Though this letter made at first a great impression on the senate, yet, as their interest in Italy was first and most important, they did not at all alter their resolution in relation to Hasdrubal and his troops. However, they despatched Himilco with a complete army, and an augmented fleet, to preserve and defend Spain both by sea and land. When he had conveyed over his land and naval forces, he fortified a camp; and having drawn his ships upon dry land, and surrounded them with a rampart, he marched with a chosen body of cavalry, with all possible expedition; using the same caution when passing through people who were wavering, and those who were actually enemies; and came up with Hasdrubal. As soon as he had informed him of the resolutions and orders of the senate, and in his turn been thoroughly instructed in what manner to prosecute the war in Spain, he returned to his camp; his expedition more than any thing else saving him, for he quitted every place before the people could conspire. Before Hasdrubal quitted his position he laid all the states in subjection to him under contribution. He knew well that Hannibal purchased a passage through some nations; that he had no Gallic auxiliaries but such as were hired; and that if he had undertaken so arduous a march without money, he would scarcely have penetrated so far as the Alps. For this reason, having exacted the contributions with great haste, he marched down to the Iberus. As soon as the Roman generals got notice of the Carthaginian senate's resolution, and Hasdrubal's march, they gave up every other concern, and uniting their forces, determined to meet him and oppose his attempt. They reflected, that when it was already so difficult to make head against Hannibal alone in Italy, there would be an end of the Roman empire in Spain, should Hasdrubal join him with a Spanish army. Full of anxiety and care on these accounts, they assembled their forces at the Iberus, and crossed the river; and after deliberating for some time whether they should encamp opposite to the enemy, or be satisfied with impeding his intended march by attacking the allies of the Carthaginians, they made preparations for besieging a city called Ibera, from its contiguity to the river, which was at that time the wealthiest in that quarter. When Hasdrubal perceived this, instead of carrying assistance to his allies, he proceeded himself to besiege a city which had lately placed itself under the protection of the Romans; and thus the siege which was now commenced was given up by them, and the operations of the war turned against Hasdrubal himself.
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For a few days they remained encamped at a distance of five miles from each other, not without skirmishes, but without going out to a regular engagement. At length the signal for battle was given out on both sides on one and the same day, as though by concert, and they marched down into the plain with all their forces. The Roman army stood in triple line; a part of the light troops were stationed among the first line, the other half were received behind the standards, the cavalry covering the wings. Hasdrubal formed his centre strong with Spaniards, and placed the Carthaginians in the right wing, the Africans and hired auxiliaries in the left. His cavalry he placed before the wings, attaching the Numidians to the Carthaginian infantry, and the rest to the Africans. Nor were all the Numidians placed in the right wing, but such as taking two horses each into the field are accustomed frequently to leap full armed, when the battle is at the hottest, from a tired horse upon a fresh one, after the manner of vaulters: such was their own agility, and so docile their breed of horses. While they stood thus drawn up, the hopes entertained by the generals on both sides were pretty much upon an equality; for neither possessed any great superiority, either in point of the number or quality of the troops. The feelings of the soldiers were widely different. Their generals had, without difficulty, induced the Romans to believe, that although they fought at a distance from their country, it was Italy and the city of Rome that they were defending. Accordingly, they had brought their minds to a settled resolution to conquer or die; as if their return to their country had hinged upon the issue of that battle. The other army consisted of less determined men; for they were principally Spaniards, who would rather be vanquished in Spain, than be victorious to be dragged into Italy. On the first onset, therefore, ere their javelins had scarcely been thrown, their centre gave ground, and the Romans pressing on with great impetuosity, turned their backs. In the wings the battle proceeded with no less activity; on one side the Carthaginians, on the other the Africans, charged vigorously, while the Romans, in a manner surrounded, were exposed to a twofold attack. But when the whole of the Roman troops had united in the centre, they possessed sufficient strength to compel the wings of the enemy to retire in different directions; and thus there were two separate battles, in both of which the Romans were decidedly superior, as after the defeat of the enemy's centre they had the advantage both in the number and strength of their troops. Vast numbers were slain on this occasion; and had not the Spaniards fled precipitately from the field ere the battle had scarce begun, very few out of the whole army would have survived. There was very little fighting of the cavalry, for as soon as the Moors and Numidians perceived that the centre gave way, they fled immediately with the utmost precipitation, leaving the wings uncovered, and also driving the elephants before them. Hasdrubal, after waiting the issue of the battle to the very last, fled from the midst of the carnage with a few attendants. The Romans took and plundered the camp. This victory united with the Romans whatever states of Spain were wavering, and left Hasdrubal no hope, not only of leading an army over into Italy, but even of remaining very safely in Spain. When these events were made generally known at Rome by letters from the Scipios, the greatest joy was felt, not so much for the victory, as for the stop which was put to the passage of Hasdrubal into Italy.
