and summoning him into his presence, in the kindest manner said, "that the fact that he had many among his countrymen who were jealous of him, might be easily collected from the circumstance that not one citizen of Nola had informed him how many were his splendid military exploits. But that it was impossible for the valour of one who served in the Roman camp to remain in obscurity; that many who had served with him had reported to him how brave a man he was, how often and what dangers he had encountered for the safety and honour of the Roman people; and how in the battle of Cannae he had not given over fighting till, almost bloodless, he was buried under a heap of men, horses, and arms which fell upon him. Go on then," says he, "and prosper in your career of valour, with me you shall receive every honour and every reward, and the oftener you be with me, the more you shall find it will be to your honour and emolument." He presented the young man, delighted with these promises, with a horse of distinguished beauty, ordered the quaestor to give him five hundred denarii, and commanded the lictors to allow him to approach him whenever he might please.
16
The violent spirit of the youth was so much soothed by the courteous treatment of Marcellus, that thenceforward no one of the allies displayed greater courage or fidelity in aiding the Roman cause. Hannibal being now at the gates, for he had moved his camp back again from Nuceria to Nola, and the commons beginning to turn their attention to revolt afresh, Marcellus, on the approach of the enemy, retired within the walls; not from apprehension for his camp, but lest he should give an opportunity for betraying the city, which too many were anxiously watching for. The troops on both sides then began to be drawn up; the Romans before the walls of Nola, the Carthaginians before their own camp. Hence arose several battles of small account between the city and the camp, with varying success, as the generals were neither willing to check the small parties who inconsiderately challenged the enemy, nor to give the signal for a general engagement. While the two armies continued to be thus stationed day after day, the chief men of the Nolans informed Marcellus, that conferences were held by night between the commons of Nola and the Carthaginians; and that it was fixed, that, when the Roman army had gone out at the gates, they should make plunder of their baggage and packages, then close the gates and post themselves upon the walls, in order that when in possession of the government and the city, they might then receive the Carthaginian instead of the Roman. On receiving this intelligence Marcellus, having bestowed the highest commendations on the senators, resolved to hazard the issue of a battle before any commotion should arise within the city. He drew up his troops in three divisions at the three gates which faced the enemy; he gave orders that the baggage should follow close by, that the servants, suttlers' boys, and invalids should carry palisades; at the centre gate he stationed the choicest of the legionary troops and the Roman cavalry, at the two gates on either side, the recruits, the light-armed, and the allied cavalry. The Nolans were forbidden to approach the walls and gates, and the troops designed for a reserve were set over the baggage, lest while the legions were engaged in the battle an attack should be made upon it. Thus arranged they were standing within the gates. Hannibal, who had waited with his troops drawn up in battle-array, as he had done for several days, till the day was far advanced, at first was amazed that neither the Roman army marched out of the gates, nor any armed man was to be seen on the walls, but afterwards concluding that the conferences had been discovered, and that they were quiet through fear, he sent back a portion of his troops into the camp, with orders to bring into the front line, with speed, every thing requisite for assaulting the city; satisfied that if he urged them vigorously while they were indisposed to action, the populace would excite some commotion in the city. While, in the van, the troops were running up and down in a hurried manner in discharge of their several duties, and the line was advancing up to the gates, suddenly throwing open the gate, Marcellus ordered that the signal should be given, and a shout raised, and that first the infantry and after them the cavalry should burst forth upon the enemy with all possible impetuosity. They had occasioned abundant terror and confusion in the centre of the enemy's line, when, at the two side gates, the lieutenant-generals, Publius Valerius Flaccus and Caius Aurelius, sallied forth upon the wings. The servants, suttlers' boys, and the other multitude appointed to guard the baggage, joined in the shout, so that they suddenly exhibited the appearance of a vast army to the Carthaginians, who despised chiefly their paucity of numbers. For my own part I would not take upon me to assert what some authors have declared, that two thousand eight hundred of the enemy were slain, and that the Romans lost not more than five hundred. Whether the victory was so great or not; it is certain that a very important advantage, and perhaps the greatest during the war, was gained on that day: for not to be vanquished by Hannibal was then a more difficult task to the victorious troops, than to conquer him afterwards.
