Meanwhile four Gallic horsemen and two Numidians, who were sent to Hannibal with a letter from Hasdrubal, after he had retired from the siege of Placentia, having traversed nearly the whole length of Italy through the midst of enemies, while following Hannibal as he was retiring to Metapontum, were taken to Tarentum by mistaking the roads; where they were seized by some Roman foragers, who were straggling through the fields, and brought before the proprietor, Caius Claudius. At first they endeavoured to baffle him by evasive answers, but threats of applying torture being held out to them, they were compelled to confess the truth; when they fully admitted that they were the bearers of a letter from Hasdrubal to Hannibal. They were delivered into the custody of Lucius Virginius, a military tribune, together with the letter sealed as it was, to be conveyed to the consul Claudius. At the same time two troops of Samnites were sent with them as an escort. Having made their way to the consul, the letter was read by means of an interpreter, and the captives were interrogated; when Claudius, coming to the conclusion that the predicament of the state was not such as that her generals should carry on the war, each within the limits of his own province, and with his own troops, according to the customary plans of warfare, and with an enemy marked out for him by the senate, but that some unlooked for and unexpected enterprise must be attempted, which, in its commencement, might cause no less dread among their countrymen than their enemies, but which, when accomplished, might convert their great fear into great joy, sent the letter of Hasdrubal to Rome to the senate; and at the same time informed the conscript fathers what his intentions were; and recommended that, as Hasdrubal had written to his brother that he should meet him in Umbria, they should send for the legion from Capua to Rome, enlist troops at Rome, and oppose the city forces to the enemy at Narnia. Such was his letter to the senate. Messengers were sent in advance through the territory of Larinum, Marrucia, Frentana, and Praetutia, where he was about to march his army, with orders that they should all bring down from their farms and towns to the road-side provisions ready dressed for the soldiers to eat; and that they should bring out horses and other beasts of burden, so that those who were tired might have plenty of conveyances. He then selected the choicest troops out of the whole army of the Romans and allies, to the amount of six thousand infantry and one thousand horse; and gave out that he intended to seize on the nearest town in Lucania and the Carthaginian garrison in it, and that they should all be in readiness to march. Setting out by night he turned off towards Picenum, and making his marches as long as possible, led his troops to join his colleague, having left Quintus Catius, lieutenant-general, in command of the camp.
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At Rome the alarm and consternation were not less than they had been two years before, when the Carthaginian camp was pitched over against the Roman walls and gates; nor could people make up their minds whether they should commend, or censure, this so bold march of the consul. It was evident that the light in which it would be viewed would depend upon its success; than which nothing can be more unfair. They said, "that the camp was left near to the enemy, Hannibal, without a general, and with an army from which all the flower and vigour had been withdrawn; and that the consul had pretended an expedition into Lucania, when he was in reality going to Picenum and Gaul, leaving his camp secured only by the ignorance of the enemy, who were not aware that the general and part of his army were away. What would be the consequence if that should be discovered, and Hannibal should think proper either to pursue Nero with his whole army, who had gone off with only six thousand armed men, or to assault the camp, which was left as a prey for him, without strength, without command, without auspices?" The disasters already experienced in the war, the deaths of two consuls the preceding year, augmented their fears. Besides, all these events had occurred "when there was only one general and one army of the enemy in Italy; whereas now they had two Punic wars, two immense armies, and in a manner two Hannibals in Italy, inasmuch as Hasdrubal was descended from the same father, Hamilcar, was a general equally enterprising, having been trained in a Roman war during so many years in Spain, and rendered famous by a double victory, having annihilated two armies with two most renowned generals. For he could glory even more than Hannibal himself, on account of the celerity with which he had effected his passage out of Spain, and his success in stirring up the Gallic nations to arms, inasmuch as he had collected an army in those very regions in which Hannibal lost the major part of his soldiers by famine and cold, the most miserable modes of death." Those who were experienced in the events which had occurred in Spain, added, that "he would not have to engage with Caius Nero, the general, as an unknown person, whom, when accidentally caught in a difficult defile, he had eluded and baffled like a little child, by drawing up fallacious terms of peace." Under the dictation of fear, which always puts the worst construction upon things, they magnified all the advantages which the enemy possessed, and undervalued their own.