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While these transactions were going on in Spain, Petilia, in Bruttium, was taken by Himilco, an officer of Hannibal's, several months after the siege of it began. This victory cost the Carthaginians much blood and many wounds, nor did any power more subdue the besieged than that of famine; for after having consumed their means of subsistence, derived from fruits and the flesh of every kind of quadrupeds, they were at last compelled to live upon skins found in shoemakers' shops, on herbs and roots, the tender barks of trees, and berries gathered from brambles: nor were they subdued until they wanted strength to stand upon the walls and support their arms. After gaining Petilia, the Carthaginian marched his forces to Consentia, which being less obstinately defended, he compelled to surrender within a few days. Nearly about the same time, an army of Bruttians invested Croton, a Greek city, formerly powerful in men and arms, but at the present time reduced so low by many and great misfortunes, that less than twenty thousand inhabitants of all ages remained. The enemy, therefore, easily got possession of a city destitute of defenders: of the citadel alone possession was retained, into which some of the inhabitants fled from the midst of the carnage during the confusion created by the capture of the city. The Locrians too revolted to the Bruttians and Carthaginians, the populace having been betrayed by the nobles. The Rhegians were the only people in that quarter who continued to the last in faithful attachment to the Romans, and in the enjoyment of their independence. The same alteration of feeing extended itself into Sicily also; and not even the family of Hiero altogether abstained from defection; for Gelo, his oldest son, conceiving a contempt for his father's old age, and, after the defeat of Cannae, for the alliance with Rome, went over to the Carthaginians; and he would have created a disturbance in Sicily, had he not been carried off, when engaged as arming the people and soliciting the allies, by a death so seasonable that it threw some degree of suspicion even upon his father. Such, with various result, were the transactions in Italy, Africa, Sicily, and Spain during this year. At the close of the year, Quintus Fabius Maximus requested of the senate, that he might be allowed to dedicate the temple of Venus Erycina, which he had vowed when dictator. The senate decreed, that Tiberius Sempronius, the consul elect, as soon as ever he had entered upon his office, should propose to the people, that they should create Quintus Fabius duumvir, for the purpose of dedicating the temple. Also, in honour of Marcus Aemilius Lepidus, who had been consul twice and augur, his three sons, Lucius, Marcus, and Quintus exhibited funeral games and twenty-two pairs of gladiators for three days in the forum. The curule aediles, Caius Laetorius, and Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus consul elect, who during his aedileship had been master of the horse, celebrated the Roman games, which were repeated for three days. The plebeian games of the aediles, Marcus Aurelius Cotta and Marcus Claudius Marcellus, were thrice repeated. At the conclusion of the third year of the Punic war, Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus the consul entered upon his office on the ides of March. Of the praetors, Quintus Fulvius Flaccus, who had before been consul and censor, had by lot the city jurisdiction; Marcus Valerius Laevinus, the foreign. Sicily fell to the lot of Appius Claudius Pulcher; Sardinia to Quintus Mucius Scaevola. The people ordered that Marcus Marcellus should be in command as proconsul, because he was the only Roman general who had been successful in his operations in Italy since the defeat at Cannae.
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