17
When Hannibal, all hope of getting possession of Nola being lost, had retired to Acerrae, Marcellus, having closed the gates and posted guards in different quarters to prevent any one from going out, immediately instituted a judicial inquiry in the forum, into the conduct of those who had been secretly in communication with the enemy. He beheaded more than seventy who were convicted of treason, and ordered their foods to be confiscated to the Roman state; and then committing the government to the senate, set out with all his forces, and, pitching a camp, took up a position above Suessula. The Carthaginian, having at first endeavoured to win over the people of Acerrae to a voluntary surrender, but finding them resolved, makes preparations for a siege and assault. But the people of Acerrae had more spirit than power. Despairing therefore, of the defence of the city, when they saw their walls being circumvallated, before the lines of the enemy were completed, they stole off in the dead of night through the opening in the works, and where the watches had been neglected; and pursuing their course through roads and pathless regions, accordingly as design or mistake directed each, made their escape to those towns of Campania which they knew had not renounced their fidelity. After Acerrae was plundered and burnt, Hannibal, having received intelligence that the Roman dictator with the new-raised legions was seen at some distance from Casilinum, and fearing lest, the camp of the enemy being so near, something might occur at Capua, marched his army to Casilinum. At that time Casilinum was occupied by five hundred Praenestines, with a few Romans and Latins, whom the news of the defeat at Cannae had brought to the same place. These men setting out from home too late, in consequence of the levy at Praeneste not being completed at the appointed day, and arriving at Casilinum before the defeat was known there, where they united themselves with other troops, Romans and allies, were proceeding thence in a tolerably large body, but the news of the battle at Cannae them back to Casilinum. Having spent several days there in evading and concerting plots, in fear themselves and suspected by the Campanians, and having now received certain information that the revolt of Capua and the reception of Hannibal were in agitation, they put the townsmen to the sword by night, and seized upon the part of the town on this side the Vulturnus, for it is divided by that river. Such was the garrison the Romans had at Casilinum; to these was added a cohort of Perusians, in number four hundred and sixty, who had been driven to Casilinum by the same intelligence which had brought the Praenestines a few days before. They formed a sufficient number of armed men for the defence of walls of so limited extent, and protected on one side by the river. The scarcity of corn made them even appear too numerous.
18
Hannibal having now advanced within a short distance of the place, sent forward a body of Getulians under a commander named Isalca, and orders them in the first place, if an opportunity of parley should be given, to win them over by fair words, to open the gates, and admit a garrison; but, if they persisted in obstinate opposition, to proceed to action, and try if in any part he could force an entrance into the city. When they had approached the walls, because silence prevailed there appeared a solitude; and the barbarian, supposing that they had retired through fear, made preparation for forcing the gates and breaking away the bars, when, the gates being suddenly thrown open, two cohorts, drawn up within for that very purpose, rushed forth with great tumult, and made a slaughter of the enemy. The first party being thus repulsed, Maharbal was sent with a more powerful body of troops; but neither could even he sustain the sally of the cohorts. Lastly, Hannibal, fixing his camp directly before the walls, prepared to assault this paltry city and garrison, with every effort and all his forces, and having completely surrounded the city with a line of troops, lost a considerable number of men, including all the most forward, who were shot from the walls and turrets, while he pressed on and provoked the enemy. Once he was very near cutting them off, by throwing in a line of elephants, when aggressively sallying forth, and drove them in the utmost confusion into the town; a good many, out of so small a number, having been slain. More would have fallen had not night interrupted the battle. On the following day, the minds of all were possessed with an ardent desire to commence the assault, especially after a golden mural crown had been promised, and the general himself had reproached the conquerors of Saguntum with the slowness of their siege of a little fort situated on level ground; reminding them, each and all, of Cannae, Trasimenus, and Trebia. They then began to apply the vineae and to spring mines: nor was any measure, whether of open force or stratagem, unemployed against the various attempts of the enemy. These allies of the Romans erected bulwarks against the vineae, cut off the mines of the enemy by cross-mines, and met their efforts both covertly and openly, till, at last, shame compelled Hannibal to desist from his undertaking; and, fortifying a camp in which he placed a small guard, that the affair might not appear to have been abandoned, he retired into winter quarters to Capua. There he kept, under cover, for the greater part of the winter, that army, which, though fortified by frequent and continued hardships against every human ill, had yet never experienced or been habituated to prosperity. Accordingly, excess of good fortune and unrestrained indulgence were the ruin of men whom no severity of distress had subdued; and so much the more completely, in proportion to the avidity with which they plunged into pleasures to which they were unaccustomed. For sleep, wine, feasting, women, baths, and ease, which custom rendered more seductive day by day, so completely unnerved both mind and body, that from henceforth their past victories rather than their present strength protected them; and in this the general is considered by those who are skilled in the art of war to have committed a greater error than in not having marched his troops to Rome forthwith from the field of Cannae: for his delay on that occasion might be considered as only to have postponed his victory, but this mistake to have bereaved him of the power of conquering. Accordingly, by Hercules, as though he marched out of Capua with another army, it retained in no respect any of its former discipline; for most of the troops returned in the embrace of harlots; and as soon as they began to live under tents, and the fatigue of marching and other military labours tried them, like raw troops, they failed both in bodily strength and spirit. From that time, during the whole period of the summer campaign, a great number of them slunk away from the standards without furloughs, while Capua was the only retreat of the deserters.