The tyrant also, with the view of cutting off any supplies that might be brought to the besieged by sea, had fitted out a small squadron, consisting of only three ships of war, with some barks and cutters, as his former fleet had been given up to the Romans, according to the treaty. In order to try the activity of these vessels, as they were then new, and, at the same time, to have every thing in fit condition for a battle, he put out to sea every day, and exercised both the rowers and marines in mock-fights; for he thought that all his hopes of succeeding in the siege depended on the circumstance of his cutting off all supplies by sea. The praetor of the Achaeans, in respect of skill for conducting operations on land, was equal to any of the most celebrated commanders both in capacity and experience, yet with naval affairs he was quite unacquainted. Being an inhabitant of Arcadia, an inland country, he was ignorant even of all foreign affairs, excepting that he had once served in Crete as commander of a body of auxiliaries. There was an old ship of four banks of oars, which had been taken eighty years before, as it was conveying Nicaea, the wife of Craterus, from Naupactum to Corinth. Led by the reputation of this ship, for it had formerly been reckoned a very famous vessel when in the king's fleet, he ordered it, though now quite rotten, and falling asunder through age, to be brought out from Aegium. The fleet sailed with this ship at its head, Tiso of Patrae, the commander, being on board it, when the ships of the Lacedaemonians from Gythium came within view. At the first shock, against a new and firm vessel, that old one, which before admitted the water through every joint, was shattered to pieces, and the whole crew were made prisoners. On the loss of the commander's ship, the rest of the fleet fled as fast as each could by means of its oars. Philopoemen himself made his escape in a light advice-boat, nor did he stop his flight until he arrived at Patrae. This untoward event did not in the least damp the spirit of a man so well versed in military affairs, and who had experienced so many vicissitudes of fortune. On the contrary, as he had failed of success in the naval line, in which he had no experience, he even conceived, thence, the greater hopes of succeeding in another, wherein he had acquired knowledge; and he affirmed, that he would quickly put an end to the tyrant's rejoicing.
27
Nabis, being both elated by this adventure, and entertaining a confident hope that he had not now any danger to apprehend from the sea, resolved to shut up the passages on the land also, by parties stationed in proper posts. With this view, he drew off a third part of his forces from the siege of Gythium, and encamped them at Pleiae, a place which commands both Leucae and Acriae, on the road by which the enemy's army seemed likely to advance. While his quarters were here, and very few of his men had tents, (the generality of them having formed huts of reeds interwoven, and which they covered with leaves of trees, to serve merely as a shelter,) Philopoemen, before he came within sight, resolved to surprise him by an attack of such a kind as he did not expect. He drew together some small ships in a remote creek, on the coast of the territory of Argos, and embarked on board them a body of light-armed soldiers, mostly targeteers, furnished with slings, javelins, and other light kinds of weapons. He then coasted along the shore, until he came to a promontory near Nabis's post. Here he landed; and made his way, by night, through paths with which he was well acquainted, to Pleiae, and while the sentinels were fast asleep, as being in no immediate apprehension, he set fire to the huts in every part of the camp. Great numbers perished in the flames before they could discover the enemy's arrival, and those who did discover it could give no assistance; so that nearly the whole was destroyed by fire and sword. From both these means of destruction, however, a very small number made their escape, and fled to the principal camp before Gythium. The enemy having been thus smitten with disaster, Philopoemen forthwith led on his forces to ravage the district of Tripolis, a part of the Lacedaemonian territory, lying next to the frontiers of the Megalopolitans, and carrying off thence a vast number of men and cattle, withdrew before the tyrant could send a force from Gythium to protect the country. He then collected his whole force at Tegea, to which place he summoned a council of the Achaeans and their allies; at which were present, also deputies from the Epirots and Acarnanians. Here it was resolved, that as the minds of his men were now sufficiently recovered from the shame of the disgrace suffered at sea, and those of the enemy dispirited, he should march directly to Lacedaemon; for he considered that by this measure alone could the enemy be drawn off from the siege of Gythium. On entering the enemy's country, he encamped the first day at Caryae; and, on that very day, Gythium was taken. Ignorant of that event, Philopoemen advanced to the Barbosthenes, a mountain ten miles from Lacedaemon. On the other side, Nabis, after taking possession of Gythium, set out, at the head of a body of light troops, marched hastily by Lacedaemon, and seized on a place called the Camp of Pyrrhus, which post he did not doubt that the Achaeans intended to occupy. From thence he proceeded to meet the enemy. From the length of their train in consequence of the narrowness of the road, they spread over a space of almost five miles. The line was closed by the cavalry and the greatest part of the auxiliaries, because Philopoemen expected that the tyrant would attack him in the rear with his mercenary troops, in whom he placed his principal confidence. Two unforeseen circumstances at once filled him with uneasiness: one, the post at which he aimed being pre-occupied; the other, the enemy having met him in front, where, as the road lay through very uneven ground, he did not see how the battalions could advance without the support of the light troops.
