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The Carthaginians were already standing before their camp in battle-array. This circumstance delayed the battle: Hasdrubal, who had advanced before the line with a few horsemen, remarked some old shields among the enemy, which he had not seen before, and some horses leaner than the rest their numbers also appeared greater than usual. Suspecting therefore, what was really the case, he hastily sounded a retreat, and sent a party to the river from which they got their water, where some of them might be intercepted, and notice taken whether there were perchance any there whose complexions were more than ordinarily sun-burnt, as from a recent march. At the same time he ordered a party to ride round the camp at a distance, and note whether the rampart was extended in any part, and also observe whether the signal sounded once or twice. Having received a report of all these particulars, the fact of the camp's not being enlarged led him into error. There were now two camps, as there were before the other consul arrived, one belonging to Marcus Livius, the other to Lucius Porcius, and to neither of them had any addition been made to give more room for the tents. But the veteran general, who was accustomed to a Roman enemy, was much struck by their reporting that the signal sounded once in the praetor's camp, and twice in the consul's; there must therefore be two consuls, and felt the most painful anxiety as to the manner in which the other had got away from Hannibal. Least of all could he suspect, what was really the case, that he had got away from Hannibal by deceiving him to such an extent, as that he knew not where the general was, and where the army whose camp stood opposite to his own. Surely, he concluded, deterred by a defeat of no ordinary kind, he has not dared to pursue him; and he began to entertain the most serious fears that he had himself come too late with assistance, now that affairs were desperate, and lest the same good fortune attended the Roman arms in Italy which they had experienced in Spain. Sometimes he imagined that his letter could not have reached him, and that, it having been intercepted, the consul had hastened to overpower him. Thus anxious and perplexed, having put out the fires, he issued a signal at the first watch to collect the baggage in silence, and gave orders to march. In the hurry and confusion occasioned by a march by night, their guides were not watched with sufficient care and attention. One of them stopped in a place of concealment which he had beforehand fixed upon in his mind, the other swam across the river Metaurus, at a ford with which he was acquainted. The troops, thus deserted by their guides, at first wandered up and down through the fields; and some of them, overpowered with sleep, and fatigued with, watching, stretched themselves on the ground here and there, leaving their standards thinly attended. Hasdrubal gave orders to march along the bank of the river until the light should discover the road; but, pursuing a circuitous and uncertain course along the turnings and windings of that tortuous river, with the intention of crossing it as soon as the first light should discover a place convenient for the purpose he made but little progress; but wasting the day in a fruitless attempt to discover a ford, for the further he went from the sea the higher he found the banks which kept the river in its course, he gave the enemy time to overtake him.
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First Nero arrived with the whole body of his cavalry, then Porcius came up with him, with the light infantry. And while these were harassing his weary troops on every side, and charging them, and the Carthaginian, stopping his march, which resembled a flight, was desirous of encamping on an eminence, on the bank of the river, Livius came up with all his foot forces, not after the manner of troops on march, but armed and marshalled for immediate action. When they had united all their forces, and the line was drawn out, Claudius took the direction of the battle in the right wing, Livius in the left; the management of the centre was given to the praetor. Hasdrubal, when he saw that an engagement was inevitable, giving over the fortification of a camp, placed his elephants in the front line, before the standards; on either side these he placed in the left wing the Gauls to oppose Claudius, not so much from any confidence he reposed in them, as because he believed them to be dreaded by the enemy; the right wing he took to himself against M. Livius, together with the Spaniards, in whom, as being veteran troops, he placed his greatest hopes. Behind the elephants, in the centre, the Ligurians were posted; but his line was rather long than deep. The Gauls were covered by a hill, which extended in front. That part of the line which was occupied by the Spaniards, engaged the left wing of the Romans, the whole of whose right wing, extending beyond the line of battle, was unengaged. The hill before them prevented their making an attack either in front or flank. Between Livius and Hasdrubal a furious contest arose, and the slaughter on both sides was dreadful. Here were both generals, here the major part of the Roman horse and infantry, here the Spaniards, veteran troops, and experienced in the Roman manner of fighting, and the Ligurians, a nation inured to war. The elephants were also driven to the same place which, on the first onset, disordered the van, and had made even dislodged the standards; but afterwards, the contest growing hotter, and the shout increasing, they became less submissive to their riders, and ranged to and fro between the two lines, as if not knowing to which side they belonged, like ships floating about without rudders. Claudius, when he had striven in vain to advance up the hill, repeatedly calling out to his soldiers, "To what purpose then have we performed so long a march with such expedition?" when he found it impossible to make his way to the enemy in that quarter, withdrawing several cohorts from the right wing, where he saw they would occupy an inactive station, rather than join in the fight, led them round the rear of the line, and, to the surprise not only of the enemy but his own party, charged their right flank; and such was their rapidity, that after showing themselves on their flank, they almost immediately made an attack on their rear. Thus on all sides, in front, flank, and rear, the Spaniards and Ligurians were cut to pieces; and now the carnage had even reached the Gauls. Here the least opposition was found; for a great number of them had quitted their standards, having slunk off during the night, and laid themselves down to sleep up and down the fields, while even those who were present, being tired with marching and watching, for their bodies are most intolerant of fatigue, could scarcely carry their arms upon their shoulders. And now it was mid-day, and thirst and heat gave them over to the enemy to be killed or captured in multitudes.
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More elephants were killed by their guides than by the enemy. They used to have with them a workman's knife, with a mallet. When these beasts began to grow furious, and attack their own party, the rider, placing this knife between the ears, just on the joint by which the neck is connected with the head, used to drive it in, striking it with all the force he could. This was found to be the most expeditious mode of putting these bulky animals to death, when they had destroyed all hope of governing them. This method was first practised by Hasdrubal, a general whose conduct both frequently on other occasions, and especially in this battle, deserved to be recorded. By encouraging the men when fighting, and sharing equally in every danger, he kept up the battle. Sometimes by entreating, at other times by rebuking, the troops, when tired and indisposed to fight from weariness and over-exertion, he rekindled their spirits. He called back the flying, and restored the battle in many places when it had been given up. At length, when fortune decidedly declared for the Romans, lest he should survive so great an army which had been collected under the influence of his name, he put spurs to his horse and rushed upon a Roman cohort, where he fell fighting, as was worthy of the son of Hamilcar and the brother of Hannibal. At no time during that war were so many of the enemy slain in one battle; so that a defeat equal to that sustained at Cannae, whether in respect of the loss of the general or the troops, was considered to have been retorted upon him. Fifty-six thousand of the enemy were slain, five thousand four hundred captured. The other booty was great, both of every other kind, and also of gold and silver. In addition to the rest, there were recovered above four thousand Roman citizens, who had been taken by the enemy, which formed some consolation for the soldiers lost in that battle. For the victory was by no means bloodless. Much about eight thousand of the Romans and the allies were slain; and so completely were even the victors satiated with blood and slaughter, that the next day, when Livius the consul received intelligence that the Cisalpine Gauls and Ligurians, who had either not been present at the battle or had made their escape from the carnage, were marching off in one body without a certain leader without standards, without any discipline or subordination; that if one squadron of horse were sent against them they might be all destroyed, he replied, "Let some survive to bear the news of the enemy's losses and of our valour."
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