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45. When Nero had got such a distance from the enemy that his plan might be disclosed without danger, he briefly addressed his soldiers, observing, that "there never was a measure adopted by any general which was in appearance more daring than this, but in reality more safe. That he was leading them on to certain victory. For as his colleague had not set out to prosecute the war which he conducted, until forces both of horse and foot had been assigned to him by the senate to his own satisfaction, and those greater and better equipped than if he had been going against Hannibal himself, that they would, by joining him, however small the quantity of force which they might add, completely turn the scale. That when it was only heard in the field of battle (and he would take care that it should not be heard before) that another consul and another army had arrived, it would insure the victory. That rumour decided war; and that the most inconsiderable incidents had power to excite hope and fear in the mind. That they would themselves reap almost the entire glory which would be obtained if they succeeded, for it was invariably the case that the last addition which is made is supposed to have effected the whole. That they themselves saw with what multitudes, what admiration, and what good wishes of men their march was attended." And, by Hercules, they marched amid vows, prayers, and commendations, all the roads being lined with ranks of men and women, who had flocked there from all parts of the country. They called them the safeguards of the state, the protectors of the city and empire of Rome. They said that the safety and liberty of themselves and their children were treasured up in their arms and right hands. They prayed to all the gods and goddesses to grant them a prosperous march, a successful battle, and a speedy victory over their enemies; and that they might be bound to pay the vows which they had undertaken in their behalf; so that as now they attended them off with anxiety, go after a few days' interval they might joyfully go out to meet them exulting in victory. Then they severally and earnestly invited them to accept, offered them, and wearied them with entreaties, to take from them in preference to another, whatever might be requisite for themselves or their cattle. They generously gave them every thing in abundance, while the soldiers vied with each other in moderation, taking care not to accept any thing beyond what was necessary for use. They did not make any delay nor quit their ranks when taking food; they continued the march day and night, scarcely giving as much to rest as was necessary to the requirements of the body. Messengers were also despatched in advance to his colleague, to inform him of his approach, and to ask whether he wished that he should come secretly or openly, by day or night, whether they should lodge in the same or different camps. It appeared most advisable that they should come into the camp secretly by night.
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A private signal was sent through the camp by the consul Livius, that each tribune should receive a tribune, each centurion a centurion, each horseman a horseman, each foot-soldier a foot-soldier; for it was not expedient that the camp should be enlarged, lest the enemy should discover the arrival of the other consul, while the crowding together of several persons, who would have their tents in a confined place, would be attended with less inconvenience, because the army of Claudius had brought with them on their expedition scarcely any thing except their arms. Claudius, on the very march, had augmented his numbers by volunteers; for not only veteran soldiers, who had completed their period of service, but young men also offered themselves without solicitation; and, as they vied with each other in giving in their names, he had enlisted those whose personal appearance and bodily strength seemed fit for military service. The camp of the other consul was near Sena, and Hasdrubal's position was about five hundred paces from it. Nero, therefore, when he was now drawing near, halted under cover of the mountains, in order that he might not enter the camp before night. Having entered when all was still, they were severally conducted into their tents by the men of their own description, where they were hospitably entertained with the utmost joy on the part of all. The next day a council was held, at which Lucius Porcius Licinus, the praetor, was present. He had his camp joined to that of the consuls, and before their arrival, by leading his army along the heights, sometimes occupying narrow defiles that he might intercept his passage, at other times harassing his troops while marching by attacking their flank or rear, he had baffled the enemy by all the arts of war. This man was, on the present occasion, one of the council. Many inclined to the opinion that an engagement should be deferred till Nero had recruited his soldiers, who were weary with marching and watching, and had employed a few days in acquiring a knowledge of his enemy. Nero urged, not only by persuasion, but with the most earnest entreaties, "that they would not render rash by delay that measure of his which despatch had made safe. That Hannibal, who lay in a state of torpid inactivity in consequence of a delusion which would not continue long, had neither attacked his camp, left as it was without a leader, nor had directed his course in pursuit of him. That the army of Hasdrubal might be annihilated, and he might retire into Apulia before he stirred a step. The man who by delay gave time to the enemy both betrayed the camp to Hannibal, and opened a way to him into Gaul, so that he might effect a junction with Hasdrubal at his leisure, and when he pleased. That they ought to give the signal for battle instantly, and march out into the field, and take advantage of the delusion of their enemies present and absent, while neither those were aware that they had fewer, nor these that they had more and stronger forces to encounter." On the breaking up of the council the signal for battle was displayed, and the troops immediately led into the field.