The consuls, on departing from the city in different directions, had drawn the attention of the public, as it were, to two wars at once, while they called to mind the disasters which Hannibal's first coming had brought upon Italy, and at the same time, tortured with anxiety, asked themselves what deities would be so propitious to the city and empire as that the commonwealth should be victorious in both quarters at once. Hitherto they had been enabled to hold out to the present time by compensating for their misfortunes by their successes. When the Roman power was laid prostrate at the Trasimenus and at Cannae in Italy, their successes in Spain had raised it up from its fallen condition. Afterwards, when in Spain one disaster after another had in a great measure destroyed two armies, with the loss of two distinguished generals, the many successes in Italy and Sicily had, as it were, afforded a haven for the shattered state; and the mere interval of space, as one war was going on in the remotest quarter of the world, gave them time to recover their breath. Whereas now two wars were received into Italy; two generals of the highest renown were besetting the Roman city; while the whole weight of the danger and the entire burden pressed upon one point. Whichever of these generals should be first victorious, he would in a few days unite his camp with the other. The preceding year also, saddened by the deaths of two consuls, filled them with alarm. Such were the anxious feelings with which the people escorted the consuls on their departure to their provinces. It is recorded that Marcus Livius, still teeming with resentment against his countrymen, when setting out to the war, replied to Fabius, who warned him not rashly to come to an action till he had made himself acquainted with the character of his enemy, that as soon as ever he had got sight of the troops of the enemy he would engage them. When asked what was his reason for such haste, he said, "I shall either obtain the highest glory from conquering the enemy, or the greatest joy from the defeat of my countrymen, a joy which they have deserved, though it would not become me." Before the consul Claudius arrived in his province, Caius Hostilius Tubulus, attacking Hannibal with his light cohorts while marching his army through the extreme borders of the territory of Larinum into that of Sallentum, caused terrible confusion in his unmarshalled troops; he killed as many as four thousand, and captured nine military standards. Quintus Claudius, who had his camps distributed through the towns of the Sallentine territory, had quitted his winter quarters on hearing of the enemy; and Hannibal, fearing on that account lest he should have to engage with two armies at once, decamped by night, and retired from the Tarentine to the Bruttian territory. Claudius turned his army to the Sallentine territory. Hostilius, on his way to Capua, met the consul Claudius at Venusia. Here forty thousand infantry and two thousand five hundred horse were selected from both armies, with which the consul might carry on the war against Hannibal. The rest of the troops Hostilius was directed to march to Capua to deliver them over to Quintus Fulvius, proconsul.
41
Hannibal, having drawn together his forces from all quarters, both those which he had in winter quarters, and those which he had in the garrisons of the Bruttian territory, came to Grumentum in Lucania, with the hope of regaining the towns which through fear had revolted to the Romans. To the same place the Roman consul proceeded from Venusia, exploring the way as he went, and pitched his camp about fifteen hundred paces from the enemy. The rampart of the Carthaginians seemed almost united with the walls of Grumentum, though five hundred paces intervened. Between the Carthaginian and Roman camps lay a plain; and overhanging the left wing of the Carthaginians and the right of the Romans were some naked hills, which were not objects of suspicion to either party, as they had no wood upon them, nor any hiding-places for an ambuscade. In the plain which lay between them skirmishes hardly worth mentioning took place between parties sallying from the outposts. It was evident that what the Roman aimed at was to prevent the enemy from going off, while Hannibal, who was desirous of escaping thence, came down with all his forces, and formed in order of battle. Upon this the consul, imitating the crafty character of his enemy, ordered five cohorts, with the addition of five maniples, to pass the summit by night and sit down in the valleys on the opposite side; a measure to which he was prompted the more strongly in proportion as he felt that there could exist no suspicion of an ambuscade in hills so uncovered. Of the time for rising up from their retreat and of falling upon the enemy he informed Tiberius Claudius Asellus, a military tribune, and Publius Claudius, praefect of the allies, whom he sent with them. The general himself, at break of day, drew out all his forces, both foot and horse, for battle. Shortly after, the signal for battle was given out by Hannibal, and a noise was raised in the camp, from the troops running hastily to arms; then both horse and foot eagerly rushed through the gates, and spreading themselves over the plain, hastened to the enemy. The consul perceiving them thus disordered, gave orders to Caius Aurunculeius, a military tribune of the third legion, to send out the cavalry of the legion to charge the enemy with all possible vehemence, for that the enemy had spread themselves like cattle in such disorder throughout the whole plain, that they might be knocked down and trampled under foot before they could be formed.
42
Hannibal had not yet gone out of the camp, when he heard the shout of his troops engaged; and thus roused by the alarm, he hastily led his forces against the enemy. Already had the Roman horse spread terror through the Carthaginian van; the first legion also of the infantry and the right wing were commencing the action, while the troops of the Carthaginians, in disorder, engaged just as chance threw each in the way of horse or foot. The battle became more general by reinforcements, and the number of those who ran out to the combat. Hannibal, amid the terror and confusion, would have drawn up his troops while fighting, (which would not have been an easy task unless to a veteran general with veteran soldiers,) had not the shouts of the cohorts and maniples, running down from the hills, which was heard in their rear, created an alarm lest they should be cut off from their camp. After this they were seized with a panic, and a flight commenced in every part; but the number slain was less, because the nearness of the camp offered to the terrified troops a shorter distance to fly. For the cavalry hung upon their rear, and the cohorts, running down the declivities of the hills by an unobstructed and easy path, charged them transversely in flank. However, above eight thousand men were slain, above seven hundred made prisoners, and eight military standards taken. Of the elephants also, which had been of no use in such a sudden and irregular action, four were killed and two captured. The conquerors lost about five hundred Romans and allies. The following day the Carthaginian remained quiet. The Roman having led out his troops into the field, when he saw that no one came out to meet him, gave orders that the spoils of those of the enemy who were slain should be collected, and that the bodies of his own men should be gathered into one place and buried. After this, for several days following in succession, he came up so near the enemy's gates that he almost seemed to be carrying in his standards. But at length Hannibal at the third watch, leaving a number of fires and tents in that part of the camp which faced the enemy, and also a few Numidians who might show themselves in the rampart and the gates, decamped and proceeded towards Apulia. As soon as it dawned, the Roman army came up to the trenches, and the Numidians, according to the plan concerted, took care to show themselves for a little time on the rampart and in the gates; and having deceived the enemy for some time, rode off at full speed, and overtook their friends on their march. The consul, when all was silence in the camp, and he could now no where see even the few who at break of day had walked up and down, sent two horsemen in advance to reconnoitre; and after he had ascertained that all was safe enough, ordered his troops to march in; and after staying there only while his men distributed themselves for plunder, sounded a retreat and led back his forces long before night. The next day he set out as soon as it was light, and following the rumour and the track of the enemy by forced marches, came up with them not far from Venusia. Here also an irregular battle took place, in which two thousand of the Carthaginians were slain. The Carthaginian quitting this place made for Metapontum, marching by night and over mountainous districts in order to avoid a battle. Thence Hanno, who commanded the garrison of that place, was sent into Bruttium with a small party to raise a fresh army. Hannibal, after adding his forces to his own, went back to Venusia by the same route by which he came, and proceeded thence to Canusium. Nero had never quitted the enemy's steps, and when he himself went to Metapontum, had sent for Quintus Fulvius into Lucania, lest that region should be left without protection.
43