28
Philopoemen was possessed of an admirable degree of skill and experience, in conducting a march, and choosing his station; having made these points his principal study, not only in times of war, but likewise during peace. Whenever he was making a journey to any place and came to a defile where the passage was difficult, it was his practice, first, to examine the nature of the ground on every side. When journeying alone, he meditated within himself; if he had company, he asked them, "If an enemy should appear in that place, what course ought he to adopt, if they should attack him in front; what, if on this flank, or on that; what, if on the rear; for he might happen to meet them while his men were formed with a regular front, or when they were in the loose order of march, fit only for the road." He would proceed to examine, either in his own mind, or by asking questions, "What ground he himself would choose; what number of soldiers, or what kind of arms (which was a very material point) he ought to employ; where he should deposit the baggage, where the soldiers' necessaries, where the unarmed multitude; with what number and what kind of troops he should guard them, and whether it would be better to prosecute his march as intended, or to return back by the way he came; what spot, also, he should choose for his camp; how large a space he should enclose within the lines; where he could be conveniently supplied with water; where a sufficiency of forage and wood could be had; which would be his safest road on decamping next day, and in what form the army should march?" In such studies and inquiries he had, from his early years, so frequently exercised his thoughts, that, on any thing of the kind occurring, no expedient that could be devised was new to him. On this occasion, he first ordered the army to halt; then sent forward to the van the auxiliary Cretans, and the horsemen called Tarentines, each leading two spare horses; and, ordering the rest of the cavalry to follow, he seized on a rock which stood over a rivulet, from which he might be supplied with water. Here he collected together all the baggage with all the suttlers and followers of the army, placing a guard of soldiers round them; and then he fortified his camp, as the nature of the place required. The pitching of tents in such rugged and uneven ground was a difficult task. The enemy were distant not more than five hundred paces. Both drew water from the same rivulet, under escorts of light troops; but, before any skirmish took place, as usual between men encamped so near to each other, night came on. It was evident, however, that they must, unavoidably, fight next day at the rivulet, in support of the watering parties. Wherefore, during the night, Philopoemen concealed, in a valley remote from the view of the enemy, as great a number of targeteers as the place was capable of hiding.
29
At break of day, the Cretan light infantry and the Tarentine horse began an engagement on the bank of the rivulet. Telemnastus, a Cretan, commanded his countrymen; Lycortas of Megalopolis, the cavalry. The enemies' watering party also was guarded by Cretan auxiliaries and Tarentine horsemen. The fight was, for a considerable time, doubtful, as the troops on both sides were of the same kind and armed alike; but as the contest advanced, the tyrant's auxiliaries gained an advantage, both by their superiority of numbers, and because Philopoemen had given directions to his officers, that, after maintaining the contest for a short time they should betake themselves to flight, and draw the enemy on to the place of the ambuscade. The latter, pursuing the runaways, in disorderly haste, through the valley, were most of them wounded and slain, before they discovered their concealed foe. The targeteers had posted themselves in such order, as far as the breadth of the valley allowed, that they easily gave a passage to their flying friends, through openings in their ranks; then starting up themselves, hale, fresh, and in regular order, they briskly attacked the enemy, whose ranks were broken, who were scattered in confusion, and were, besides, exhausted with fatigue and wounds. The victory was no longer doubtful; the tyrant's troops instantly turned their backs, and flying with much more precipitation than they had pursued, were driven into their camp. Great numbers were killed and taken in the pursuit; and the consternation would have spread through the camp also, had not Philopoemen ordered a retreat to be sounded; for he dreaded the ground (which was rough and dangerous to advance on without caution) more than he did the enemy. Judging, both from the issue of the battle and from the disposition of the enemy's leader, in what apprehension he then was, he sent to him one of the auxiliary soldiers in the character of a deserter, to assure him positively, that the Achaeans had resolved to advance, next day, to the river Eurotas, which runs almost close to the walls, in order to intercept his way, so that the tyrant could have no retreat to the city when he required it, and to prevent any provisions being brought thence to the camp; and that they intended, at the same time, to try whether any could be prevailed on to desert his cause. Although the deserter did not gain entire credit, yet he afforded to one, who was full of apprehensions, a plausible pretext for leaving his camp. On the day following, he ordered Pythagoras, with the auxiliaries and cavalry, to mount guard before the rampart; and then, marching out himself with the main body of the army, as if intending to offer battle, he ordered them to return with all haste to the city.